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THE SEC AND THE COURTS' APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE
OF EARNINGS PROJECTIONS, ASSET APPRAISALS,




One of the basic goals of the federal securities laws is to provide
investors with full and fair disclosure of significant information con-
cerning the securities in which they invest.' Yet for years one type
of information potentially of great relevance to investors was almost
totally excluded from the disclosure schemes embodied in the Se-
curities Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 pri-
* Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1974; J.D., University of Michigan Law School,
1977. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims re-
sponsibility for any private publication or statement of any of its employees. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission or of the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission. This article is
dedicated to Vernon and Jane Hiler.
1. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982) (preamble) ("An Act
to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and
foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof");
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982) ("[T]ransactions in securi-
ties as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets
are affected with the national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for
regulation and control of such transactions ... including ... to insure the maintenance
of fair and honest markets in such transactions."). See also HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION , ch.
XIX, at 556-60 (Comm. print No. 95-29, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 REPORT] (discussing
disclosure philosophy behind federal securities legislation).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982) [hereinafter Securities Act]. The primary pur-
pose of the Securities Act, as noted in the preamble, see supra note 1, is to provide for
disclosure of firm-oriented information concerning securities sold to the public. The
disclosure scheme of the Securities Act is accomplished through the requirement that a
registration statement containing specified information be filed with the SEC prior to
the offer or sale, and be "in effect" prior to the sale, of nonexempt securities in nonex-
empt transactions. See Securities Act §§ 5-7, and schedules A and B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-
77g (setting forth the requirement to file a registration statement, § 5, and the content
of such statement, § 7 and schedules A and B); Securities Act §§ 3-4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-
77d (exempting certain securities and certain transactions from registration). The SEC
has adopted disclosure requirements for the various forms of registration statements
which it has promulgated under the Securities Act, in addition to the specific require-
ments set forth in § 7 and schedules A and B of the Act. These requirements, as to the
content of the nonfinancial or textual portions of registration statements, are set forth in
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marily because of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
policy. Until recently the SEC prohibited the inclusion in filings of
most "soft information," a term that is used to refer generally to
certain predictive information, such as earnings projections or asset
appraisals.
This SEC prohibition on soft information disclosure was based
primarily on the perception that such information, calling for sub-
jective judgments, was inherently unreliable, and on the concomi-
regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 to -.502 (1986), as incorporated by whatever form is
applicable, and in interpretative releases and disclosure guides. The content of financial
statements that must be included in registration statements generally is governed by
regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 to .12-29 (1986), various interpretative releases,
and generally accepted accounting principles [hereinafter GAAP]. See, e.g., Accounting
Series Release Nos. 4 ("Administrative Policy on Financial Statements"), 150 ("General
Revision of Regulation S-X") (discussing the roles of the SEC and the accounting pro-
fession in establishing accounting principles), and 280 ("Statement of Policy and Estab-
lishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and Standards"), AccouNTING
SERIES RELEASES (CCH) (1981). For a general background discussion of the operation
and premise of the Securities Act disclosure system, see 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, ch.
XIX, at 566-72.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [hereinafter Exchange Act]. The basic firm-ori-
ented disclosure scheme of the Exchange Act is designed to provide continuous periodic
disclosure by issuers whose securities are widely held or are traded in the securities
markets. Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), requires issuers with
securities registered pursuant to § 12 of the Exchange Act to file periodic reports with
the SEC. Section 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d), requires issuers who have issued securities
pursuant to a Securities Act registration statement within the prior year to file the peri-
odic reports required by § 13(a) for at least one year, if they are not already subject to
those requirements by virtue of a § 12 registration. The form and content of filings
under § 13 are also governed by regulation S-K and by regulation 12B, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b-1 to -37 (1986), as made applicable through the particular filing form in-
volved. Financial statements are governed by regulation S-X, interpretative releases,
and GAAP. Rules and regulations governing the content of proxy solicitations and re-
quiring information statements to be filed with the Commission and sent to securities
holders in the absence of a solicitation of proxies for a scheduled shareholders meeting
have been adopted pursuant to § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a). See
SEC regulations 14A, 14E, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l to -102, § 240.14e-1 to -3. Filings are
also required when other persons or, in some cases, the issuer takes some action with
respect to the issuer or its securities.
Specifically, filings are required:(1) in connection with the acquisition of beneficial ownership of equity securities
registered pursuant to § 12 of the Exchange Act, see Exchange Act § 13(d), (f), (g), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f), (g); SEC regulation 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 to -102;(2) in connection with tender offers for securities registered pursuant to § 12, see
§ 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d); SEC regulation 14D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.141-1 to -101;
(3) in connection with certain issuer "going private" transactions and issuer
tender offers, see § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e); and
(4) when a majority of the directors of the issuer are to be elected or designated
pursuant to agreement in certain specified transactions, see § 14(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f).
See also 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. XIX, at 573-617 (discussing the Exchange
Act disclosure system existing at the time).
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tant fear that unsophisticated investors would fail to appreciate the
uncertainty that soft information involves. But market analysts and
other professionals concerned with securities disclosure long have
argued that certain soft information is necessary and highly relevant
to informed investment decisions. As a result, the SEC's policy on
disclosure of soft information has undergone significant revision
over the last ten years.
This article first will explore the SEC's changing policy con-
cerning disclosure of soft information, particularly earnings projec-
tions and asset appraisals, and the judicial response to these views.
The second part of the article will discuss the various sources of a
duty to disclose soft information under the federal securities laws
and will present a proposed standard for determining the material-
ity of soft information.
II. THE SEC AND THE COURTS' APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE OF
SoFr INFORMATION
A. Early SEC Focus on Predictions of Future Economic Performance in
the Securities Registration Process
The term "soft information" has been used to refer generally to
information about a particular issuer or its securities that inherently
involves some subjective analysis or extrapolation, such as projec-
tions, estimates, opinions, motives, or intentions.4 While it has been
pointed out that much of what is considered "hard" (historical or
factual) information-either required or permitted to be included in
filings with the SEC-contains elements of subjectivity,5 what has
been excluded from those filings as soft information seems to be
distinguishable by the degree of subjectivity involved or the extent
4. See, e.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972) (noting that soft information includes "future earnings, ap-
praised asset valuations and other hypothetical data"); 1977 Report, supra note 1, at D-
14 (citing as examples of soft information: "opinions, predictions, analyses and other
subjective evaluations"); Schneider, Nits, Grits and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 254, 255 (1972) [hereinafter Schneider, Nits] (listing various categories of
soft information).
5. See Earnings Projections; Rule 14a-9, Securities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,202 n.3 (Apr. 23, 1976)
(listing examples of future oriented information required in SEC filings at that time);
Fiflis, Soft Information: The SEC's Former Exogenous Zone, 26 UCLA L. REV. 95, 97-98 n.7
(1978) (listing numerous types of soft information then required in SEC filings); Mann,
Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against Permitting
Projections, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222, 231-32 (1971) (discussing "numerous aspects of
audited financial statements [which] are implicitly based on projections."); Schneider,
Nits, supra note 4, at 256-57.
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to which objective verification is possible.6
The SEC developed its traditional policy against disclosure of
soft information primarily in the context of considering what consti-
tuted appropriate disclosure in registration statements filed under
the Securities Act. 7 Early in its history the SEC determined that po-
6. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 5, at 231-32 ("[A]n analysis of material required or
permitted to be included in prospectuses indicates that the distinction between fact and
prognostication is more easily stated than applied .... ); Schneider, Soft Information
Disclosures: A Semi-Revolution, 1984 INST. ON SEC. REG., at 20 [hereinafter Schneider, Semi-
Revolution] ("The hard-soft dichotomy is a matter of degree."). Consider, however, the
view that "there is a difference almost of kind rather than mere degree between attempt-
ing to project future earnings and the estimations that admittedly are involved in such
current accounting determinations as estimated bad debts or depreciation." Herwitz,
Projections and Forecasts, 1973 INST. ON SEC. REG. 119, 127-28. Herwitz explained, for
example, that the "hardness" of the otherwise subjective estimate of bad debt reserves
was due to the experience of the issuer and others in its industry and, as to depreciation, a
supposedly rational allocation system that has developed under generally accepted ac-
counting principles. Id. at 326. These explanations, however, suggest that any per-
ceived "difference of kind" between certain types of soft and hard information may be
based on the development of experience in dealing with the latter type of information
and, thus, on the development of acceptable assumptions or reference points for draw-
ing the subjective conclusions on which the information is based. See, e.g., Schneider,
Semi-Revolution, supra, at 32-33 (noting that the SEC's current policy of encouraging or
requiring certain soft information disclosures may have come about, in part, because
"once the Commission and the courts became accustomed to dealing with soft informa-
tion in Williams Act filings, it was a normal transition to apply a similar approach to
other types of disclosure documents .... "). The Williams Act of 1968 added to the
Exchange Act provisions, which, among other things, require certain disclosures in situ-
ations involving potential change of control of an issuer. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e),
78n(d), (e), (f) (1982). See also Gormly, Financial Forecasts: Problems and Considerations, 6
SEC. REG. LJ. 32, 39-40 (1968) ("It has been pointed out that conventional financial
statements embody many estimates that are not unlike forecasts, except that the rules
governing them have been developed through experience....") (citing Kripke, The SEC,
The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1197-1201 (1970)
[hereinafter Kripke, Myths]).
7. See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act
Release No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at
82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973) ("It has been the Commission's long-standing policy generally not
to permit projections to be included in prospectuses and reports filed with the Commis-
sion."); SEC DISCLOSURE GROUP, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF FED-
ERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 95-96 (1969) [hereinafter
WHEAT REPORT] (discussing policy against including projections and predictions in re-
ports filed with the SEC and concluding that policy should not be changed); 1977 RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 347-55 (surveying SEC position on disclosure of "soft
information" and recommending that the policy be changed to one encouraging the
disclosure of management projections and other forward-looking or soft information.)
See generally Fiflis, supra note 5 (discussing SEC view and then-current recommendations
to change that policy); Gormly, supra note 6 (surveying SEC's and courts' view of finan-
cial projections); Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus.
LAw. 300 (1961) (discussing SEC's disclosure philosophy in general and its application
to specific categories of soft information); Mann, supra note 5 (discussing reasons under-
lying SEC's policy concerning disclosure of projections in prospectuses); Schneider,
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tential investors should be given only objectively verifiable facts
from which they in turn could extrapolate any relevant forward-
looking information.' The overriding interest was in protecting new
investors from overreaching by persons willing to make unfounded
predictions of success and value in what are essentially selling
documents.9
In this context the SEC was concerned that inclusion in pro-
spectuses of predictions of future economic performance, such as
projections of an issuer's sales and earnings or of the future value of
its securities, would lead to undue reliance by investors who would
tend to attribute an unjustifiable degree of certainty to any state-
ment contained in a filing reviewed by the SEC, regardless of cave-
ats."0 This fear was exacerbated by the potential for manipulation
Semi-Revolution, supra note 6 (surveying SEC's prior and current views and case law);
Schneider, The SEC's Evolving Attitude Toward Soft Information in SEC Filings, 1979 INST. ON
SEC. REG. 176-95; Schneider, Nits, supra note 4 (discussing SEC's policy and suggesting
basis for change in the policy); Address by SEC Chairman Casey, National Investors
Relations Institute (Oct. 3, 1972), at 2-4, quoted in Schneider, Nits, supra note 4, at 268
n.46.
The Commission's current policy concerning disclosure of financial projections is
set forth at 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1986). See infra note 32.
8. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 96 ("It has been the Commission's long-
standing policy not to permit projections and predictions in prospectuses and reports
filed with the Commission. Such documents are designed to elicit material facts. Their
factual character is widely recognized. Investors and their advisors are at liberty to make
their own projections based on the disclosures resulting from the Commission's require-
ments."); see also Heller, supra note 7, at 307 ("[T]he Securities Act . . . is interested
exclusively in facts. Conjectures and speculations as to the future are left by the Act to
the investor on the theory that [the investor] is as competent as anyone to predict the
future from the given facts.").
9. See, e.g., Kripke, Myths, supra note 6, at 1188-89, 1197 n. 189 ("[O]ver the years,
we have encountered an unscrupulous fringe among promoters whose predictions are
pretty far out. We do not want them going [public] under [the SEC's] auspices.") (quot-
ing Phillip Loomis, the Commission's General Counsel at the time); Schneider, Semi-
Revolution, supra note 6, at 28; Schneider, Nits, supra note 4, at 258-59, 264 ("The tradi-
tional [SEC] practice has been oriented toward the potential new investor, and reflects a
policy judgment that it is highly important to protect [the investor] against buying a
security which is worse than [the investor] thinks, but relatively less important to protect
[the investor] against missing a favorable opportunity.").
10. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7, at 96 ("A real danger exists, in the Study's judg-
ment, that projections appearing in prospectuses and other documents filed under the
securities laws and reviewed by the Commission would be accorded a greater measure of
validity by the unsophisticated than they would deserve."); 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, at
348 (referring to soft information: "The Commission has excluded certain types of in-
formation from SEC filings for fear that such information, although useful and impor-
tant to knowledgeable constituents of the investment community, might be
misunderstood and unduly relied upon by unsophisticated investors."); Heller, supra
note 7, at 307 ("[A]ttempts by companies to predict future earnings ... have almost
invariably been held by the Commission to be misleading because they suggest to the
1118 [VOL. 46:1114
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of such information by those creating the data, and by the difficulty
of SEC and judicial review of information not objectively verifiable.
An inconsistency is apparent in this reasoning. The premise
that investors are only interested in hard facts from which they are
capable of drawing their own conclusions about an issuer's future
prospects assumes a high degree of investor sophistication and rela-
tively equal access to information or skilled analysis. Conversely, the
concern that potential investors would misinterpret or place undue
reliance on such information assumes away a certain level of sophis-
tication. Since the SEC initially directed its disclosure policy at the
unsophisticated investor, I" it resolved this conflict by prohibiting
the feared disclosure. Over time, however, it became increasingly
difficult to justify the exclusion of certain soft information from SEC
filings, especially earnings projections, when market professionals
and individual investors alike viewed it as essential to informed in-
vestment decisions. 12
investor a competence and authority which in fact does not exist."); Schneider, Nits,
supra note 4, at 258. See also Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400,
408-09 (N.D. Il. 1964) ("Bold statements contrary to concrete and historic fact run the
risk of ready refutation and exposure, and to that degree are self-policing. Predictions,
estimates, and opinions are more elusive and may present graver dangers of misleading
the investing public."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9 n.8, Radol v.
Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985) (in opposition to petition for certiorari) (describ-
ing SEC's traditional position), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986).
11. See 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, ch. X, at 348; Fiflis, supra note 5, at 105; Heller,
supra note 7, at 301 n.6.
12. See, e.g., 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, at 349 ("The investor's task is to assess fu-
ture earning power of the corporation."); Heller, supra note 7, at 304-10 (admitting that
the "intrinsic value" of an investment depends upon future earnings, but arguing
against disclosure of projections); Herwitz, supra note 6, at 127 ("[F]uture prospects are
the real key to the present value of securities .... "); Libby & Rollinson, Securities Law of
Materiality as It May Relate to "Optional" Publication of Projections, 31 Bus. LAw. 701 (1976)
("The single most important aspect of any securities investment is the prospect of earn-
ings."); Schneider, Nits, supra note 4, at 259 ("the Commission's view does not deny
either the relevance of soft information in making investment decisions, or the fact that
soft information is used extensively"); LORIE AND HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEO-
RIES AND EVIDENCE 113-22 (1973) (discussing the primacy of earnings in determining the
value of an issuer's securities).
Prior to the SEC's policy change, various commentators undertook to refute the
basis for the SEC's position or to mollify its concerns. In addition to the issues of unreli-
ability, ease of manipulation, undue investor reliance, and difficulty of review, other ar-
guments presented were that requiring or permitting projections would be excessively
costly or cause competitive injury to issuers and that the potential liability from inaccu-
rate projections could cause management to be unduly conservative. These arguments
eventually were overcome and will not be discussed at any length in this article. For a
discussion of these issues, see generally Herwitz, supra note 6; Mann, supra note 5;
Schneider, Aits, supra note 4; Note, Disclosure of Future Oriented Information Under the Securi-
ties Laws, 88 YALE L.J. 338 (1978).
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Moreover, because issuers generally were not prohibited from
public disclosure of soft information in press releases or other
materials, it soon became evident that the availability of information
such as earnings projections outside of, while prohibited in, SEC
public disclosure documents could cause an imbalance in investor
access to information.' 3 In such an environment the unsophistica-
ted investor, whom the SEC sought to protect by its policy against
disclosure of soft information, would be the most likely to suffer. 14
B. The SEC's Policy Shift on Disclosure of Predictions
of Economic Performance
Ironically, while the SEC's policy against soft information dis-
closure focused on the perceived unreliability of predictive informa-
tion such as earnings projections, the obvious significance of such
information to investors made it the focal point of a reevaluation of
that policy. In 1972 the SEC initiated public rulemaking proceed-
ings to consider specific issues regarding the use of "estimates, fore-
casts or projections of earnings and revenues . . . ."11 In 1973, as a
result of hearings, the SEC issued a statement that it had deter-
mined that "changes in its present policies with regard to the use of
projections would assist in the protection of investors and would be
in the public interest."' 6 The SEC discussed the importance of such
information to investors as follows:
13. See Fiflis, supra note 5, at 97 (noting use of soft information outside of prospec-
tuses and other SEC filings); Mann, supra note 5, at 226-27, 229-30 (same); Schneider,
Nits, supra note 4, at 259-60 (same).
In its 1973 release concerning the use of projections, the Commission recognized
that projections were "widespread" in the securities markets but expressed concern
"that all investors do not have equal access to this material information." Securities Act
Release No. 5362, supra note 7, at 82,667 (emphasis added).
14. This concern may be even more justifiable today in light of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In that case, the Court adopted a
rule in an insider trading case that allows insiders to disclose material, nonpublic corpo-
rate information selectively without violating the antifraud provisions, as long as the
insider does not personally benefit from the disclosure. Id. at 654-61. See generally Hiler,
Dirks v. SEC: A Study in Cause and Effect, 43 MD. L. REV. 292 (1984). The overriding
rationale for the Court's opinion is that market efficiency is advanced by allowing ana-
lysts and other market professionals access to such information. Thus, while the courts
still generally deny shareholder claims that certain soft information should have been
disclosed to them in connection with various transactions affecting their investment, see
cases cited infra notes 51-53, the same information may be viewed as subject to selective
disclosure under Dirks.
15. Public Proceedings in the Matter of Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Eco-
nomic Performance, Exchange Act Release No. 9844, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,075, at 82,322 (Nov. 1, 1972).
16. Securities Act Release No. 5362, supra note 7, at 82,667.
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The Commission recognizes that projections are currently
widespread in the securities markets and are relied upon in
the investment process. Persons invest with the future in
mind and the market value of a security reflects the judg-
ments of investors about the future economic performance
of the issuer. Thus projections are sought by all investors,
whether institutional or individual. 1 7
The Commission also announced its intention to adopt standards to
govern disclosure of projections in filings, including prospectuses,
but declared that it had determined "not to require issuers to gener-
ate or disclose projections."' 8
The policy transition that began with the 1973 release was slow
in development. A series of rule and form proposals in 1975 relat-
ing to permissive disclosure of certain soft information' 9 were with-
drawn in 1976 after unfavorable public comment. 20 In the 1976
release withdrawing the proposal,2 1 the SEC instead issued a policy
statement in which it recognized that its long standing policy gener-
ally not to permit projections in Commission filings may have acted
as an impediment to what it admitted was widespread investor inter-
est in obtaining "management's assessment of future perform-
ance." 22 In the absence of a more specific proposal, the SEC stated
that it would not object to disclosure of projections in filings if made
in good faith with a reasonable basis.23 The SEC was careful to note
17. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Securities Act Release No. 5581, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,167, at 85,300 (Apr. 28, 1975).
20. The 1975 release proposed a complex system for, in effect, continuous disclo-
sure of projections once voluntarily undertaken. It provided for disclosure of underly-
ing assumptions and for comparison with actual results. One commentator summarized
the public criticism of the rule as involving "such things as an excessively broad defini-
tion of projection, the obvious illusory character of the supposed safe harbor against
liability, and the complex cycle of filings and refilings .... " Gormly, supra note 6, at 42.
21. Adoption of Amendment to Rule 14a-9 and Withdrawal of Other Proposals, Se-
curities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,461 (Apr. 23, 1976).
22. Id. at 86,202.
23. Id. The Commission also noted that the projections must be "presented in a
reasonable format and accompanied by information adequate for investors to make their
own judgments." Id. This is a modification of the strict 1975 proposal, which specifi-
cally would have required disclosure of material assumptions underlying the projection.
The 1976 policy statement left this issue open to interpretation. As with the 1975 pro-
posal, the 1976 policy statement referred only to projections of future economic per-
formance. The Commission also published for comment proposed Guides expressing
its Division of Corporation Finance's views on disclosure of projections in Securities Act
and Exchange Act filings.
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that it was neither encouraging nor discouraging such disclosure.2"
It also amended the note to rule 14a-9 under the Exchange Act 25 by
deleting "earnings" and "dividends" from the list, in that note, of
information that it considered potentially misleading if included in
proxy statements.26
In 1978, in response to recommendations of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Corporate Disclosure, 27 the SEC issued a statement en-
couraging disclosure of management projections both in filings with
the SEC and in general. 28 This policy shift was based in part on the
24. Id.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, note (a) (1986).
26. Securities Act Release No. 5699, supra note 21, at 86,201, 86,203. Rule 14a-9
prohibits false or misleading statements in proxy solicitation materials. The rule and
note presently read, in pertinent part:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any
statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a
proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or mis-
leading.
Note: The following are some examples of what, depending upon particu-
lar facts and circumstances, may be misleading within the meaning of this sec-
tion.
(a) Predictions as to specific future market values.
(b) Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or
personal reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning im-
proper, illegal or immoral conduct or associations, without factual foundation.
(c) Failure to so identify a proxy statement, form of proxy and other
soliciting material as to clearly distinguish it from the soliciting material of any
other person or persons soliciting for the same meeting or subject matter.
(d) Claims made prior to a meeting regarding the results of a solicitation.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1986).
27. The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure was appointed on Feb. 2,
1976. See Solicitation of Public Comments by Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclo-
sure, Securities Act Release No. 5707, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,531, at 86,374 (May 18, 1976). The result of its work, the 1977 REPORT,
supra note 1, was issued November 3, 1977. Among other things, the Advisory Commit-
tee recommended that the SEC "encourage issuers to publish forward-looking and ana-
lytical information," and that it adopt a safe harbor rule "to provide maximum incentive
for disclosure of management projections and other forward-looking information,
whether or not filed with the Commission." 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, ch. X, at 344.
28. Guides for Disclosure of Projections for Future Economic Performance, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,756
(Nov. 7, 1978). The SEC had issued a preliminary response to the 1977 REPORT, supra
note 1, in February 1978. Preliminary Response of the Commission, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5906, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,505 (Feb. 15,
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"significance attached to projection information and the prevalence
of projections in the corporate and investment community .... 29
At the same time the SEC also proposed a safe harbor rule covering
disclosure of "projections of future economic performance," such
as earnings and dividends.3 ' A final rule was adopted in 1979.31 It
provides a safe harbor based essentially on the standard recognized
in judicial decisions prior to that time, that a projection made in
good faith and with a reasonable basis will not be actionable under
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.32
1978). In Securities Act Release No. 5992, the SEC also revised and authorized publica-
tion of the Division Guides proposed in Securities Act Release No. 5699, supra note 21.
In those guides the Division noted that projections should be made in good faith with a
reasonable basis, presented in an appropriate format with accompanying disclosure that
"should facilitate investor understanding of the basis for and limitations of projections."
Securities Act Release No. 5992, supra, at 81,036. In this regard, although the Division
did not take the position that projections disclosed without assumptions are per se mis-
leading, id. at 81,038 n. 19, it stated its belief that disclosure of at least the most signifi-
cant assumptions underlying a projection enhances investor understanding. Id. at
81,038.
29. Securities Act Release No. 5992, supra note 28, at 81,037. The SEC noted its
agreement with the Advisory Committee that "the availability of forward-looking and
analytical information is important to an investor's assessment of a corporation's future
earning power and may be material to informed investment decisionmaking." Id. at
81,036 (citing the 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, at 349-50).
30. Proposed Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 5993,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,757, at 81,041 (Nov. 7, 1978).
31. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117 (July 2, 1979) (adopting Exchange Act rule
3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1986), and Securities Act rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175
(1986)).
32. Securities Act Release No. 6884, supra note 31, at 38,814. See cases cited infra
notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing the prevailing judicial standard for judg-
ing the accuracy of projections).
The SEC's proposed safe harbor rule would have covered only projections of reve-
nues, income (loss), earnings (loss) per share, or other financial items. Securities Act
Release No. 5993, supra note 30, at 81,041. The final safe harbor rule covered "forward-
looking statements," defined to mean statements concerning (i) projections of revenues,
income (loss), earnings (loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital struc-
ture, or "other financial items"; (ii) management's plans and objectives for future opera-
tions; (iii) future economic performance contained in the then-required management's
discussion and analysis of the summary of earnings; and (iv) assumptions underlying or
relating to such statements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(c) (1986). The rule has been amended
on several occasions to comport with the SEC's integrated disclosure system and to add
several categories of "information" not otherwise included within the definition of "for-
ward-looking statements" to its coverage, including statements of "the value of proved
oil and gas reserves ... presented voluntarily or pursuant to Item 302 of Regulation S-K
.... " 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(b)(ii)(2). These added categories of information may only
be disclosed in documents "filed" with the Commission. Id. As to the defined types of
"forward-looking information," the rule applies to statements of such information that
are included in documents filed with the Commission, subsequent affirmations of such
statements, or statements made prior to a filing that are reaffirmed in a filed document
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C. Judicial Approaches to Disclosure of Predictions
of Future Economic Performance
1. Early Decisions.-During the period in which disclosure of
earnings projections was prohibited in SEC filings, judicial decisions
in the area generally involved claims that (1) dissemination of earn-
ings projections in press releases or otherwise outside of SEC filings
violated the antifraud provisions of the securities laws because the
projections were false or misleading,33 or (2) failure to disclose
earnings projections violated the antifraud provisions by rendering
some disclosure misleading.3 4
The early leading cases involving the claim that projections
were false or misleading were Dolgow v. Anderson 5 and Marx v. Com-
puter Sciences Corp. 6 Those cases recognized that earnings projec-
tions can be "facts" for purposes of the antifraud provisions,37 but
within a reasonable time after the making of the statement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(b).
The SEC rejected the Advisory Committee's suggestion that the rule apply to statements
outside of filings because the SEC wished to ensure that there was equitable disclosure
of such information. The SEC's present policy on soft information, which, as enunciated
in the safe-harbor release, encourages the disclosure of specified soft information pursu-
ant to the safe-harbor rule, is set forth in § 229.10 of regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10,
which took the place of Guide 62, under the SEC's integrated disclosure system. See
Adoption of Integrated Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6383, [Accounting Series
Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328 (Mar. 16, 1982).
33. Various antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws make it unlawful in
various circumstances "to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading .... See SEC rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10-5 (1986). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated under § 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) [hereinafter § 10b] to cover any statements made
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security and using jurisdictional means,
i.e., interstate commerce. See infra notes 79-80. For further examples of similar prohibi-
tions, see Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) ("the offer or sale of any
security" using jurisdictional means); Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77n() (state-
ments made in connection with any tender offer); SEC rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9
(proxy soliciting materials); SEC rule 12b-70, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (requiring Ex-
change Act filings to contain all material information necessary to make required state-
ments not misleading). See also Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (providing
for private rights of action against various persons for misstatements or omissions in
registration statements effective under the Securities Act); Securities Act § 12(2), 17
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982) (providing private rights of action against persons offering or
selling securities through use of interstate commerce by means of prospectus or oral
communication containing misstatements or omissions).
34. See supra note 33.
35. 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(claim under rule lOb-5).
36. 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974) (claim under rule lOb-5).
37. Id. at 489 (citing G&M, Inc. v. Newbern, 488 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1973)). In New-
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that they are not actionable as false statements simply because they
eventually prove inaccurate.3" This follows because such statements
bern the court rejected the argument that representations as to future earnings were not
actionable under rule l0b-5 because they were mere opinion. See also Priest v. Zayre
Corp., Civ. Action No. 86-2411-7 slip op. (D. Mass May 1, 1987) (letter to shareholders
contained "combination of specific projections and factual assertions that, if proved in-
accurate, are sufficiently material" to support an antifraud claim); King v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,176 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 1987) (deny-
ing motion to dismiss claim, among others, that earnings predictions by brokerage firm
employees were fraudulent); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823, 829 (S.D.
Cal. 1975) ("a forecast, essentially a prediction, may be regarded as a 'fact' within the
meaning of [rule] 10b-5") (both King and Eichen citing Marx and Newbern).
Cases dealing with predictions as to earnings or future value by broker-dealer firms
or their employees also established that opinions and predictions can be actionable
under the antifraud provisions. E.g., Gottreich v. San Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d
866, 867 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that purportedly expert predictions as to future price
of shares "may constitute misstatements of material facts and brokers may be subject to
liability for making them") (citing Max and Newbern); Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 114-
15 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring) (discussing SEC's theory that broker-dealers
must have adequate basis for estimates and predictions regarding an issuer's earning or
future stock value). The theory in such cases is that "when a broker-dealer goes into
business (hangs out his 'shingle') he impliedly represents that he will deal fairly and
competently with his customers and that he will have an adequate basis for any state-
ments or recommendations which he makes concerning securities." R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 553 (5th ed. 1982).
Arguably, regardless of whether the speaker has a preexisting relationship or duty
to deal fairly with shareholders or investors, the antifraud provisions, which themselves
create an obligation to speak truthfully in certain contexts, e.g., in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, see supra note 33, concomitantly can supply the implicit
representation that estimates are made in good faith and have a reasonable basis, at least
when the speakers should reasonably expect--due to the circumstances under which
they are speaking, such as when they purport to have special knowledge of an issuer or
special expertise-that investors will rely on them. See, e.g., Rose v. Arkansas Valley
Envtl. & Utility Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1100, 1206-08 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (discussing duty to
speak truthfully and finding complaint sufficient to state action under § 10(b) for attor-
ney's opinion letter concerning legality of bonds being issued; noting that "[s]ince this is
not a true non-disclosure situation, a separate, pre-existing relationship of 'trust and
confidence' is not required.") (emphasis in original). But see id. at 1206 n.38 (warning
that "it is clear that where there was no reason for the defendant to know or believe that
his statements would be communicated to or relied upon by the securities purchaser or
seller, he has no 'duty' to that person") (citation omitted); cf. First Virginia Bankshares v.
Benson, 559 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 592 (1978); Gottreich, 552
F.2d at 867; Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., [1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,899 (S.D.N.Y.) (refusing class certification and noting little likelihood of
success on claim that news publication's own estimate of an issuer's earnings was delib-
erately inaccurate or recklessly prepared), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
38. Marx, 507 F.2d at 489-90; Dolgow, 53 F.R.D. at 670, 678-79 (denying class certifi-
cation for lack of substantial possibility that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits; find-
ing that projections that proved inaccurate were "reasonable and sound" and accurately
reflected the issuer's "best estimates of its future prospects"). See also Goldman v.
Belden, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,492, at 96,862 (Aug.
11, 1983) ("Economic prognostication, though faulty, does not, without more, amount to
fraud.")(quoting Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 11, 117 (2d Cir. 1982)
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are predictive; therefore, the only truly factual elements involved in
a projection are the implicit representations that the statements are
made in good faith and with a reasonable basis.3 9 Thus, when a de-
fendant can show that it has fulfilled those representations, the
courts generally find that the projection was not "false" at the time
it was disseminated.4 °
What constitutes a "reasonable basis" and to what extent the
facts or assumptions underlying or bearing on the accuracy of the
projection must be disclosed to avoid rendering that projection mis-
leading present more difficult questions. On the question of reason-
able basis, in Dolgow the court found that various optimistic
predictions, including a projection of record earnings, were not
false or misleading at the time issued even though the issuer eventu-
ally reported an almost ten-percent decline in earnings. 4' In reach-
(emphasis added)); REA Express, Inc. v. Interway Corp., 410 F. Supp. 192, 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("the mere fact that a forecast is inaccurate does not make it fraudu-
lent.") (citing 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10B-5, § 513, at 98
(1974)); Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("an earning forecast is
not actionable merely because the facts do not turn out as predicted")
39. Marx, 507 F.2d at 490 (projection constitutes representation that it is an "in-
formed and reasonable belief" and "implies a reasonable method of preparation and a
valid basis"); id. at 490 n.7 ("the sole factual elements of a projection should be that it
represents management's view, that it was reached in a reasonable fashion and that it is a
sincere view") (citing Kripke, Myths, supra note 6, at 1199); REA Express, 410 F. Supp. at
196 ("projections must be regarded ... as a representation that [at the time issued] it
was the informed, reasonable and sincere belief [of management]").
40. Newbern, 488 F.2d at 745-46 ("a reasoned and justified statement of opinion ...
is not actionable"); Connellan v. Himelhoch, 506 F. Supp. 1290, 1299 (E.D. Mich.
1981); Dolgow, 53 F.R.D. at 670, 678-79; Schuller v. Slick Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,065 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1975). But see Beecher, 374 F.
Supp. at 348 (finding projections false and misleading because of failure to disclose as-
sumptions and other data; requiring "high standard of care" and factual basis such that
investor would conclude that projections were "highly probable" to be realized). See
also Fiflis, supra note 5, at 118-27 (discussing good faith and reasonable basis standard).
When the SEC adopted a safe harbor rule in 1979 for predictions of future economic
performance, it incorporated a similar standard. See supra text accompanying note 32.
It is now settled that some degree of scienter is required for violations of certain
antifraud provisions. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (intentional or knowing
conduct required for violation of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 and for § 17(a)(l) but not
§ 17(a)(2)-(3) of the Securities Act). Thus, there necessarily will be some interplay be-
tween the "good faith" standard for projections and the scienter requirement when an
action is brought under the antifraud provisions. Of course, if the basis or method of
preparation of the projection is sufficiently unreasonable, that may be an indication of
recklessness. See, e.g., Marx, 507 F.2d at 490 (noting that the untruthfulness of a state-
ment is "inextricably linked" with the scienter requirement of rule lOb-5); Rose, 562 F.
Supp. at 1207 (noting that if a defendant states something for which there is "so little
basis for an honest belief," the scienter standard under rule lob-5 may be satisfied).
41. Dolgow, 53 F.R.D. at 685. The main issue discussed in the opinion was denial of
class certification. See supra note 38.
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ing this conclusion the court found that the projection was based on
"carefully prepared and extensively reviewed internal docu-
ments."4 2 The documentation resulted from an ongoing and well-
established budget review process. Although it is not clear that all
projections would have to be based on as thorough and ongoing a
process as that which the court described at some length in Dolgow,
it appears that the court considered it very important that the dis-
closed projections did not differ from internal information and doc-
umentation.43 Indeed, in Marx, in which an issuer only attained
forty-one percent of its prior forecast, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant
because "a jury .. .could reasonably find that [the defendant], by
ignoring facts seriously undermining the accuracy of the forecast,
failed to meet the duty imposed by § 10(b)." 4 4 The Ninth Circuit
held, in part, that a jury could find that the failure to disclose at the
time of the optimistic forecast "facts indicating that [the issuer] was
in serious financial trouble . . ." was a material omission.45
In general, underlying assumptions or facts should be disclosed
if material to an accurate understanding of the projection or if they
represent a material qualification of the projection.46 It is also clear
42. Id. at 678.
43. See id. at 670 ("It is not true that the 'internal data... did not justify the issuance
of forecasts of substantial earnings gains.' "), 678 (estimates were consistent with, and
"fairly and accurately reflected, internal documents").
44. Marx, 507 F.2d at 490.
45. Id. at 492. The holding that the lack of additional factual disclosure could be a
material omission apparently was separate from the holding that a jury could also rea-
sonably find on the facts presented that the forecast, regardless of additional factual
disclosure, was an " 'untrue statement of a material fact,' actionable under Rule lOb-5
. . Id. In this regard, perhaps it is significant that the court noted that from its
inception, the issuer's principal product had not met internal projections. Id. at 488.
Although the court found nothing in the record proving intentional misconduct, it ex-
pressed concern that the projections may have lacked a reasonable basis in light of the
negative experience of the issuer with its product. Id. at 490.
46. Id. at 490-91 (finding that § 10(b) requires disclosure of facts seriously under-
mining accuracy of forecasts, but noting that an issuer "need not detail every corporate
event ... which has or might have some effect upon the accuracy of its earnings fore-
cast"); Keinnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (failure to discover
facts undermining prediction of return on investment could lead to liability under rule
1Ob-5); Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("any assumptions un-
derlying the projection must be disclosed if their validity is sufficiently in doubt that a
reasonably prudent investor ... might be deterred from crediting the forecast").
When the SEC initially announced its tolerance of earnings projections, it noted
that underlying assumptions would have to be disclosed. See Securities Act Release No.
5362, supra note 7; Securities Act Release No. 5581, supra note 19. The final safe harbor
rule, however, does not require disclosure of assumptions to avoid liability, but in
adopting the rule the SEC noted its belief that "key assumptions underlying a forward
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that changes in underlying facts or assumptions that render a pro-
jection materially inaccurate at some point after dissemination must
be disclosed as long as the particular prediction remains alive in the
marketplace.
4 7
In early cases involving the claim that a filing with the SEC was
false or misleading because it omitted disclosure of financial fore-
casts, the courts generally relied on the SPC's firm policy against
disclosure of projections and predictive forecasts in such filings to
hold that disclosure was not required.48 Most of these cases avoid
looking statement are of such significance that their disclosure may be necessary in or-
der for such statements to meet the reasonable basis and good faith standards embodied
in the rule." Securities Act Release No. 6084, supra note 31, at 81,942. See also Fiflis,
supra note 5, at 124-27 (noting that "[g]ood faith and reasonableness of the basis cannot
suffice in every case to avoid misrepresentation," if disclosure of assumptions or addi-
tional facts are necessary to an informed understanding of the meaning and potential
accuracy of the prediction). See also supra note 28 (discussing SEC's views on assump-
tions in its 1978 safe harbor rule proposal).
47. See SEC v. Pelorex Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,122 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1973) (entering consent to injunction for violation of rule lOb-5
involving, among other things, failure to make timely disclosure of inaccuracies in pro-
jections); Securities Act Release No. 5699, supra note 5, at 86,203 (noting that duty of
prompt disclosure may extend to situations in which prior projections no longer have a
reasonable basis).
The SEC's most recent policy, encouraging predictions of economic performance,
found in regulation S-K, notes that: "[W]ith respect to previously issued projections,
registrants are reminded of their responsibility to make full and prompt disclosure of
material facts, both favorable and unfavorable, regarding their financial condition. This
responsibility may extend to situations where management knows or has reason to know
that its previously disclosed projections no longer have a basis." 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.10(b)(3)(iii) (1986). See also Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985) ("if a corporation voluntarily makes a public
statement that is correct when issued, it has a duty to update that statement if it becomes
materially misleading in light of subsequent events"); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F.
Supp. 904, 908 ("It is now clear that there is a duty to correct or revise a prior statement
which was accurate when made but which has become misleading due to subsequent
events. This duty exists so long as the prior statements remain 'alive,' " i.e., so long as
investors could reasonably rely on the statement.), rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
48. See Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 987 (6th Cir. 1976) ("The failure to
make a projection of future earnings of an acquired company in a merger proxy state-
ment is not actionable under Rule 10(b)-5") (noting SEC's position), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 954 (1977); Straus v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(noting that no court had ever imposed liability for failure to include projections in a
registration statement, but reading the complaint as alleging failure to disclose facts on
which a projection might be based); Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F.
Supp. 400, 410 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (finding that report deemed to constitute proxy materi-
als and containing earnings and stock value predictions was misleading because, based
on SEC policy, "[wihatever its value for other purposes, it was inappropriate for use in
proxy solicitation"). See also Rodman v. Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)
(alleging antifraud violations for failure to disclose intent to retain control and need to
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any in-depth discussion of the materiality or the importance to in-
vestors of such information by accepting the SEC's view that predic-
tive information need not be disclosed because it tends to mislead
investors "by conveying a certitude which inherently [it] cannot pos-
sess."4 9 This reliance on SEC policy allowed the courts to avoid any
discussion of the materiality issue, which more than likely would
have led to the curious result that the information was significant to
shareholders but, nevertheless, could be denied to them."°
2. Decisions During the SEC's Policy Change.-Although the SEC's
policy began to change in 1973 to one encouraging disclosure of
management's projections, the courts have been reluctant to recog-
nize the new policy in fact situations that arose before or during the
SEC's reformation of its views." Moreover, the SEC policy is permis-
sive, and the courts seem reluctant to hold that disclosure is required
under the antifraud provisions if a defendant has complied with all
specific disclosure items mandated by SEC regulations. The courts
remain troubled by the reliability issue and the difficulty in review-
ing the subjective judgments that go into creation of predictive in-
formation, and seem concerned over imposing potentially
enormous liability for failure to disclose such potentially uncertain
information. Thus, most courts rely on the fact that the SEC merely
has made disclosure of earnings projections permissible, and refer
generally to the speculative nature of projections to hold that there
is no obligation to disclose them.5
2
borrow funds to finance stock repurchases). This case is often cited in soft information
cases for the general proposition that "[flull factual disclosure need not be embellished
with speculative financial predictions." Id. See also Fiflis, supra note 5, at 118 ("For some
time there has been a school of thought, sanctioned by the SEC, which held that projec-
tions and other similar soft information in SEC-filed documents were per se misleading
."; noting further that some courts followed this view).
49. Union Pacific, 226 F. Supp. at 409.
50. The Ninth Circuit, in discussing whether earnings projections that were publicly
disclosed were false or misleading, stated: "Nor can there be any doubt that the forecast
of earnings was a 'material' fact.... And generally earnings projections of a company
constitute a prime factor in estimating the worth of its stock .... Marx, 507 F.2d at
489.
51. Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1233 (1st
Cir. 1984) ("[A]t the time the [defendant's] proxy statement was issued [1976], the
[SEC] frowned on such disclosures."); Lewis v. Oppenheimer & Co., 481 F. Supp. 1199,
1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (relying on SEC policy against disclosure at time proxy was issued,
and stating that even SEC policy would permit such disclosure in 1979: "Financial fore-
casts or speculations are not required by any statute, case, S.E.C. rule or regulation.").
52. See, e.g., Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 952 (1987) (refusing to follow materiality standards announced by other circuits, see
infra note 53, but finding no duty to disclose projections, based on five factors: absence
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Those cases that discuss the materiality issue in any depth tend
to focus on the reliability question, echoing the SEC's early concern
over the potential for investor misunderstanding. As a result, they
generally enunciate standards that either balance the importance of
the information against its uncertainty and its potential to mislead,
of specific disclosure requirement in the filing in question; SEC's policy reversal in ex-
perimental stage; general uncertainty of projections; potential to mislead investors; and
impracticality of a duty to update); Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 216 (6th
Cir. 1984) (noting that the defendant's schedule 14D-9 contained all of the information
required to be disclosed and that § 10(b) does not require volunteering of economic
forecasts); Pavlidis, 737 F.2d at 1233 ("[Flederal securities laws do not require corporate
management to speculate about future profitability in proxy statements .... "); Vaughn
v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that "[tihe SEC does not
require a company to disclose financial projections," and observing lack of evidence that
the estimates in question were made with "such reasonable certainty even to allow them
to be disclosed"); Marsh, 533 F.2d at 987 (noting that in the 1973 policy release, see supra
note 16, the SEC stated that it " 'has never required a company to publicly disclose its
projections and does not intend to do so now,' " and noting no authority for "the prop-
osition that a failure to project higher earnings in a merger proxy statement is actionable
under Rule lOb-5") (it is unclear whether any projections in fact existed); Mendell v.
Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 & n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that neither the SEC
nor the Second Circuit have required inclusion of projections in proxy statements, that
the SEC's safe harbor rule does not require disclosure, and that, in any case, plaintiff
failed to indicate what statements were rendered misleading without the requested dis-
closure); Bradshaw v. Jenkins, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,719, at 97,909 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 1984) (no duty to disclose estimates of future
loan write-offs and litigation liabilities since "the SEC has not reached the point of re-
quiring the disclosure of financial projections"; noting potential unreliability of such
information); Caspary v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 579 F. Supp. 1105, 1110
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that the securities laws
do not generally require disclosure of such necessarily speculative information, and that
no statements were made that could be rendered misleading by failure to disclose ex-
isting predictions); Fisher v. Plessey Co., 559 F. Supp. 442, 450-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (de-
nying summary judgment for defendant on issue of whether company which made self-
tender failed to disclose preliminary earnings reports, because they may be material if
calculable with "substantial certainty," but granting summary judgment to defendant as
to financial projections because projection disclosure is permitted but not required;
characterizing the projections at issue as "conjecture, albeit highly competent conjec-
ture"); Margolis v. Masters, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,855, at
90,289 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1981) (failure to provide projection of profitability does not
violate securities laws because a company is permitted to make projections "but it is not
required to do so"); Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 526 F. Supp. 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aft'd, 683 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting policy of requiring factual disclosure
only and lack of cases imposing liability for failure to disclose projections or predictions
where issue was failure to disclose market impact of announced insider tender offer);
Lewis v. Oppenheimer & Co., 481 F. Supp. 1199, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting that, in
context of management buyout, financial forecasts are speculative and not required by
any statute, case, SEC rule or regulation; only factual disclosure required); Straus v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that the SEC "per-
mits" disclosure of projections, but that no court has imposed liability for failure to
include them in a registration statement, therefore reading complaint as alleging failure
to disclose facts in a registration statement on which a projection could be based).
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or require a degree of certainty that brings the omitted information
close to "hard," factual information.
53
D. The SEC's Early Approach to Asset Values
The SEC's policy against disclosure of asset values developed in
the same context and out of concerns similar to those that gave rise
to its early prohibition on earnings projections. As Professor Kripke
53. Several cases directly discussed the materiality issue prior to the SEC's policy
change. In Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975), the
court addressed a claim based on selective disclosure of projections. The court distin-
guished cases that had allowed such claims, observing that in those cases "reliability was
not a substantial factor and the importance of the information to investors far out-
weighed any potential for misunderstanding." Id. at 567. Although the Alaska Interstate
court concluded that the general rule against soft information disclosure should control
on the facts presented, it seemed to prefer a test for materiality of soft information that
would balance investor need against the potential uncertainty of the projection. Id. at
567-68. In Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court discussed
whether disclosed earnings projections were false or misleading and concluded that
before projections could be disclosed they must be based on facts that allow investors to
conclude that the predicted outcome is "highly probable."
Also, at least the Second Circuit would find earnings projections or preliminary in-
formation material in insider trading cases, without reference to SEC policy on corpo-
rate disclosures. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980)
(tip that earnings would be down, based on insider's knowledge of preliminary figures,
could be material information); SEC v. Lums, 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (tip
concerning corporate earnings projections was material). For a discussion of the basis
for insider trading liability, see infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the basis. Some courts, however, have viewed insider trading cases differently
from cases of corporate disclosure, stating that information can be material at any earlier
stage in an insider trading context. See infra text accompanying notes 301-07.
During or subsequent to the SEC's policy change, several courts have more clearly
enunciated materiality standards. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,
292 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (since projections must be "reasonably
certain" before they may be disclosed, failure to disclose five-year plan in letter to share-
holders in opposition to outsider's tender offer did not support lOb-5 claim in that it
contained highly tentative projections prepared only for management); James v. Gerber
Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978) (no duty to disclose earnings figures in
insider trading context because not calculable with "substantial certainty"); Froid v. Ber-
ner, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,201, at 95,942-43 (D.N.J. Dec. 19,
1986) (materiality of earnings projections sufficiently shown to defeat motion to dismiss,
based on test enunciated by Third Circuit that weighs the potential aid the information
will give shareholders against the potential harm it could do); Howing Co. v. Nationwide
Corp., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,358, at 92,308 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 18, 1985) ("earnings and cash flow projections do not rise to the level of
substantial certainty triggering a duty to disclose)" (citing Gerber Products); Fisher v. Pies-
sey Co., 559 F. Supp. 442, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (raising issue as to whether prelimi-
nary earnings reports were calculable with "substantial certainty" and therefore
material) (citing Gerber Products); infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text. See also
Walker, 802 F.2d at 710 (though rejecting specific materiality tests, stating that "it would
appear prudent to release only those projections that are reasonably certain") (citing
Panter).
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explained: "The wild unorganized accounting of the 1920's fre-
quently accepted purported values as the basis for security issues,
and the result was widespread frauds, deception of investors and
losses."'5 4 In light of the SEC's preference for verifiable "facts," its
concern for unsophisticated investors, and the legacy of value ac-
counting, it is not surprising that the SEC opted for historical "cost
accounting" for assets in financial statements.55
In addition to concerns for reliability and for the unsophistica-
ted investor, however, the SEC's position on accounting for assets
arguably could be justified on relevancy grounds. Although the
SEC never truly denied the relevance of earnings projections,56
some commentators advanced the proposition that asset values were
irrelevant to investors in a going concern. 57 Others argued that as-
set values may be as relevant as earnings projections since they in
essence represent the present worth of future net cash flows. 58 Ad-
ditionally, asset values may provide information regarding leverage
available to a company.59 It also can be asserted that existing share-
54. Kripke, Myths, supra note 6, at 1188.
55. Kripke, Myths, supra note 6, at 1188-96 (discussing SEC's position on financial
statement accounting for assets); Kripke, Rule lOb-5 Liability and "Material" "Facts, " 46-
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1070-75 (1971) (same) [hereinafter Kripke, Facts]; Kripke, A Search
for a Meaningful Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 291, 294-97 (1975) [hereinafter Kripke,
Disclosure Policy] (discussing origin of the use of cost (minus depreciation) as basis for
listing assets in SEC filings); Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, chs. 9A-9B (1953);
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 6, 17 (1965) (superceding Accounting Re-
search Bulletin No. 43 Ch. B). See ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, CURRENT TEXT, General
Standards of Depreciation § D40.102 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1984).
56. See supra note 12.
57. Kripke, Myths, supra note 6, at 1189 n.155 ("[T]here is an argument of some
plausibility-at least, this writer was once convinced of it-that the values of fixed assets
which are not to be sold are of no relevance. Since the most important thing from the
point of view of the investor is the proper determination of income, historical cost and
not value is what is relevant because it is cost which should be spread into the income
account through depreciation accounting."); Heller, supra note 7, at 308-10 (advancing
going concern argument). See also cases cited infra note 141.
58. Kripke, Projections and Appraisals: Analysis of the Case Law, 7 SEC. REG. L. REV. 93
(1976) [hereinafter Kripke, Projections and Appraisals] ("projections and appraisals. . . are
basically the same problem from a different point of view. An appraisal, the current
value of an earning asset, is the present worth of the projected future earnings from the
asset.") (citing Kripke, Disclosure Policy, supra note 55, at 299-301). See also id. at 296 n.16
(" 'It isn't the amount of dollars of income that is significant, but rather the rate of earn-
ings-earning power.... It needs also be emphasized that it is the percentage of earn-
ings to the current value of the resources utilized, rather than to "cost" or "book value,"
that is significant.' ")(quoting W. Paton, Accounting For Goodwill, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
STUDY No. 10, 147-48 (1968)).
59. Mann, supra note 5, at 235 (arguing that asset appraisals are relevant even in
selling documents, e.g., prospectuses: "unrealized appreciation is relevant in determin-
ing the corporation's ability to secure additional funds for expansion through future
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holders should be informed of the true value of the assets in which
they hold an interest since they could decide to take control of the
company and realize that value through liquidation.6" These vari-
ous arguments represent the ongoing dialogue between two sepa-
rate viewpoints on the basic question of accounting for assets in
financial statements: the SEC's approach based on historical cost
(minus depreciation) and the view known as current value
accounting. 6
1
Because the issue of asset valuations, unlike the dispute over
earnings projections, is more closely tied to the basic accounting
system adopted by the SEC, disclosure of asset appraisals or values
was not advanced nor specifically addressed in the SEC's early ef-
forts to provide a safe harbor for the use of certain soft information.
In its 1972 release, announcing its rulemaking hearings on disclo-
sure of soft information, the SEC stated that the hearings would fo-
cus on "projections and estimates of economic performance" and
would not include consideration "of such subjects as valuation
accounting."62
The SEC's 1973 policy statement and the subsequent safe har-
bor releases focused on "projections of future economic perform-
ance." 63  The final safe harbor rule does not directly cover
appraisals.' 4 And the notorious note to rule 14a-9 under the Ex-
change Act, which originally listed as examples of potentially mis-
leading statements in connection with a proxy solicitation
"[p]redictions as to specific future market values, earnings or divi-
dends," has been amended twice,65 leaving the reference to specific
borrowing .... [and] may be more relevant in predicting future earnings than the cost or
historical values reflected by the balance sheet") (footnote omitted); Kripke, Myths, supra
note 6, at 1193 (discussing several arguments supporting the relevance of asset value
disclosure even when a sale of assets is not imminent).
60. Kripke, Projections and Appraisals, supra note 58, at 98-102 (arguing that asset ap-
praisals should be disclosed in various contexts, e.g., merger proxy statements, and may
be relevant even when there is no likelihood of sale since disclosure could induce a third
party to seek control in order to realize on the value of assets).
61. See authorities cited supra notes 55, 57-58. See also Mann, supra note 5, at 235
(citing WHEAT REPORT, supra note 7); Kripke, Disclosure Policy, supra note 55, at 302-09;
Kripke, Myths, supra note 6, at 1188-96; Note, Corporate and Insider Disclosure of Asset Ap-
praisals Under Rules lOb-5 and 14a-9, 61 B.U.L. REV. 683, 704-07 (1981).
62. Exchange Act Release No. 9844, supra note 15.
63. Securities Act Release No. 5362, supra note 7.
64. Securities Act Release No. 6084, supra note 31.
65. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117 (June 25, 1979); Adoption of
Amendment to Rule 14a-9, Exchange Act Release No. 12,371, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,461 (Apr. 23, 1976).
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future market values as the sole example of potentially misleading
predictions.66
Nevertheless, even during the early years of its prohibition on
disclosure of earnings projections, the SEC argued in certain spe-
cific situations that asset values were relevant and, indeed, required
disclosure by virtue of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
While the SEC's bias against disclosure of soft information largely
grew out of concern for protecting buyers from overly optimistic
earnings forecasts and share valuations, the pressure to require as-
set value disclosure arose in situations in which existing stockhold-
ers were being asked to sell their shares or to change fundamentally
the nature of their investment. 67 Even in such situations, the con-
cern for reliability and investor misunderstanding led to seemingly
inconsistent positions by the SEC. As discussed below, the courts
were not particularly receptive to this apparent conundrum, as they
struggled to ensure fairness to shareholders as well as to manage-
ment in light of the SEC's traditional approach to disclosure of asset
values.
E. Early Judicial Treatment of Asset Values
Early cases in which the SEC and the courts expressed concern
over undisclosed asset values usually involved insiders attempting to
acquire control of those assets to capture the excess value for them-
selves. In 1947 the SEC obtained a permanent injunction against
66. See supra note 26.
67. See Kripke, Projections and Appraisals, supra note 60, at 94-98; Kripke, Facts, supra
note 55, at 1071-72. One SEC Chairman noted:
where... [the SEC's] historical bias [against soft information] has really given
way and where it is of great significance to investor relations people is when it
has had the effect of under-informing existing shareholders by withholding
from them management's opinions and judgments about the future. These
shareholders are not necessarily buyers as are those to whom new issue pro-
spectuses are addressed. They need information which will help them to de-
cide whether to hold what they have or sell. If they are not given a full picture
they may sell themselves out too cheaply. Thus, when we put restrictions on
management passing along to stockholders information about appreciation in
the value of assets, the prospects of new discoveries, the development of new
technologies and methods and products, we may be putting existing sharehold-
ers at a disadvantage in their investment decisions and dealings with those who
are able to acquire realistic information in the market place and elsewhere.
Opinion, judgment and all future oriented information calls for prudence and
care in developing the factual basis and drawing a conclusion but that is no
reason for prohibiting it.
Address by SEC Chairman Casey, National Investor Relations Institute (Oct. 3, 1972), at
2-4, quoted in Schneider, Nits, supra note 4, at 268-69 n.46.
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Standard Oil Company of Kansas and its president for alleged an-
tifraud violations, based on their repurchase of Standard's stock in
the open market and pursuant to an exchange offer without disclos-
ing existing appraisals of the company's oil-producing properties,
which greatly exceeded book value.68 The injunction was obtained
by consent, without findings by the court. The SEC noted in its liti-
gation release announcing the action that the appraisals were pre-
pared by "qualified engineers" and "were required, accepted and
relied on by certain banks" in connection with loans extended to the
company.69 The SEC alleged a scheme to buy back Standard stock
and merge the company into a private corporation owned by Stan-
dard's president. Although the defendants consented to the injunc-
tion, they noted in their Answer to the Complaint that they had
conformed with accounting standards prevailing in the oil industry
in preparing the balance sheet figures that were presented to
shareholders.70
Thus, the SEC early recognized that increased asset values
could be important to selling shareholders and that issuers and in-
siders had a duty to disclose those values even though they had
complied with accepted accounting standards, at least in situations
68. SEC v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas, Litigation Release No. 388 (Feb. 26, 1947).
The appraisals estimated a present value of 4 to 5 times the balance sheet amount of less
than $4 million. They also estimated future net revenue of $33 million to $36 million.
69. Id.
70. Id. Prior to the 1978 release, the accounting methods varied. See, e.g., Replace-
ment Cost Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 5878, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,356 (Oct. 26, 1977) (proposing rule amendment to re-
quire disclosure of certain operating and financial data relating to oil and gas produc-
tion); Accounting Practices, Oil and Gas Producers, Securities Act Release No. 5877,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,355 (Oct. 26, 1977) (propos-
ing rule amendment to require disclosure of future net revenues from estimated produc-
tion of "proved" oil and gas reserves in financial statements).
In 1978, the SEC adopted disclosure requirements for oil and gas producers al-
lowing use of a prescribed form of either the "full cost" or the "successful efforts" meth-
ods. Either method requires disclosure of the present value of future net revenue from
the estimated production of "proved" oil and gas reserves. Adoption of Requirements
for Financial Accounting and Reporting Practices for Oil and Gas Activities, Securities
Act Release No. 5966, [Accounting Series Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
72,275 (Sept. 12, 1978). Proved reserves are those able to be estimated with an accepta-
ble degree of reliability based on actual production and other factors. See infra note 119.
Oil and gas reserves present a special problem under the historical cost method of ac-
counting for assets in that the full cost method usually involves listing these reserves at
the combined costs of exploration and of acquiring land rights, a number bearing little
relation to the value of the oil or gas which may in fact exist in the ground. This prob-
lem and the present SEC accounting methods for valuing oil and gas reserves are dis-
cussed at infra notes 170-172.
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in which a plan existed to take control of the assets'.7  Several early
judicial decisions seemed to herald the development of a similar
view by the courts.
In Speed v. Transamerica Corp.72 a controlling corporate share-
holder purchased stock of the issuer pursuant to a written offer to
minority shareholders, without disclosing a substantial appreciation
in the value of the issuer's tobacco inventory. 73 The defendant had
been given a detailed inventory by the issuer showing its tobacco
valued at existing market prices.74 The latest annual report of the
issuer, which the plaintiffs alleged the defendant had "caused to be
mailed" to shareholders,75 listed the inventory in the financial state-
ments at average CoStS, 7 6 the accepted accounting standard for SEC
filings at the time. 7 The court did not discuss the reliability of the
inventory values given to the defendant, which were based upon
readily determined market prices. 78 The trial court found that the
defendant violated section 10(b) 79 and rule lOb-5 ° in effecting the
71. Standard Oil did not involve a specific intent to liquidate the assets once control
over them was acquired. Such an intent became a key element in the cases, discussed at
infra notes 72-115 and accompanying text, in which several courts recognized an obliga-
tion to disclose the appreciated value of assets. Standard's assets consisted almost en-
tirely of oil producing properties, id., and thus were obviously the real target of the stock
acquisitions, but there was no indication that the individual defendant intended to dis-
pose of them or the reserves other than in the ordinary course of business. The case
could thus be read as expressing a view by the SEC requiring value disclosures in every
case where an insider seeks to take control of an issuer. The SEC later limited its view to
cases involving an intent to liquidate the assets acquired. See infra text accompanying
note 107.
72. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
73. Id. at 828.
74. Id. at 823, 828.
75. Id. at 812.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 818 n.6. The court noted that it was "of some importance" that the SEC
did not object to the method of carrying the inventory when reviewing a registration
statement relating to the acquisition, which was later withdrawn. The SEC did request a
tabulation showing liquidation value of the stock to be surrendered. The SEC, which
appeared as amicus curiae, pointed out in oral argument that the SEC's then rule 3-06
required disclosure of "material facts not revealed by accepted accounting practices."
Id. That rule, currently Securities Act rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1986), provided
for disclosure of material facts necessary to make statements made not misleading.
78. 99 F. Supp. at 823.
79. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
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stock purchases without disclosing the increased inventory values, in
light of the defendant's undisclosed preexisting intent to liquidate
the issuer."1 The court emphasized that the "crucial finding" was
that at the time of the offer to shareholders the defendant planned
to "capture" the increased value of the inventory by "merging, dis-
solving or liquidating" the issuer.8 2
A result similar to Speed was reached in Feit v. Leasco Data Process-
ing Equipment Corp., 3 involving disclosure in a registration statement
filed under the Securities Act. The dispute centered on Leasco's
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)
80. Rule l0b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
81. 99 F. Supp. at 828. At the time of the offer there were no specific SEC disclosure
requirements for cash tender offers. However, subsection "b" of rule lOb-5, prohibiting
misleading statements, i.e., half-truths or omissions, material to the statements made,
would cover anything said in connection with the purchase of the target's shares. The
Speed court, under "Conclusions of Law," determined: "In making an offer of 33 1/3%
above the current market price, defendant impliedly represented that the price offered
was a fair price at the time." Id. at 843; see also id. at 829. It is unclear whether the court
viewed this as a false representation or merely as forming the basis for a duty to disclose
the increased values, so as to avoid rendering the implied statement misleading. The
court did state in its Conclusions of Law that, under the existing proof, defendants had
the burden of proving fairness and that the price was "inadequate." Id. at 843. The
Speed court also discussed the issue of the defendant's disclosure obligations in terms of
insider trading principles, which require an insider to disclose facts material to an invest-
ment decision when dealing with the issuer's shareholders.
82. Id. at 828; see also id. at 826, 827. The court noted: "In fact, plaintiffs and the
SEC both reluctantly admitted the asset or real value would not be a significant factor in
the absence of a plan to liquidate, etc." Id. at 826. This, of course, provides a way of
distinguishing the situation in Speed from the ordinary situation of a going concern. The
court apparently believed that the market value of the issuer's stock already reflected
some part of the increased inventory value on a going-concern basis. Id. In a footnote,
however, the court noted that the SEC later took the position that "the materiality of the
great increase" in inventory value did not depend upon proof of a plan to liquidate. Id.
at n.9. Such a conclusion would require an insider to disclose at least known asset values
in any case where he is purchasing control of the issuer.
83. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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1968 exchange offer for the common stock of Reliance Insurance
Company. The district court noted that the "crucial element" of the
takeover bid was Leasco's interest in gaining access to Reliance's
"surplus surplus."' 84 That term refers to the capital excess of an in-
surance company over that required by state regulation to be main-
tained as reserves to guarantee the integrity of the company's
insurance operations. 85 The court stated that several reports con-
cerning the value of Reliance's surplus surplus "provided the impe-
tus" for Leasco's takeover bid.86 One report, prepared by an
outside analyst and generally available in the financial community,
valued Reliance's redundant capital at $80 million; another, pre-
pared by a Leasco officer, estimated that capital as between $100
million and $125 million. 87 Leasco's plan was to form a holding
company for Reliance into which the surplus surplus could be trans-
ferred to escape the restrictions of insurance regulations.88
After discussions toward a friendly merger with Reliance
proved futile, Leasco commenced a hostile tender offer. 89 Reliance's
management aggressively opposed the bid. After extended discus-
sions, Reliance entered into an agreement with Leasco not to op-
pose the takeover or to impair existing surplus surplus, in return for
certain concessions to management. 90
In its registration statement covering the shares to be ex-
changed, Leasco did not specifically indicate its plan to use surplus
surplus, but stated an intention to pursue a plan previously an-
nounced by Reliance to form a holding company for which Reliance
would "provide the maximum amount of funds legally available
.... "9 The district court found that Leasco's failure to include "an
84. Id. at 581.
85. See id. at 551.
86. Id.
87. Id. Neither report was prepared with the use of any corporate inside informa-
tion. The report prepared internally at Leasco valued the surplus surplus at $120 mil-
lion as of mid-year 1967 and $100 million as of the end of 1967. The court also referred
to a report available to Leasco that was prepared by the State of New York Insurance
Department regarding the computation and use of surplus surplus generally.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 554-55.
90. Id. at 556-57. The court found that the agreement was the end of open hostilities
and that "[t]hereafter, an effective working relationship commenced between what was
to be parent and subsidiary." Id. at 556. The court apparently considered Leasco to
have insider status after this point. See id. at 549.
91. Id. at 551-52. The holding company concept was important to Leasco's plan to
utilize the excess capital for non-insurance purposes. However, Leasco was assisted in
its ambiguous disclosure by the fact that Feit, on hearing of Leasco's initial interest (and
hoping to head off a takeover attempt), itself announced a reorganization plan to pro-
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estimate-or-range-for surplus surplus" in the registration statement
constituted the omission of a material fact necessary to make other
statements made not misleading, thus giving rise to an action under
section 11 of the Securities Act. 2
Interestingly, the court did not specifically state that the partic-
ular estimates that were available had to be disclosed.93 This may be
due to the evidence offered concerning their unreliability, although
the court's discussion of materiality does not evince any particular
concern for the reliability of either the existing estimates or any that
Leasco may have been required to prepare to avoid liability.94 In
fact, the court's discussion of materiality did not focus on the unreli-
ability issue, but rather on the degree of certainty required concern-
ing the effect of the omitted information on a shareholder's decision
to tender.95 The court seemed to assume reliability based on the
effect that the available estimates of surplus surplus had on Leasco
in reaching its decision to acquire Reliance.96
vide "more flexible operations... and ... utilization of financial resources through the
Holding Company concept." Id. at 554. Thus, both parties were vague in their disclo-
sure and neither directly discussed the anticipated use of surplus surplus.
92. Id. at 575. Section 11 provides for a private right of action against issuers and
others, under various circumstances, for false or misleading statements which are in-
cluded in a registration statement.
93. Note that the court held that the violation occurred in the failure to include "an
estimate-or-range-of surplus surplus" in the registration statement. Id. at 575. The
court stated that "Leasco could have used [the available] estimates or commissioned an
independent computation based on public information." Based on these statements, the
source of a duty to disclose is unclear under the court's analysis. Rather than finding
that disclosure of existing estimates was necessary to avoid rendering a statement mis-
leading, it seems that the court may have required Leasco actually to create estimates for
disclosure regardless of what was said. The court does cite to language in the registra-
tion statement that refers implicitly to surplus surplus, see supra text accompanying note
91, but neither its holding nor reasoning ties the duty to any omission in that language.
The court does not discuss the notion of an implied representation of fair price. The
remaining possible rationale for the court's decision is insider trading principles, but
even such notions would not require an insider to create material information to
disclose.
94. See id. at 552-54 (discussing uncertainties in calculation). Concerning the notion
that Leasco may have been required to create an estimate, see supra note 93.
95. Id. at 569-75. The finding of materiality rested primarily on evidence that the
quantity of surplus surplus was so important to Leasco in its plan to capture it for use
outside of Reliance and that securities professionals were then expressing significant
interest in such situations. Id. at 574. The first factor could, of course, go to the reliabil-
ity of existing estimates. The court also found it significant that after the acquisition,
when Leasco filed a registration statement offering its own securities, it included an esti-
mate of surplus surplus. Id.
96. See, e.g., id. at 572 (noting that the surplus surplus was so important to Leasco
that it protected it by way of a clause in its agreement with management). The reliability
issue was raised, but the court viewed it only as a possible statutory defense under § 11,
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The Feit case is similar to Speed because of a failure to disclose
asset values by one who could be considered an insider97 and whose
intent was to capture a valuable asset. The plan to spin-off Reli-
ance's highly liquid surplus surplus, in essence, constituted a "liqui-
dation" of the asset. As in Speed, the court was not concerned with
the reliability of existing valuations, but with several important dif-
ferences in the valuations. The valuation in Speed apparently was
made by calculating inventory amounts at easily determined existing
market prices, but the computation in Feit required projections and
subjective judgments. The Feit defendants argued that such a com-
putation required missing inside information to be reliable, but to
no avail.98 The Feit court's lack of concern for reliability seemed to
emanate from the apparently great degree of reliance by Leasco on
the existing estimates. Both the Speed and the Feit courts applied
existing standards of materiality without any special test of
reliability.
Two years later, although presented with a similar situation, the
Second Circuit rejected the approach of Speed and Feit in the
landmark case of Gerstle v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc.99 The defendant cor-
poration had acquired a controlling interest in General Outdoor
Advertising Company (GOA), and thereafter placed its personnel in
various director and management positions.'0 0 Defendant's repre-
sentatives then spearheaded an announced plan to sell GOA's "less
profitable" advertising plants.' In pursuit of this goal GOA's per-
sonnel prepared several internal studies showing estimated sales
values of GOA's plants far in excess of the recorded book value. 10 2
When the defendant determined to merge with GOA in a stock-
for-stock exchange, GOA filed a proxy statement that failed to dis-
which provides that liability will not be imposed if individual defendants had reasonable
grounds to believe that the registration statement contained no omission of material
fact. Id. at 576-83. The court found that the director-defendants did not have reason-
able grounds to believe that the available estimates "were so inaccurate that one or all of
them could not have been included in the prospectus." Id. at 579. Put another way, the
court would require inclusion if the estimates were not too inaccurate. This finding was
made despite significant evidence concerning the difficulty and the subjective judgments
required in preparing such an estimate, id. at 552-54, and without discussing the SEC's
policy against soft information disclosure in registration statements.
97. See supra note 90.
98. 322 F. Supp. at 561.
99. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
100. Id. at 1284.
101. Id. at 1285. After the press release GOA continued to sell its plants, including
most of its top earners. Id. No allegations were made concerning the announcement.
102. Id. at 1284-86.
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close the existing GOA valuations, but included a statement that
previous sales "demonstrated that the market value of a substantial
portion of the company's plants was considerably in excess of book
value." °10 3 The district court found that the GOA proxy violated
section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and rule 14a-9 by failing to dis-
close adequately the market value of GOA's plants and the defend-
ant's intent to sell those plants.'1 4
The Second Circuit held that the proxy was misleading in its
failure to disclose adequately that the defendant intended "to pur-
sue aggressively" a policy of selling GOA's plants.' 0 5 But it de-
clined to require disclosure of the plant valuations.' 06
The SEC had filed an amicus brief in the district court. It took
the position that although disclosure of appraisals generally is not
allowed in a merger proxy, when there is an intent to liquidate and
assets are reflected at substantially lower than current liquidating
value, existing valuations must be disclosed if they have been made
by a qualified expert and have a sufficient basis in fact, to avoid ren-
dering the proxy misleading under rule 14a-9.10 7
The court of appeals, however, referred to the SEC's long-
standing policy against disclosure of asset appraisals and to "the
policy embodied in the note to rule 14a-9 [which] has consistently
been applied to bar the disclosure of asset appraisals... "108 Based
on this, the court noted that it had long been an "article of faith"
among securities lawyers that asset appraisals could not be disclosed
in a proxy statement.' 0 9
103. Id. at 1288. The proxy also disclosed the price received on several prior plant
sales and the profit from those sales.
104. Id. at 1291.
105. Id. at 1295, 1298. The proxy statement rather disclosed that GOA intended to
continue in business after the merger, although additional plant sales would be consid-
ered. Id. at 1288.
106. Id. at 1294.
107. Id. at 1291-92. The SEC's position was more limited than its position in Speed, see
supra notes 77, 82, in that it would only allow disclosure of appraisals made by a "quali-
fied expert." If that became the rule, it obviously would be easy to avoid since it would
only apply to existing appraisals, and thus the acquiring party could simply avoid using
appraisals by a qualified expert. The valuations in Speed and Feit would probably not
qualify for disclosure under such a standard. See infra note 115.
108. Id. at 1292. The court recognized that the note does not specifically refer to
asset appraisals but rather to predictions of "future market values." Happily, for the
defendant, when the issue of whether the proxy should contain discussion of potential
profits from future plant sales was brought to the attention of the Commission's Division
of Corporation Finance, a supervisor noted his belief that such disclosure would be con-
trary to SEC policy. Id. at 1288-99.
109. Id. at 1293.
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The court rejected the SEC's characterization of its prior ap-
proach to appraisals as requiring a case-by-case analysis,"o and de-
clined to view Speed as authority for its amicus position, since that
case involved the value of an actively traded commodity the market
value of which could be ascertained with "reasonable certainty on
the basis of actual sales."' " Thus, since no true "appraisal" of mar-
ket value was required in Speed, the court did not see the result in
that case as overcoming the SEC's policy against appraisal disclo-
sure." 2 The court noted that the SEC was in the process of reexam-
ining its general policy against soft information disclosure and that
the Commission might determine that the policy deprived potential
selling shareholders of "valuable information."' 3 But in the final
analysis, the court concluded that "we would be loath to impose a
high liability on [defendant] on the basis of what we perceive as a
substantial modification, if not reversal, of the SEC's position ... by
way of its amicus brief. . . ."'" The Second Circuit thus rejected
the SEC's call for asset appraisals in a situation similar to Speed and
Feit. It did so without discussing the materiality or the reliability of
the appraisals at issue." 5
One significant problem area, in which the SEC's seemingly in-
consistent policy may have contributed to the Second Circuit's re-
jection of the SEC's position in Gerstle, is valuation of oil and gas
reserves. The SEC's amicus position in Sunray Dx Oil Co. v. Helmerich
& Payne, Inc. 116 exemplifies the difficulty in this area. That case in-
volved a merger of Sunray with Sun Oil Company. The district
court held that the merger proxy was false and misleading in that it
failed to disclose, among other things, information concerning oil
reserves on properties in which Sunray had recently acquired an in-




113. Id. at 1294. Although the court noted that the SEC's policy against appraisal
disclosure was based on its distrust of their reliability, it did not separately discuss the
reliability of the appraisals at issue.
114. Id. In a footnote, the court stated that the Commission should proceed by "rule
or a statement of policy" in order to publicize the change more widely. Id. at 1294 n.13.
115. The court noted that even if it accepted the SEC's position, it would not neces-
sarily require disclosure of the appraisals at issue, because they were internally prepared
without the assistance of expert appraisers. Id. at 1292 n.10. See supra note 107.
116. 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968).
117. Id. at 450. The Tenth Circuit stated that it appeared that the trial court had held
that the omitted material information related to the successful oil operations on a con-
tiguous oil property, owned by a third party, but that the trial judge had also alluded to
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on the SEC's amicus position that only estimates of "proved"
reserves could be included in SEC filings." 8 The court noted that
proved reserves are those considered proved to a "high degree of
certainty" by actual production or various accepted tests. 119 "Possi-
ble" and "probable" reserves are less certain and are considered
"unproved."1 2 0 The court concluded that the "sharp conflict" in
the expert testimony demonstrated that the reserves in question
were outside of the "proved" category.' 2 1
The SEC's exposition of its policy concerning oil reserve disclo-
sure, adopted by the Tenth Circuit, was similar to its concern for the
uncertainty involved in earnings projections, but included a special
degree of concern for unsophisticated investors. The SEC noted
that it has "always been very careful in its scrutiny of oil reserves
because their proper valuation requires a type of knowledge seldom
possessed by those outside of the petroleum industry,"' 12 2 and that
investors "would ignore or misconstrue the technical but extremely
significant difference between 'proved' and 'probable' reserves.'
23
The SEC's position against disclosure in Sunray was noted by
the failure of Sunray to advise its stockholders of the increased value of its own property.
The Tenth Circuit held that based on either foundation, the trial court had erred. Id.
The SEC also noted that the district court's holding was unclear as to the required dis-
closure and construed the opinion as "requiring the inclusion in the defendants' proxy
material of figures representing number of barrels of Sunray's "probable" reserves and
the anticipated future income from those reserves." Brief for the Securities and Ex-
change Commission as Amicus Curiae at 2, Sunray Dx. Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne,
Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (emphasis added). The
latter factor, estimated future earnings from reserves, is usually what is referred to when
speaking about the "value" of oil or gas reserves.
118. 398 F.2d at 450. The SEC's position in Sunray breaks down into two parts. First,
an estimate of reserves stated in number of barrels was allowable in SEC filings but only
as to "proved" reserves, because any such quantification creates "an aura of certainty,
which, except in the case of proved reserves, the Commission believes would be mis-
leading to all but sophisticated investors." Amicus Brief, supra note 117, at 10. Second,
any estimate of future earnings-even from proved reserves-was not allowed. This
result was reached by reference to the SEC's then-existing, broader policy against earn-
ings projections. Id. at 11.
119. 398 F.2d at 450. The SEC, noting that any statement on reserves is necessarily
an estimate, defined "proved" reserve as follows: "Proven reserves as to which definite esti-
mates of amounts are appropriate may be developed or undeveloped. The term 'proven
developed reserves' is used for producing wells where there are sufficient engineering
and geological data of oil or gas that is reasonably certain to be ultimately produced by
such wells." Amicus Brief, supra note 117, at 8 n.3 (quoting In re Great Sweet Grass Oils,
Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683, 693 n.1 1 (1957)) (emphasis in original).
120. 398 F.2d at 450.
121. Id. at 451.
122. Amicus Brief, supra note 117, at 6.
123. Id. at 5.
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the Second Circuit in Gerstle. The Gerstle court rejected the SEC's
attempt to distinguish the need for disclosure in Gerstle as calling for
only "present liquidating values," whereas in Sunray the disclosure
at issue involved, essentially, the projection of future earnings based
upon reserve estimates.' 24 The Gerstle court believed that there was
little difference between estimating the selling value of assets in a
present liquidation mode and estimating revenues from an ordinary
course disposal of a commodity such as oil.' 25 This may or may not
be true, depending on the projected time periods and the complex-
ity of the underlying assumptions involved. Moreover, the SEC's
position in Sunray does in fact allow disclosure of soft information.
Estimating the quantity of even proved reserves, as required by SEC
disclosure policy for oil and gas concerns at the time, involves sub-
jective judgments. Indeed, it would appear to be more difficult to
estimate the very existence of such an asset than to estimate the sell-
ing value of an asset that is known to exist. Taking an estimate of
even proved reserve quantities, let alone unproved reserves, to the
next level-i.e., estimating future net revenues from extraction of
those reserves-would have contravened the SEC's policy at the
time of Sunray against earnings projections.
The SEC's positions in Sunray and Gerstle demonstrate the diffi-
culty inherent in applying the SEC's early, blanket prohibition on
disclosure of earnings projections and asset appraisals. Resolution
of the asset appraisal problem is more difficult because even after
doing away with its prohibition on earnings projections in filings,
the SEC was confined by its strict cost-based approach to accounting
for assets in financial statements. 126 The years following Gerstle have
seen a slow evolution in this area, as well as more formal policy
statements concerning asset value disclosure in liquidation and
merger situations. This will be discussed in part F, below.
While the district court's opinion in Gerstle, finding a duty to
124. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1292.
125. Id. The Second Circuit cited to Professor Kripke's analogy of an appraisal as the
present value of future net earnings from an asset to justify its refusal to distinguish the
asset appraisals in Gerstle from the cash flow projections in Sunray. Id. (citing Kripke,
Myths, supra note 6, at 1200). Indeed, the Second Circuit noted that the appraisals in
Gerstle "hinged" on the ability to pay the purchase price out of projected earnings. Id. at
1292. Although the exact basis for the appraisals in Gerstle is not disclosed, the defend-
ants made eight-year earnings projections for individual plants available to prospective
purchasers, which indicated that if 29%o of the purchase price were paid in cash, the
remainder could be paid out of future cash flows resulting from depreciation of the
stepped-up basis available to the purchaser. Id. at 1285 n.2, 1292.
126. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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disclose asset values, was on appeal to the Second Circuit, an opin-
ion rejecting an obligation to disclose such values was issued by the
Third Circuit in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc. 127 American
Metal Climax, Inc. (AMAX) owned 42.3% of RST, a Zambian corpo-
ration engaged in copper mining and related activities.' 28 While
RST was negotiating a forced sale of a majority of its mining proper-
ties to a government-controlled entity, pursuant to a nationalization
policy in Zambia, AMAX approached it to discuss a merger. 129
Under the proposal, RST's remaining non-nationalized assets, con-
sisting of, among other things, $60 million in cash, would be exter-
nalized by transfer to a non-Zambian entity.13 0
In arriving at a value for the consideration to be offered to
RST's shareholders, which was to consist of AMAX debentures and
warrants, RST and its advisers negotiated with AMAX over values to
be assigned to RST's assets.' 3 ' These valuations were not disclosed
in RST's proxy statement seeking approval of the merger.13 2 The
proxy did include the fairness opinion of RST's investment bank-
ers.13 3 The district court had found that a "clear presentation" of
the values assigned to RST's assets and the basis for those values
were "crucial" to a shareholder's decision.'3 4 The district court
held that this omission was material and violated rule lOb-5.'1 5
127. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
128. Id. at 259. Six AMAX directors also held seats on RST's board, which consisted
of thirteen directors. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1344
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
129. 332 F. Supp. at 1337-39.
130. Kohn, 458 F.2d at 259.
131. Kohn, 322 F. Supp. at 1345-48. In the merger as eventually effected, AMAX is-
sued $76.2 million of its debentures and warrants to the remaining RST shareholders.
RST's investment bankers valued the non-AMAX stockholder's interest in the non-na-
tionalized assets at $75.2 million. Id. at 1345. It is not clear whether this latter figure
was disclosed in the proxy.
132. Id. at 1361.
133. Id. at 1363. The district court found that the failure to highlight sufficiently the
fact that the investment bankers did not perform an independent evaluation of several
important assets violated rule lOb-5 in light of the prominent display of their fairness
opinion. Id. at 1354, 1363. This holding was upheld by the Third Circuit. Kohn, 458
F.2d at 268.
134. Kohn, 322 F. Supp. at 1361. "Proxy materials" were sent to RST shareholders,
although the SEC's proxy regulations apparently were inapplicable. RST was a Zambia
corporation and did not, apparently, have securities registered under § 12 of the Ex-
change Act, supra note 3. See 322 F. Supp. at 1336.
135. Id. at 1361-62. The district court's lOb-5 findings involved disclosure in an Ex-
planatory Statement and Appendices sent to RST shareholders by RST. The district
court found that AMAX, although not a majority shareholder, effectively controlled RST
and the outcome of the merger negotiations because of its stock interest and domination
of the RST board of directors. Id. See also id. at 1352 ("Although it seems clear that
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The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of a viola-
tion of rule lOb-5 in various aspects, but rejected its holding that
asset values should have been disclosed.1 36 The court discussed this
latter issue in a single paragraph. It simply noted the SEC's tradi-
tional policy discouraging soft information in proxy materials, and
concluded that "the general rule should apply here."'' 3 7 The appar-
ent basis for this conclusion was that "[n]o truly reliable estimates of
value ever materialized."' 31 8 The Third Circuit's belief concerning
reliability stemmed from the fact that the available figures were ad-
vanced during negotiations as part of the parties' bargaining
strategies. 139
The facts in Kohn differ significantly from those in Speed, Feit,
and Gerstle. Speed and Gerstle both involved failure to disclose ex-
isting asset values in light of an undisclosed intent to liquidate those
assets. Feit was similar in that the inadequately disclosed, intended
use of surplus surplus involved a spin-off of that asset, which effec-
tively made it "liquid," i.e., readily usable.
In Kohn, however, the assets acquired were to be used in a go-
ing concern. Asset values were assigned solely to determine the ex-
change ratio. In such a context, many of those values were based on
projected earnings.' 40 Valuations to negotiate a merger price no
[RST's Chairman of the Board] did his best to negotiate a fair deal with AMAX, he was
bargaining from a position of weakness in a situation which was inherently coercive to
him and the public stockholders of RST."). The court used AMAX's position of control
as a basis for finding that AMAX owed a fiduciary duty to non-AMAX shareholders of
RST, id. at 1355, which it breached by imposing an unfair transaction upon them, id. at
1365. The finding of a fiduciary duty also implicitly supported the district court's 10(b)
holding that the assigned asset value should have been disclosed in the Explanatory
Statement and Appendices since such information was material. Id. at 1343, 1350, 1365.
Although the specific findings of violation are not related directly to AMAX, the relief
was ordered against AMAX. Id. at 1366-70. Thus, it is implicit that AMAX was held
responsible for the Explanatory Statement.
136. Kohn, 458 F.2d at 265. The court agreed that certain disclosures regarding the
nature of the transaction, the benefits to AMAX, and the basis for the investment
banker's opinion were misleading. Id. at 263-65, 268.
137. Id. at 265.
138. Id.
139. Id. The Third Circuit did not discuss the district court's conclusion that AMAX
effectively controlled those negotiations. The district court found it "significant" that
"during the course of the negotiations, as to every asset which had a range of values
assigned to it by either AMAX, RST or their advisers .... the value accepted as a basis
for the transaction was invariably on the lower range." Kohn, 322 F. Supp. at 1361.
Moreover, since the district court was concerned that a controlling shareholder had
forced unfair values on minority shareholders, and the court required disclosure of ex-
isting, higher valuations and the basis for such values, i.e., what information in fact was
available during negotiations, reliability would not be a significant issue.
140. See, e.g., Kohn, 322 F. Supp. at 1346-48.
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doubt are common. Thus, if the district court's opinion in Kohn had
stood, it might have been susceptible to a reading requiring disclo-
sure of the basis for determining a price, including earnings projec-
tions, in most merger cases.' 4' Yet that opinion seems more limited
since it involved, in the district court's view, a controlling share-
holder taking advantage of its influence by using the lowest values
available to impose an unfair price on noncontrolling shareholders,
without disclosing existing higher values. 142 This was still a step up
141. In situations where the acquirer intends to continue the operations of the target,
courts generally have held that, regardless of reliability or SEC policy, disclosure of asset
values is not required because they are viewed as irrelevant. See, e.g., Seaboard World
Airlines v. Tiger Int'l Inc., 600 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1979) (when market price for stock is
available, disclosure of other factors going to asset value is not required if target is to be
operated as a going concern); Gerrity v. Chapin, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,241, at 96,717 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1980) (disclosures of asset values
not required in going concern situation in which proxy proposed equity investment and
management agreement by outsider); Christopher v. Time Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,056, at 97,690 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1975) (finding
no obligation to disclose asset value in merger situation; but conceding need to reevalu-
ate SEC policy concerning valuation of assets of "ongoing concern"); Madonick v. Deni-
son Mines, Ltd., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,550, at
95,907, 95,910 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1974) (relying on Gerste to hold that there is no obliga-
tion to disclose replacement value of assets in anticipated going concern situation even
where plaintiffs claimed that they might have rejected merger and sought complete liq-
uidation or a more favorable exchange ratio; however, disclosure of value of tax credit to
acquiror may be required); In re Brown Co. Sec. Litig., 355 F. Supp. 574, 584 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (holding unsupported estimates of value not material in merger where going con-
cern is anticipated). But cf. Texas Partners v. Conrock Co., 685 F.2d 1116, 1121 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that management proxy relating to antitakeover proposals may have
required general statement that assets were undervalued as relevant to shareholders'
evaluation of effect of proposals on issuer's attractiveness as a takeover candidate);
Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,358, at 93,228-29 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1978) (refusing to dismiss or to grant summary
judgment because the court could not say that failure to disclose recent appraised values
relating to exchange ratio in merger was not material in light of what was said regarding
per share high and low prices and book value of stock being acquired); Denison Mines,
Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 819 (D. Del. 1974) (calling for a case-by-
case determination as to disclosure of asset values). To recognize that asset values
should be disclosed in a merger situation where a going concern is contemplated would
come close to admitting the need for valuation accounting in general. The SEC's proxy
rules do not specifically require disclosure of asset values in a normal merger situation.
See SEC regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-13 (1986).
142. See supra note 135. This position raises the issue, discussed above in connection
with the Speed decision, whether a failure to disclose the unfairness of a transaction or, at
least, to disclose facts indicating that unfairness, constitutes an antifraud violation. See
Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (mere breach of fiduciary duty or unfair-
ness not actionable under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5). See also SEC schedule 13E-3, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13c-100, item 8 (1986) (requiring disclosure of factors bearing on fairness
of certain transactions or of the consideration involved); SEC schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101, item 15.
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from Speed and Feit, in which the holdings were clearly limited to
situations involving an intent to liquidate.
With the court of appeals' decisions in Kohn and Gerstle, the via-
bility of the Speed and Feit opinions was largely vitiated, and the
SEC's apparent attempt to establish, by its amicus positions in Speed
and Gerstle, a liquidation exception to its general rule against disclo-
sure of asset appraisals was largely forestalled. Thereafter, the SEC
issued various policy statements and rules that clarified, to some ex-
tent, its position in various situations.
F. Recent SEC Policy Statements on Disclosure of Asset Values
As the SEC focused its policy reevaluation concerning soft in-
formation on disclosure of earnings forecasts and struggled to de-
velop a judicially acceptable policy on asset value disclosure in
merger situations such as those involved in Speed and Gerstle, a par-
ticular type of corporate buyout transaction in which management
interest played a key role appeared prominently on the scene. Low
stock prices and a variety of other economic factors in the mid 1970s
contributed to the attractiveness of what became known as the lever-
aged buyout. 143 Leveraged buyouts involve financing the purchase
of an issuer's assets or of a controlling interest in the issuer by lever-
aging the assets over which control is sought. 1 44 Management in-
volvement in these transactions as part of the purchasing group and
as the recipient of various tax advantages, often unavailable to other
shareholders, led to SEC concern over potential unfairness to
outside shareholders and over the lack of disclosure of increased
asset values available for use in financing the transaction.' 45 These
,143. See e.g., A. BORDEN, GOING PRIVATE, 3-9 to -15 (1986) ("when the going private
phenomenon first came to public attention in the mid-1970s, most transactions involved
majority stockholders of small public companies who, disappointed in the public market,
perceived in depressed market conditions an opportunity to resume the entire owner-
ship of their companies"; discussing the advantages to majority shareholders in gen-
eral); Dannen, "LBOs: How Long Can This Go On?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1986, at
151 (describing the field of leveraged buyouts as an "explosion" which, in scarcely more
than twenty years, has seen the size of the largest deals grow from $14 million to over
$13 billion, with institutional investors playing an ever-larger role and making "a lot of
people wonder whether the shareholders in companies that go the LBO route aren't left
holding the short end of the stick"). See also Going Private Transactions, Exchange Act
Release No. 14,185, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,366
(Nov. 17, 1977) (discussing depressed market conditions and other factors contributing
to the rise in such transactions).
144. See A. BORDEN, supra note 143, at 3-10; Disclosure of Proxy Statements Concern-
ing Certain Sale of Assets Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 15,572, 3 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 24,115 (Feb. 15, 1979).
145. See A. BORDEN, supra note 143, at 2-7 to -10, 2-13 to -16; Exchange Act Release
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were among the primary concerns expressed in a series of SEC en-
forcement actions in the late 1970s involving leveraged buyouts, 146
and in the SEC's proposal and final adoption, in August 1970, of
rules 13e-3' 47 and 13e-4 4 ' under the Exchange Act, governing "go-
ing private" transactions and issuer tender offers. 1 49
In February 1979, before the adoption of rules 13e-3 and 13e-
4, the Commission responded to disclosure problems in connection
with leveraged buyouts by authorizing its Division of Corporation
Finance to publish the latter's views and practices in administering
the proxy disclosure rules in the context of such transactions.' 50
In the sale of assets release the Division of Corporation Finance
No. 15,572, supra note 144. See generally In the Matter of Spartek, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 15,567, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,961
(Feb. 14, 1979) (combined administrative proceeding under § 15(c)(4) of the Exchange
Act and Report of Investigation pursuant to § 21 (a) of the Exchange Act); In the Matter
of Woods Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 15,337 (Nov. 16, 1978) (administrative pro-
ceeding under § 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (1982)).
146. See, e.g., Spartek, supra note 145 (finding failure to comply with § 13 of the Ex-
change Act in failure to file timely form 8-K concerning transaction; expressing concern
over, among other things, failure to disclose in proxy the value of certain assets, includ-
ing gas reserves, and the tax and employment advantages accruing to management);
Woods, supra note 145 (finding failure to comply with §§ 12 and 13 of Exchange Act;
expressing concern over, among other things, failure to disclose in proxy the value of
certain assets to be sold, the purpose of the transaction, and the failure of investment
bankers, who gave fairness opinion, to explore other alternatives).
147. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1986). Rule 13e-3, in general, makes it unlawful for an
issuer with equity securities registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act or any affiliate of
such issuer, to engage in a "Rule 13e-3 transaction," unless it complies with specific
filing/disclosure requirements with respect to the transaction. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
3(b)(2). Rule 13e-3 transactions, essentially, are certain types of transactions by the is-
suer or its affiliates that are designed to ensure, or make it likely, that the issuer's securi-
ties will cease to be publicly traded or that the issuer will no longer be subject to the
periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3).
The rule also contains an antifraud provision which essentially tracks the language
of rule lOb-5. The rule's prohibition, however, operates in connection with a rule 13e-3
transaction for an issuer with equity securities registered under § 12 of the Exchange
Act or that is a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, or an affiliate of such issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(b)(l).
148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1986). Rule 13e-4 is similar in structure to rule 13e-3 in
that it also has filing disclosure requirements and an antifraud provision, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-4(b)(1)-(2), but which apply to an "issuer tender offer" as defined at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-4(a)(l)-(2).
149. For the chronology, see Exchange Act Release No. 14,185, supra note 143 (pro-
posing rule 13e-3 and schedule 13E-3 and discussing need for regulation); Going Pri-
vate Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 16,075, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 82,166 (Aug. 2, 1979) (adopting same); Tender Offer by Issuers, Ex-
change Act Release No. 16,112, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,182 (Aug. 16, 1979) (adopting rule 13e-4 and schedule 13E-4).
150. Exchange Act Release No. 15,572, supra note 144.
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described certain "novel, multistep sales of asset transactions" that
had been proposed in proxy solicitations. The described transac-
tions involved the cash sale of substantially all of an issuer's assets to
another company that intended to continue the issuer's business
under its prior name and to retain the issuer's management under
long-term employment contracts."' When a significant amount of
the purchase price of the assets was borrowed, the assets to be
purchased were usually directly or indirectly pledged to secure re-
payment of a loan.' 52 In some cases, the selling issuer became an
investment company that thereafter invested in tax-exempt securi-
ties; in others, the issuer resold its post-sale assets (cash) to a tax-
exempt bond fund in return for shares of the fund.'53 These trans-
actions often were intended and were structured to benefit certain
large shareholders who were in high tax brackets and held shares
with a low tax basis. 154
The Division expressed concern in the release that as a result of
management's interest in the outcome of such a proposed transac-
tion, "the highest price for the (issuer's) assets may not be ob-
tained."' 55 The staff referred to item 16 (now item 15) of schedule
14A under the Commission's proxy regulations, requiring a brief
description of "the facts bearing upon the question of fairness of the
consideration" 156 in transactions involving the acquisition or dispo-
sition of property, to note:
Under certain circumstances, it would be appropriate to
disclose information known to management about any as-
sets the fair market value of which is materially greater than
their book value and which are (i) not necessary to ... op-
erations as a going concern and which could be sold by the
[purchaser] ... or (ii) to the knowledge of management are
material to [any] lender's decision to finance the purchase
price. 157
151. Id. at 17,621-23. The Division noted: "In some instances employment and other
arrangements ... may be substantially equivalent to ownership interests ...." such that
the purchaser becomes an affiliate of the seller. Id. at 17,621-24 & n.8.




156. Schedule 14A of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1986), prescribes
the disclosure requirements for proxy solicitations with respect to securities registered
under § 12 of the Act, subject to certain exceptions. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2, 3(a).
157. Exchange Act Release No. 15,572, supra note 144, at 17,621-6 (emphasis added).
The Division noted that in connection with some transactions, independent appraisals
had been obtained and disclosed and that the Commission in Woods, supra note 145, had
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Although the SEC's staff did not identify specific circumstances
that might render value-related disclosure "appropriate," the de-
scribed situations differ from the situations involving an immediate
intent to liquidate such as in Speed and Gerstle. Yet the policy ex-
pressed in the release is consistent with the SEC's position in Speed
and Gerstle, although on a broader scale. That is, although specific
value disclosure is not mandated in the sale of assets release, there
is concern for situations in which asset values are important to the
purpose or the success of the transaction, and therefore to evalua-
tion of the fairness of the consideration paid, even when there is no
intent to liquidate. Interestingly, no guidelines were discussed con-
cerning the reliability or materiality of value information that might
be disclosed in such contexts. When the SEC adopted rule 13e-3
and schedule 13E-3 in 1979,158 a specific disclosure item was in-
cluded that requires a summary of any appraisal received from an
outside party if the appraisal is materially related to any transaction
covered by the rule.' 59
One year after the 1979 sale of assets release, the SEC author-
ized an interpretative release (1980 proxy release) concerning proxy
contests in which a principal factor was "the disposition of some or
all of an issuer's assets or outstanding stock with the proceeds to be
made available to shareholders." ' 160 The subject proposals had as a
common factor the premise that the existing market price of the is-
suer's securities did not reflect the value that could be realized
through liquidation. 6 In connection with such proposals, it was
noted, the sponsors projected the dollar amount per share that
would result from effectuation of the proposal. In marked contrast
to the earlier interpretation of the note to rule 14a-9 as forbidding
all predictions of future market value in proxy materials, the SEC's
staff noted its concern that the parties to such contests "may not
engage in a thorough debate of the merits of such valuations...,"162
due to, among other reasons, the perception of serious risk of liabil-
ity in attempting to forecast future values and the limited time avail-
expressed concern about full disclosure. Id. at 17,621-27 & n.22. It also noted that the
antifraud provisions may necessitate, under certain circumstances, disclosure in addition
to that mandated by specific item requirements in schedule 14A or by the proxy rules.
158. See supra notes 147, 149.
159. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, item 9 (1986).
160. Interpretative Release Relating to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
16,833, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,117 (May 23, 1980).




able in which to formulate an estimate.163  The release was
addressed to management's inclusion of or opposition to valuations
in proxy materials. The SEC's staff did warn that such information
was "only appropriate and consonant with Rule 14a-9 . . . when
made in good faith and on a reasonable basis . . ." and with ade-
quate disclosure concerning the basis for and the limitations on any
projected realizable values.1 64  Nevertheless, the release implicitly
recognized that rule 14a-9 is not a total prohibition on such disclo-
sure and that it may be desirable to debate fully asset values in cer-
tain situations. 65 The 1980 proxy release, therefore, memorializes
a dramatic departure from the absolute prohibition on value disclo-
sure that the Gerstle court saw as existing under the note to rule 14a-
9.
Indeed, during the time between Gerstle and the 1980 proxy re-
lease the SEC and the accounting profession took significant steps
toward supplementing the SEC's traditional, historic-cost-based fi-
nancial statement requirements with value-related disclosure for
certain large issuers. Specifically, the SEC and the accounting pro-
fession embraced replacement-cost166 disclosure in response to the
inadequacy of historic-cost accounting for reflecting the effects of
inflation and changing prices on earnings and assets.' 6 7 Although
163. Id. The Division noted that the usual expectation would be that the interests of
the opposing parties "will generally assure a full airing of the principal issues . Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 17,621-12 to -13. In fact, in a recent amicus brief by the United States, in
which the SEC participated, the 1980 release is described as requiring appraisals in cer-
tain proxy contests:
The Commission in 1980 issued a release reflecting the staff's insistence upon
the disclosure of good-faith appraisals made on a reasonable basis in proxy
contests where the principal issue is the liquidation of all or a portion of the
issuer's assets. SA Rel. No. 16833 (May 23, 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 36374 (1980).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11 n.9, Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244
(6th Cir. 1985) (petition for writ of certiorari), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986) (em-
phasis added). Certiorari was denied in Radol on the issue of the materiality of asset
appraisals under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 210-214.
166. "Replacement cost" refers to a method of "current cost" accounting which seeks
to measure the value of existing assets by reference to the current cost of replacing them
with identical assets or equivalent assets, if the former are unavailable or economically
unfeasible. See BURTON, PALMER & KAY, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, ch. 8,
at 12-13 (1981) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
167. In 1976 the SEC adopted rule 3-17 under regulation S-X. Accounting Series Re-
lease No. 190, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,596 (1976). Regulation S-X is the repository of the
SEC's requirements, including form and content, for financial statements filed under the
various statutes which it administers. 17 C.F.R. Part 210 (1986) (regulation S-X). See
supra notes 2, 3. Under rule 3-17 certain large issuers were required to estimate the
current replacement cost of inventories and the current cost of replacing property,
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the purpose and result of replacement-cost disclosure are somewhat
different from true "fair value" accounting, 68 the experiment with
plant, and equipment with assets of equivalent productive capacity. Sales cost and de-
preciation expense were also computed based on the current replacement of the goods
and services sold and the cost of replacing productive capacity (i.e., property, plant and
equipment), respectively. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17. Under rule 3-17 these figures were to
be disclosed either in a footnote to or as a supplemental part of the financial statements,
though they could be unaudited. Id.
In 1979 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the policy-making body
of the accounting industry, issued a statement requiring certain large enterprises to
measure inventory, property, plant, and equipment at "current cost." FINANCIAL RE-
PORTING AND CHANGING PRICES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 33
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1979) [hereinafter SFAS 33]. This term, under SFAS
33, refers to a method of measuring assets and expenses associated with the use or sale
of assets at current cost or lower recoverable amount. Id. at 22(b). In addition to
requiring disclosure for the specific assets covered by rule 3-17, SFAS 33 required cur-
rent cost measurements for expenses and net assets, as well as computation of operating
income from continuing operations based on current costs. Id. at 35. SFAS 33 re-
quired that the disclosure be outside of but supplemental to the financial statements. Id.
at 27. Both rule 3-17 and SFAS 33 were "current cost" methods of accounting, but
they differed in relative focus. Rule 3-17 considered replacement cost with assets of
productive capacity equal to those owned, whereas SFAS 33 looks to the actual assets
owned by measuring the cost to acquire assets with the same "service potential," i.e.,
assets with the same operating capacity and costs. See HANDBOOK, supra note 166, ch. 8,
at 12-13.
After the FASB issued SFAS 33 the Commission rescinded rule 3-17, relying on
SFAS 33. See Accounting Series Release No. 271, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,888 (1979). After
1980 the FASB issued further statements on current cost accounting applicable to vari-
ous other specific assets. See SFAS 39 (mining, oil and gas); SFAS 40 (timberlands);
SFAS 41 (income-producing real estate); SFAS 46 (motion picture films); SFAS 54 (in-
vestment companies); SFAS 69 (amendment regarding oil and gas activities); SFAS 70
(amendment regarding foreign currency translation); SFAS 82 (amendment to eliminate
certain disclosures). The resulting pronouncements were incorporated by reference
into SEC rules and regulations as part of required supplemental disclosure pursuant to
item 302 of regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. § 229.302. The SEC's 1979 safe-harbor rule cov-
ering predictions of future economic performance was expanded to cover these required
disclosures as well as information about changing prices that is voluntarily disclosed.
Accounting Series Release No. 287, 44 Fed. Reg. 13,988 (1981).
On December 2, 1986, the FASB adopted SFAS 89 which supersedes SFAS 33, and
the other changing prices statements (SFAS Nos. 39, 40,41, 46, 54, 69, 70 and 82; FASB
Technical Bulletin No. 81-4). In SFAS 89 the FASB encourages voluntary supplemental
disclosure of the effects of changing prices, id. at 3, and notes that "[a]lthough the U.S.
economy is experiencing little inflation at the present time," if that condition changes,
the FASB again may need to require such disclosure, id. at 6. The FASB also stated
that entities are "not discouraged" from experimenting with other forms of similar dis-
closure. Id. at B. In response to the issuance of SFAS 89 the SEC has amended regu-
lation S-K to delete references to SFAS 33 as well as the other changing prices
statements. Disclosure of the Effects of Inflation and Changes in Prices, Securities Act
Release No. 6681, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,050, at
88,380 (Dec. 18, 1986).
168. "Fair value" generally represents "the exchange price that could be reasonably
expected in an arm's-length transaction." HANDBOOK, supra note 166, ch. 37, at 39. Fair
value is the concept that is debated under the general rubric of asset "appraisals" or
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the former concept is another indication of the SEC's recognition
that asset disclosure based on something other than historic-cost
may be appropriate or required under various circumstances.
In the area of oil and gas accounting, the SEC early recognized
that disclosure of estimates of proved reserves in the financial state-
ment portion of filings was appropriate.' 69  In 1978 the SEC
adopted new financial accounting and reporting practices for oil-
and gas-producing activities that, in addition to disclosure of proved
reserves, required disclosure of "the present value of future net rev-
enues from the estimated production of proved oil and gas reserves
17. 0,,70 The SEC had opposed disclosure of such values in its brief
in Sunray. In 1982 the SEC amended regulation S-K to allow textual
disclosure of estimates of the amount and value of unproved reserves
values in cases such as Gerstle. (Technically speaking, one usually thinks of an "ap-
praisal" as a formal, independent valuation). The concept of "economic" or "future
exit" value is similar in that it represents the discounted value of future net cash flows.
See HANKBOOK, supra note 166, ch. 8, at 12. These concepts are different from the cur-
rent cost concepts of rule 3-17 and SFAS 33, but under a current or replacement cost
method which measures the cost to replace the asset with an asset of equivalent produc-
tive capacity, as depreciated, the result may approximate the fair value of the asset. See
SFAS 33, at 12. See also Exchange Act Release No. 16,833, supra note 160, at 17,621
n.13 (warning that although values disclosed by registrants under the SEC's then-ex-
isting replacement cost rules are "relevant information to an assessment of an entity's
economic value, . . . [such values] will not necessarily coincide with future realizable
value in the context of a given plan for the disposition of assets."). In an inflationary
period, measurement of replacement or current cost should generally cause a decline in
earnings figured on such a basis, except in industries where production costs fall due to
increased efficiencies and technologies.
169. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 8 n.3,
Sunray Dx Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968) (citing
Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683, 693 n.1 1(1957)); Id. at 9 n.4 (noting vari-
ous filings in which estimates of proved oil reserves were required).
170. Securities Act Release No. 5966, supra note 70 (also adding rule 3-18 to regula-
tion S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-18 (1986)). See also 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-18(k)(5) and (6). The
estimate of future net revenues must be included in the body of the financial statement,
the notes thereto, or in a separate schedule or other presentation that is an integral part
of the financial statement. Rule 3-17 was redesignated as rule 4-10 in 1980. General
Revision of Regulation S-K, Securities Act Release No. 6233, [1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,302 (Sept. 25, 1980). The adoption of these standards
recognizes the need to supplement or to vary historic-cost information in different situa-
tions.
The SEC also experimented with a form of current value accounting to provide an
alternative to information. As a former chief accountant of the SEC has noted, "the SEC
believed that none of the currently followed accounting and reporting practices based
on historical cost.., provided sufficient useful information. Accordingly, they proposed
an alternative approach, termed reserve recognition accounting (RRA), which is a form
of current value accounting." HANDBOOK, supra note 166, ch. 37, at 8. Reserve recogni-
tion accounting was abandoned in 1981. Accounting Series Release No. 289, [AcCoUNT-
ING SERIES RELEASES TRANSFER BINDER] (CCH) 3,293 (FEB. 26, 1981).
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"where such estimates previously have been provided to a person
that is offering to acquire, merge or consolidate" with the issuer or
otherwise to acquire its securities.' 7 ' The SEC also noted that even
though regulation S-K otherwise prohibited disclosure in filings of
less-than-proved reserves, its staffs practice has been to permit such
disclosure if the effect of exclusion would be to render a filing
misleading. 172
Despite these changes and policy statements concerning the
need for asset value and other soft information disclosure, many re-
cent cases rely on Gerstle and Kohn or the SEC's early policy to avoid
the difficult issues of reliability and materiality or to create an almost
per se rule against disclosure of asset values.' 73 This is largely due
171. Securities Act Release No. 6383, supra note 32. The Commission's position con-
cerning textual disclosure of estimates of oil or gas reserves is set forth in full in 17
C.F.R. § 229.102, instructionJ (1986):
[E]stimates of oil or gas reserves other than proved . . . and any estimated val-
ues of such reserves shall not be disclosed in any document publicly filed with
the Commission, unless such information is required to be disclosed in the doc-
ument by foreign or state law; provided, however, that where such estimates
previously have been provided to a person that is offering to acquire, merge or
consolidate with the registrant or otherwise to acquire the registrant's securi-
ties, such estimates may be included in documents relating to such acquisition.
The admonition against disclosure of other than proved reserve quantities or value was
previously in 17 C.F.R. § 229.20, instruction 4 to item 2(b) (1981). Release No. 6383, in
which the Commission adopted the SEC's integrated disclosure system, added the for-
eign or state law exemption and the proviso. The 1982 release also redesignated the
item and moved the instruction.
172. In Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K, Securities Act Release No. 6332, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Report No. 926, Part II (Aug. 6, 1981), the Commission also pro-
posed revising the instruction to item 102 (then item 20) concerning oil and gas disclo-
sure, (then instruction 4), to allow estimates of less than proved reserves and related
values when the omission of such information would render the other disclosure mis-
leading. Commentator criticism caused the Commission not to adopt the revision. See
id. However, the Commission had stated in proposing the release that the proposed
revision was consistent with the staff practice at the time. Id. See also Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 47 (Sept. 16, 1982) (allowing disclosure of estimated or appraised value of
undeveloped lease acreage, i.e., that portion with value other than that attributable to
proved reserves).
173. See, e.g., South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d
1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting no change in SEC policy on disclosure of asset values
since Gerstle); Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F. Supp. 1543, 1549 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing
lack of authority to require disclosure of value of store leases); Hecco Ventures v. Ava-
lon Energy Corp., 606 F. Supp. 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing South Coast and simply
finding no need to disclose appraisals); Deutsch v. Flannery, 597 F. Supp. 917, 922
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing lack of authority to require disclosure of predictions regarding
future values); Bradshaw v. Jenkins, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,719 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 1984) (relying on SEC policy); Dixon v. Ladish Co., 597 F.
Supp. 20, 30 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (soft information must be reasonably certain before it may
be disclosed; citing Kohn to decline to require disclosure), aff'd in relevant part sub nona.
Kademian v. Ladish Co., 792 F.2d 614, 625 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming holding as to asset
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to the lag between the time the facts of a case develop and the time a
final judicial resolution is reached. 1 4 Thus, the courts have been
able to rely on the Gerstle court's finding that although the note to
rule 14a-9 does not specifically refer to asset values or even abso-
lutely prohibit any particular type of disclosure, "it is clear that the
policy embodied in the note ... has consistently been enforced to
bar disclosure of asset appraisals ... as well as Gerstle's admoni-
tion that a substantial modification or reversal of that policy should
be done through SEC rule or policy statement, and not merely in an
amicus position. 176 Several courts have discussed this limited basis
for Gerstle, but concluded that at the time of the events before them
there had been no formally announced change in the SEC's posi-
tion. t 7 1 Others have interpreted the SEC's position to apply only to
liquidation situations,' 78 or have noted the absence of any specific
values in Dixon; noting that plaintiffs did not dispute general rule that there is no duty to
disclose such internal valuations); Gerrity v. Chapin, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,241, at 96,717 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no duty to disclose asset ap-
praisals in going concern situation; citing Gerstle). But cf. Texas Partners v. Conrock Co.,
685 F.2d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 1982) (pointing to the new SEC policy authorizing the
inclusion of asset valuations in proxy statements; but refusing to address whether sub-
stantially undervalued assets require disclosure); South Coast, 669 F.2d at 1274-78
(Fletcher, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lower court's analysis was "incomplete" be-
cause "it failed to take the necessary first step of determining materiality); Sulzer v. As-
sociated Madison Cos., [1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,053 (M.D.
Fla. 1985) (noting the relaxation of the policy of nondisclosure and holding that the
existence and value of tax benefits is not so speculative and uncertain as to preclude its
disclosure in proxy materials); Bolton v. Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822, 837-38 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (failure to disclose that some of the trustees had a personal interest in a corporate
liquidation would be material for rule lOb-5 purposes, as would nondisclosure as to the
value of corporate assets); Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., [1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,358, at 93,228-29 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (materiality of failure to
state appraisal values of two corporations in a proxy statement seeking shareholder ap-
proval of a merger must be determined by the trier-of-fact); Denison Mines, Ltd. v.
Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 819-20 (D. Del. 1974) (declining to hold asset val-
ues immaterial as a matter of law).
174. See, e.g., Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 240 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986) (noting that at time of the tender offer at issue, 1981, the
SEC did not require asset value disclosure in any context); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters.,
744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984) (declining to apply newly announced materiality stan-
dard to facts occurring in 1976, prior to SEC policy changes regarding asset value
disclosure).
175. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1291 (2d Cir. 1973).
176. Id. at 1294.
177. See, e.g., South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d
1265 (9th Cir. 1983); Christopher v. Time, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,056 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Madonick v. Denison Mines Ltd., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
178. See, e.g., Starkman, 772 F.2d at 240 n.6 (noting 1980 proxy release as limited in-
stance in which appraisal disclosure is allowed but only if reliable); Texas Partners, 685
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SEC rule requiring disclosure 1 79 or of any expert appraisal in the situa-
tions before them.' 80
These cases evince a tendency by the courts to look to a clear
SEC rule or policy statement for guidance before venturing into an
area requiring difficult assessments of subjective and expert judg-
ment, the determination of which can result in significant liabilities.
Nevertheless, although the SEC's positions in Speed, Gerstle, and the
1979 sale-of-assets and 1980 proxy releases address only a limited
number of situations, clearly, in the words of the Gerstle court, "the
policy embodied" in those pronouncements, as well as in the Com-
mission's other statements concerning predictions of economic per-
formance and asset values, represents a substantial and well-
recognized modification of the position that formed the basis for the
Gerstle decision. It should be clear to securities professionals and
issuers that the SEC's policy will require disclosure of projections or
asset values in situations in which they are material to accurate and
adequate disclosure in SEC filings. Unreliability and fear of investor
misunderstanding, though of concern, should not alone be a suffi-
cient basis for denial of a claim that a disclosure is false or mislead-
ing absent disclosure of, at least, existing predictive information.
The courts must now venture beyond Gerstle toward a more in-depth
analysis of the materiality of soft information in particular cases. As
discussed below, when the courts have done so, they have focused
special attention on the issue of reliability, placing it at the center of
at least three differing standards for determining materiality.
G. Recent Judicial Decisions
Recently, in light of the SEC's evolving disclosure policy con-
cerning soft information, several courts of appeals have avoided the
analysis of Gerstle and its dependence on prior SEC policy and have
treated directly the materiality issue in cases involving earnings pro-
F.2d at 1121 (describing the 1980 proxy release as limited to liquidation situations, but
noting that a general statement concerning undervaluation might be material). See also
cases cited supra note 141.
179. See, e.g., Starkman, 772 F.2d at 240 (noting, among other things, absence of SEC
rule); Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 216 (6th Cir. 1984) (characterizing
investment banker's report as containing "speculative assumptions that were little more
than predictions of future business success"; noting compliance with all SEC disclosure
requirements in finding no duty to disclose such information under the securities laws).
180. See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 988-89 (3d Cir. 1984) (re-
jecting duty to disclose nonexpert appraisal); South Coast, 669 F.2d at 1272 (rejecting
need for disclosure because of no change in SEC policy since Gerstle, and stating that
even if it followed SEC's amicus position in Gerstle, the appraisals at issue were not re-
quired to be disclosed because they were not prepared by experts).
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jections or asset appraisals. The concern for reliability, however,
generally predominates these courts' analyses and has resulted in
the adoption of several varying standards for determining the mate-
riality of soft information.
In a 1981 decision, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. ,181 the Seventh
Circuit considered whether a report of improved nine-month earn-
ings results in a letter to shareholders was misleading because it
failed to disclose an internally projected year-end decline in net in-
come. 18 2 The court noted that there is no general duty to disclose
earnings projections and that other courts had found that projec-
tions must be "reasonably certain" before disclosure was even al-
lowable.' 8 3 In finding that it was not necessary to disclose the
projections at issue to avoid misleading stockholders, the court ap-
pears to have viewed two factors as particularly significant in consid-
ering the reliability or certainty of the projections. First, the court
stated that the fact that actual year-end results eventually varied sub-
stantially from the undisclosed projections presented a "compelling
inference" that those projections were "highly tentative."'' 84 Sec-
ond, the court specifically relied on the fact that the projections
were prepared only for management's use in finding that there was
no duty to disclose them.18 5 Thus, although it did not specifically
adopt a "reasonable certainty" standard, the court appears to have
sought guidance from such a standard, looking to objective indica-
tors of the reliability of the projections at issue.
In a more recent decision, involving an alleged misleading
proxy disclosure, the Seventh Circuit appears to have followed
the general standard of materiality that the Supreme Court enunci-
ated in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc. 186 In Kademian v. Ladish
181. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
182. Id. at 291-92. Optimistic statements in several press releases were also alleged to
be misleading. The plaintiffs alleged various other disclosure deficiencies under
§§ 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act, see supra note 33, in connection with the issuer's
opposition to a hostile takeover attempt. Id. at 282-89. The potential acquiror eventu-
ally withdrew an announced tender offer because acquisition plans announced by the
issuer created doubt, in the offeror's view, concerning the earnings potential of the is-
suer. Id. at 281, 285.
183. Id. at 292 (citing Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980));
Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1328 (W.D. Mich. 1978)).
184. 646 F.2d at 292.
185. Id. at 293. "We therefore find that because the projections [which were included
in a five-year plan] were tentative estimates prepared for the enlightenment of manage-
ment with no expectation that they be made public, there was no duty to reveal them."
Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a directed verdict in favor
of the defendants as to the projection claim, as well as on all other aspects of the case.
186. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). TSC Industries held that "[an omitted fact is material if
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Co. 187 the Seventh Circuit held that several internal valuations of an
issuer's stock were not required to be disclosed in a proxy statement
in which management proposed a merger at a lower price, because
disclosure of the additional potential values would not change, in
the language of TSC Industries, "the 'total mix' of information avail-
able."' 8 The court based this conclusion on the fact that several
other valuations that exceeded the merger price had been disclosed.
The court also believed that the undisclosed values were specula-
tive, but it did not feel compelled to formulate a standard that
judges the reliability of projections. Since several higher values had
in fact been disclosed, the court could simply look to the general
"total mix" language of TSC Industries for guidance.' 89
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it impor-
tant in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449. The Supreme Court elaborated further:
This standard is fully consistent with Mills' [Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375 (1970)] general description of materiality as a requirement that "the
defect have a significant propensity to affect the voting process." It does not
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the stan-
dard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in
the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must
be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omittedfact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made
available.
Id. at 449 (emphasis added). Although this standard was announced in the context of a
claim that a proxy statement was misleading in violation of rule 14a-9 of the Exchange
Act, it has been applied generally by the lower courts in determining materiality under
both §§ 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act. See, e.g., Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244,
252-53 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744
F.2d 978, 985 (3d Cir. 1984); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205 n.10 (3d Cir.
1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 289 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Seaboard World Airlines v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 358 n.3, 360-61
(2d Cir. 1979).
187. 792 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1986).
188. Id. at 625.
189. Id. The court seemed to consider the issue of materiality separate from the issue
of reliability: "Aside from the fact that these latter two valuations are as suspect of being
speculative as the first two [which were disclosed], their omission is not material." Id.
(footnote omitted). The court quoted Panter for the proposition, which the court stated
was undisputed by the parties, that generally there is no duty to disclose internal valua-
tions. The court went on to consider the materiality of the particular valuations at issue,
however, because the plaintiff claimed that they were necessary disclosures in light of
the disclosure of other valuations. Id. The lower court had relied on Panter, without a
specific discussion of materiality, in finding no duty to disclose the valuations. Dixon v.
Ladish Co., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,804, at 90,061-62
(E.D. Wis. 1984).
Because of the reliability concern, the "total mix" concept of TSC Industries by itself
is not particularly helpful in many soft information cases. Consider the recent decision
in Burlington Indus. v. Edelman, Civ. Action No. C-87-274-G, slip. op. (M.D.N.C. Order
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In Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises'9 ° the Third Circuit an-
nounced a standard for determining materiality of soft information
based on a balancing approach. Minority shareholdiers of a target
claimed that a tender offeror violated sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the
Exchange Act by failing to disclose in its tender offer materials vari-
ous per-share valuations of the target. 9 ' The defendant had
purchased several reports concerning the target prepared by a third
corporation that had considered acquiring a controlling block of the
target's shares. 192 The reports contained five alternative per-share
valuations of the target under hypothetical liquidation and going-
concern situations. 193
The court of appeals recounted the evolution of SEC policy re-
garding disclosure of soft information, noting that a primary reason
for the early policy against disclosure was the concern for reliabil-
ity, 19 4 but that the recent policy shift favoring more soft information
disclosure was based on "recognition of shareholders' need for such
information. ' 19 5 In an apparent attempt to accommodate these
competing interests, the Third Circuit announced a standard for de-
termining the duty to disclose soft information "on a case by case
basis, by weighing the potential aid such information will give a
shareholder against the potential harm, such as undue reliance, if
the information is released with a proper cautionary note."' 196 The
entered June 5, 1987), in which the court, among other things, granted a preliminary
injunction for alleged violations of § 14(e) of the Exchange Act and rule 14e-3 thereun-
der by virtue of an insider's alleged disclosure of nonpublic information about an issuer
to a potential tender offeror. The court, in concluding that the plaintiff showed a rea-
sonable likelihood of success on the merits, noted that the soft information at issue, i.e.,
valuations of divisions and assets and opinions about potential divestiture, may not be
material standing alone, but when combined with certain hard information that was dis-
closed, may have significantly altered the "total mix" available. Slip op. at 37-38.
190. 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
191. Id. at 981-82. The target's management was also sued.
192. Id. at 981.
193. Id. at 982. There apparently was no allegation that the valuations were based on
nonpublic information received from the issuer, although one of the valuations was "per
Peterson," who was the ex-President of the target and the party from whom the third
corporation had considered purchasing the block of stock. Id. at 981; Flynn v. Bass
Bros. Enters., 456 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Additionally, the court of appeals
discussed a study prepared by a vice-president of the target with land values supplied by
the controlling shareholder (the ex-President of the target) and "some 'unnamed people
within or without of the [target].' " 744 F.2d at 990. There was no intention to liquidate
the target, id. at 982, and the highest valuation was one based on the target as a going
concern. Id. More than half of the total asset value of the target was in its land holdings,
apparently consisting of farming operations. Flynn, 456 F. Supp. at 487.
194. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 985.
195. Id. at 987.
196. Id. at 988 (footnote omitted).
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court then listed seven factors that a court "must consider" in apply-
ing the standard, without assigning any particular weight to any of
them.' 97 The court declined, however, to apply retroactively the
"new" standard to the facts before it, 9 ' and instead looked to the
state of the law at the time of the tender offer at issue (1976), af-
firming the district court's conclusion that disclosure was not
required.' 99
The Third Circuit's approach is an attempt to accommodate the
competing interests that have been at the center of the soft informa-
tion dispute: reliability and shareholder need for the information.
Whether the court's approach is workable and consistent with TSC
Industries will be discussed in Section III, below.
More recently, the Sixth Circuit, in two cases arising out of a
takeover battle for Marathon Oil Company, enunciated a standard
for materiality of soft information predominantly based on the con-
cern for reliability. Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co.2 ' involved a claim
that two asset valuations, expressed in price-per-share, and five-year
earnings and cash-flow projections were required disclosure under
rule lOb-5 to avoid rendering misleading various statements made
by Marathon in opposition to Mobil Oil Company's hostile tender
offer.2 ' The appraisals at issue, one prepared in-house and the
197. Id. The factors listed were as follows:
The facts upon which the information is based; the qualifications of those who
prepared or compiled it; the purpose for which the information was originally
intended; its relevance to the stockholders' impending decision; the degree of
subjectivity or bias reflected in its preparation; the degree to which the infor-
mation is unique; and the availability to the investor of other more reliable
sources of information.
But see Landy v. Amsterdam, 815 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1987) (failure to disclose in merger
proxy appraised values of properties previously sold along with the actual sales prices,
which were disclosed, did not alter the "total mix" of information available as required
for materiality under TSC Industries; not discussing the factors listed in Flynn).
198. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988. The court noted that its decision not to apply the stan-
dard retroactively was confined to the facts of the case before it, and that it did not mean
to imply that the new standard should never be so applied. Id. at 988 n.19.
199. Id. at 988-89. The district court had directed a verdict for the defendants. The
court of appeals judged the reports at issue by the policy set forth in the SEC's brief in
Gerstle, (though that standard was enunciated for disclosure in situations in which an
intent to liquidate existed, and no such intent was found in Flynn. See supra note 193).
The Flynn court, thus, affirmed the district court as to the appraisals because they "were
not prepared by experts, had no adequate basis in fact and were prepared to encourage
financing to purchase [the controlling shares]." 744 F.2d at 989. Similarly, the court
found that the study prepared by a vice-president of the target was not sufficiently relia-
ble to be disclosable. Id. at 990.
200. 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
201. Id. at 233. The plaintiff also claimed that additional disclosure was required re-
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other by Marathon's investment bankers, largely involved estimating
future net revenues from Marathon's oil and gas reserves, including
probable and possible reserves.20 2
In affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendants, the court of appeals discussed the SEC's policy on
asset value disclosure, noting particularly that at the time of the
events at issue the SEC prohibited disclosure in filings of anything
other than "proved" reserves.2 0 3 Though compelling, this appar-
ently was not definitive since the court went on to consider whether
any judicial authority required a contrary result. 20 4
The Sixth Circuit reviewed several previous decisions in which
it had considered soft information disclosure2 0 5 and concluded:
garding Marathon's negotiations with its eventual "white knight," U.S. Steel. Id. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all issues.
202. Id. at 234. For a discussion of "probable" and "possible" reserves, see supra text
accompanying notes 119-20.
203. Id. at 240-4 1. See also Rice v. Hamilton Oil Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,175 (D. Colo. 1986) (tender offer materials must disclose estimates
and forecasts with respect to oil and gas discoveries "only if there is a substantial cer-
tainty that these estimates will increase 'proved' reserves"; citing Starkman and Sunray).
For a discussion of "proved" reserves, see supra note 119.
204. Nevertheless, the court's comment as it undertook such an inquiry was not very
favorable for the plaintiffs:
Absent compelling authority to the contrary, we are reluctant to impose liability
on Marathon for failing to disclose asset appraisals based on hypothetical valua-
tions which the SEC did not then permit to be disclosed in most contexts, par-
ticularly since Section 23(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78w(a)(1) provides that no liability under the federal securities laws shall be
imposed for "any act done or omitted in good faith conformity with a rule,
regulation, or order of the Commission."
Starkman, 772 F.2d at 241 (citation omitted). The plaintiff's claim in Starkman was not
limited to disclosure in filings but included allegations that a press release and a letter to
shareholders, required by rule 14e-2 to be sent by management faced with a tender offer
[17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1986)], were misleading without the requested disclosure.
The fact that the SEC has promulgated specific item disclosure for specific transac-
tions should not be viewed as dispositive on disclosure issues. Regulations cannot antic-
ipate every situation and, ultimately, the need for disclosure is judged by what is
necessary to render statements accurate and not misleading and to fulfill management's
obligation for full disclosure to shareholders. Moreover, even a prohibition on certain
reserve disclosure in the normal accounting context of regulation S-K should not allow
management to escape liability if statements made are otherwise misleading or where
the information becomes relevant to a special action or decision by management. See,
e.g., Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 47 (Sept. 16, 1982) (although disclosure of unproven
reserves is generally not allowed in SEC filings, such disclosure is permissible if neces-
sary to avoid rendering statements misleading); Securities Act Release, No. 6332, supra
note 172 (noting that a proposed amendment to that effect simply would have codified
staff practice); Exchange Act Release No. 16,833, supra note 160 (recognizing need for
disclosure of appraisals in certain proxy contests).
205. 772 F.2d at 241. In particular, the court noted its decision in James v. Gerber
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"Our cases fully support a rule under which a tender offer target
must disclose projections and asset appraisals.., only if the predic-
tions underlying [them] are substantially certain to hold."'20 6 The
court rejected the balancing test of Flynn as "uncertain and unpre-
dictable. ' 2° 7 The court then stated that there was no duty to dis-
close the appraisals since they were based on "highly speculative
assumptions regarding the path of oil and gas prices, recovery rates
and the like over a period of thirty to fifty years."' 208 The court also
concluded that the five-year earnings information in question did
not rise to the level of substantial certainty.20 9
In Radol v. Thomas,2 10 the companion case to Starkman, the
plaintiffs appealed a jury's finding that Marathon and U.S. Steel did
not violate sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act2 1 ' by fail-
Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978), in which it held that an issuer did not
violate rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose earnings projections in connection with its
purchase of shares from a stockholder, because " 'such sales figures, projections, fore-
casts and the like only rise to the level of materiality when they can be calculated with
substantial certainty.' " Id. The Starkman court also cited Arber v. Essex Wire Corp.,
490 F.2d 414, 421 (6th Cir.) (insider not required to volunteer economic forecast), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974) and Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 987 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). See also Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d
209 (6th Cir. 1984) (no duty to disclose projections and asset values given to tender
offeror since speculative and since the latter varied from balance sheet information pre-
pared according to GAAP).
206. 772 F.2d at 241 (emphasis added). The court noted that its approach "focuses
on the certainty of the data underlying the appraisal or projection, [and] ensures that the
target company's shareholders will receive all essentially factual information." Id. at 242
(emphasis added). This focus may foretell a strict application of the standard. The
court earlier stated: "Our cases formally establish the rule that soft information such as
asset appraisals and projections must be disclosed only if the reported values are virtu-
ally as certain as hard facts." Id. at 241. Under such a standard, very little "soft" infor-
mation would be required to be disclosed. Also, the court is not announcing an
affirmative duty to disclose, since it earlier made clear that the target's disclosure obliga-
tions are confined to those items mandated by SEC regulations or necessary to avoid
rendering statements made misleading. Id. at 238.
207. Id. at 242.
208. Id.
209. Id. The court noted that Marathon had stated to shareholders its belief that the
bid was "grossly inadequate" and that disclosure of the valuations and projections
would only have supported this statement. Id.
210. 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986).
211. Section 14(e) reads:
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for ten-
ders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any
such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of
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ing to disclose the two asset valuations at issue in Starkman during
U.S. Steel's "white knight" tender offer, which was endorsed by
Marathon.2" 2 The court referred to its opinion in Starkman as reaf-
firming its adherence to the "basic rule established by [its] prior de-
cisions" that soft information need only be disclosed if the
predictions underlying the information are "substantially certain to
hold."21 The court held that the district court's jury instructions
correctly stated the general standard of materiality as set forth in
TSC Industries and "the specific rule" in the Sixth Circuit governing
this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reason-
ably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
212. Radol, 772 F.2d at 250-52. The district court had granted summary judgment for
the defendants on various other federal and state claims, including the claim that U.S.
Steel's two-tier tender offer, offering cash for about 51% of Marathon's common stock
and U.S. Steel notes for the remaining shares, was manipulative in violation of § 14(e).
Id. at 252. All aspects of the grant of summary judgment were upheld by the Sixth
Circuit.
213. Radol, 772 F.2d at 252-53. In fact, the earnings and cash flow projections at issue
in Starkman were disclosed in U.S. Steel's offer. Moreover, the asset appraisals were
disclosed as required by item 9 of schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3, item 9 (1986),
in proxy materials filed after completion of U.S. Steel's cash tender offer, in connection
with the second tier of its offer, a freeze-out merger. Item 9 of the schedule requires a
summary of any appraisal received from an outside party that is materially related to a
rule 13e-3 transaction.
Rule 13e-3 generally covers "going-private" transactions or "freeze-out" mergers.
See supra note 147. When a series of transactions is involved, the schedule is required to
be filed generally at the time of the first transaction in the series. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3,
instruction A(5). The rule, however, only applies to transactions by an issuer subject to
§§ 12 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act or its affiliates. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(b) to -3(c).
Thus, in cases such as Radol in which an unaffiliated party makes a tender offer for con-
trol to be followed by a freeze-out merger, schedule 13E-3 and rule 13e-3 are not appli-
cable until after a successful tender offer, i.e., after the offeror becomes an affiliate of the
issuer. Affiliate is defined as "a person that directly or indirectly through one or more
intermediaries controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with [the] issuer."
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(1). The definition in fact specifically provides that a tender
offeror does not become an affiliate until after termination or extension of the offer. Id.
Thus, the court of appeals in Radol found additional reasons to view the plaintiffs' claim
unfavorably since, in essence, it was a claim that information that is required by SEC
regulations to be disclosed only after U.S. Steel's tender offer is successful, should have
been disclosed prior thereto. 772 F.2d at 252.
The Radol decision, however, should not be read to disallow claims for disclosure of
certain information alleged as necessary to avoid rendering statements made misleading
simply because such information is required by specific SEC regulation at a later time.
Any disclosure required to avoid an antifraud violation is in addition to specific disclo-
sure requirements. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. But see Starkman, 772
F.2d at 240 ("[I1n Radol v. Thomas, No. 83-3598, (6th Cir. 1985), we have rejected the
position that SEC rules regarding freeze-out mergers and proxies should determine the
disclosure obligations of target management in the first stage of a two-tier tender
offer.").
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the duty to disclose asset appraisals.214
Thus, the Sixth Circuit in Starkman and Radol clearly enunciated
a standard for the future, requiring substantial certainty of underly-
ing predictions before soft information must be disclosed.
Although the appraisals at issue were based on price and cost as-
sumptions stretching thirty to fifty years into the future, and thus
their reliability could be questioned more easily, the court's lan-
guage in Starkman and Radol seems to indicate that it will be difficult
to meet this materiality standard in any case. For example, at one
point in Starkman the court stated that projections and appraisals
were required to be disclosed "only if the reported values are virtu-
ally as certain as hard facts." '2 1 5 Whether or not the Sixth Circuit's
test is consistent with TSC Industries will be discussed in Section III
below.
The Fourth Circuit recently considered disclosure of earnings
forecasts in Walker v. Action Industries.216 Although the court dis-
214. Radol, 772 F.2d at 253. The Sixth Circuit noted: "Indeed, if there was an error
below on [the asset appraisal] issue, it was in allowing it to reach the jury." Id. at 253.
The court noted that the purpose of the "substantial likelihood" test of TSC Industries is
to lessen the uncertainty facing management "in determining what must be disclosed
while preserving shareholder's access to all truly factual information." Id. Thus, it ap-
pears that the court links its materiality standard for soft information to the general test
for materiality of TSC Industries, and may apply the test rigidly to require disclosure of
only that soft information that is very close to fact. See supra note 206.
215. 722 F.2d at 241. See also Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146
(S.D. Ohio 1985). The district court found that a merger proxy statement was not mis-
leading for failing to disclose projected growth rates and increased earnings. In refer-
ring to the standard enunciated in Starkman, the court quoted the stricter language of the
opinion and seemed to interpret it as announcing a per se standard for earnings and
cash flow projections:
The Court in Starkman ... noted that the disclosure of "soft" information such
as appraisals and earnings projections is required only when "the reported val-
ues are virtually as certain as hard facts." Id. at 18, and that earnings and cash
flow projections do not rise to the level of substantial certainty triggering a
duty to disclose. Id. at 21 (citing Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209
(6th Cir. 1984) and James v. Gerber Products, Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir.
1978)). In the companion case of Radol v. Thomas, No. 83-3598, the Court
specifically approved the instruction that a "failure to make known a projection
of future earnings is not a violation of the Federal Securities Laws." Id. at 15.
Therefore, we conclude that defendants were not required to disclose pro-
jected growth rates and future increase of earnings.
Howing, 625 F. Supp. at 156-57.
216. 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff claimed that the issuer should have
disclosed earnings projections during its self-tender for 15% of its shares and in a later
press release announcing actual results. The tender offer encouraged the plaintiff's in-
terest in the issuer and, without reading the tender offer materials, he purchased more
shares instead of tendering. The subsequent press release, reporting a decline in earn-
ings, caused the plaintiff to sell his shares. The next fiscal quarter the issuer reported
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cussed the approaches of the Seventh, Third, and Sixth Circuits in
Panter,2 17 Flynn, and Radol,2 t a it declined to adopt any of those stan-
dards.2 '9 The court concluded that under the circumstances of the
case before it, there was no duty to disclose projections because the
SEC did not require the disclosure,22 0 projections in general could
mislead investors, and the imposition of a duty to update was im-
practical. 22 ' Although these concerns seem to lead ineluctably to a
per se rule, the court stated that it was not holding that a duty to
disclose projections would never exist under any circumstances. 22
increased earnings. Id. at 705. The district court did not allow the claim on the tender
offer to go to the jury and instructed the jury on the press release claim that an issuer
has no duty to disclose projections. Id. at 705-06 & n.5. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
217. The court read Panter as apparently taking a strict position that there is no duty
to disclose financial projections. Walker, 802 F.2d at 707. But see supra note 185 and text
accompanying notes 183-85. The court also seemed to put the Second Circuit in the
same category, at least as to asset appraisals. Id. at 708 (citing Gerstle v. Gamble
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973)). The Second Circuit, however, has
not considered that issue in light of present SEC policy.
218. Walker, 802 F.2d at 708. The court included the Ninth Circuit as apparently fol-
lowing the Sixth Circuit's approach in Radol. Id. at 708-09 (citing Vaughan v. Teledyne,
Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) (no duty to disclose projections absent evi-
dence that they were "made with reasonable certainty")). This standard does in fact
appear to differ to a significant degree from the Starkman "substantial certainty" test.
Moreover, in South Coast Servs. Corp, v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d
1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit later adopted a strict non-disclosure ap-
proach, based on the reasoning of Gerstle. See supra note 173. The court in South Coast
also noted that even if it applied the SEC's amicus position in Gerstle, the requirements
that the appraisals be by a qualified expert and have a sufficient basis in fact were not
met. Id. at 1272.
219. Walker, 802 F.2d at 703 n.ll.
220. The court noted that there was no requirement to disclose projections under
rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1986), see supra note 148, which governed disclosure
in the "issuer tender offer" out of which the case arose. See supra note 216. The court
also noted that the SEC has not imposed a duty to disclose projections generally. 802
F.2d at 709.
221. 802 F.2d at 710. The issuer prepared various internal projections on a weekly,
monthly, and quarterly basis. Id. at 704-05. However, the issuer would only be required
to update as to material changes and only so long as a prior statement was alive in the
market place. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. No doubt many issuers that
regularly disclose earnings projections generate projections on a similar basis as the
issuer in Walker. In adopting its safe harbor for projections, the SEC reminded issuers of
the obligation to update projections that become materially inaccurate. Securities Act
Release No. 6084, supra note 31.
222. 802 F.2d at 710. The court stated that those projections which are voluntarily
disclosed should be "reasonably certain." Id.
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III. AN APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE OF SOFT INFORMATION
A. The Duty Issue
As discussed previously in this article, the courts often relied on
the SEC's early policy to conclude in a particular case that there was
no duty to disclose soft information, thus avoiding the difficult ma-
teriality issue.2 2 3 With the recent SEC policy shift and the apparent
recognition by the courts that such information may be material, the
courts must now first consider whether there is a legally recognized
source for a duty or an obligation to disclose the information; if so,
only then do they need to determine whether it is material.224 In
discussing this issue, it is helpful to consider persons who may have
disclosure obligations in two general groups, "insiders" and "out-
siders." Generally, insiders are those persons who are officers, di-
rectors, or controlling shareholders of an issuer and other persons
who may be in a position affording access to nonpublic information
from the issuer.225 Outsiders are all other persons.
Although there is some disagreement among commentators,
the courts have been reluctant to hold that issuers and insiders have
223. See cases cited supra notes 48, 51, 53, 173, 177 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986) (under rule
lOb-5, must begin with analysis of whether a duty to disclose exists), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 1284 (1987); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 984 (3d Cir. 1984) (when a
duty to speak exists the securities laws require disclosure of material facts); Staffin v.
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1202 (3d Cir. 1982) (first step is to determine whether there
is a duty to disclose).
225. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1979); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 917 (1961) (in addition to
traditional insiders, an insider's duty may be imposed on persons with access to corpo-
rate information); Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982) (fol-
lowing Cady, Roberts access test to define insider status, but finding no liability). Under
Dirks outsiders can acquire an insider's status, or "become a fiduciary" if they have "en-
tered" into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the [is-
suer] and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes." Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 654-55 & n.14. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (outsider can
become "temporary insider" by "legitimately being given access to confidential corpo-
rate information solely for corporate purposes"). In Tome the defendant who was
deemed to have become a "temporary insider" had developed a relationship affording
access based primarily on friendship with an insider, although he also informally became
an adviser to the corporation. The precise nature of the confidential relationship re-
quirement is unclear at this time. See Hiler, The Judiciary Considers the Nature of Confidential
Relationships in Insider Trading Cases-A Look at United States v. Reed, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 128
(1985). An outsider can also inherit an insider's fiduciary obligation with respect to
public information if the outsider receives the information in breach of a duty by the
insider. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-64. See infra note 244. This article will refer to "insiders"
generally as including the issuer, traditional insiders, and persons who have access to




an "affirmative duty" to disclose material information. That is, even
an issuer and its insiders have no general obligation to disclose facts
as they become material, absent some action or circumstances that
will trigger the duty to disclose.2 26 Once a duty to disclose is trig-
gered, however, the issuer or the insiders involved in the triggering
event will be obliged to disclose all material facts.2 2 7 This does not
mean that they must disclose all facts that would be significant in
any context, for the notion of "materiality" contains some notion of
relevance, as will be evident in the discussion below and in the next
section.
Various events trigger an insider's duty to disclose. First, even
when an issuer or insider is silent, i.e., makes no statement, trading
226. See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22 (lst Cir. 1987); Staffin v. Green-
berg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1202 (3d Cir. 1982); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F.
Supp. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Warner Communications v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp.
1482, 1489 n.12 (D. Del. 1984). See also State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp.,
654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981) (no general duty to disclose information to correct or
verify market rumors). But see Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) ("undue delay" in disclosure
can violate rule lOb-5); Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5092, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970) (suggesting affirmative duty to disclose material business events
promptly; also discussing need to disclose to avoid misleading statements or if issuer is
trading in its own securities); Securities Act Release No. 5699, supra note 21 (setting
forth policy statement on earnings projections; citing Release No. 5092 to remind issu-
ers of their duty to make prompt disclosure of material facts). Although some commen-
tators continue to argue for such a duty, support has not developed in the case law. See
Block, Barton & Garfield, Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Information Concerning Issuer's
Financial Condition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAw. 1243, 1244 n.7 (1985) (authorities
cited therein).
227. See, e.g., Levinson, 786 F.2d at 746 ("If the defendants were under a duty gener-
ally, and if the undisclosed facts were material, a violation has occurred if the other
requisite lOb-5 factors . . . are also present."); Flynn, 744 F.2d at 984 (if duty exists,
disclosure of "any" material facts is required). In Flynn the court's statement is quite
broad: "Where a 'duty to speak' exists, therefore, federal securities law requires disclo-
sure of any 'material fact' [under the antifraud provisions]." 744 F.2d at 984. Several
commentators have questioned whether an outsider who has a duty to disclose, or who
is required to or voluntarily makes some statement, must disclose material information
that is not based on information received from the issuer or insiders or specifically re-
quired by SEC rule or regulation. See, e.g., Schneider and Shargel, Soft Information and
Appraisal Disclosure, 18 REV. SEC. REG. 215, 217 (1985) (discussing Flynn). Based on the
rule in Chiarella that there can be no general duty to disclose absent a confidential rela-
tionship, it would seem that an outsider's obligation, absent inside information, is lim-
ited to making specifically mandated disclosures and such additional disclosures
required so that the disclosures made are not misleading. See infra note 234. It also
seems clear that the court's statement in Flynn was made in the context of the court's
determination that the tender offeror had a duty to disclose in "its capacity as a majority
shareholder," 744 F.2d at 984, and not simply in its capacity as a tender offeror required
to comply with the provisions of SEC regulations governing tender offers. Id. at 984 n.5.
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by the insider in the issuer's securities will trigger a duty to disclose
material facts.228 This rests on the general proscription of the vari-
ous antifraud provisions under the federal securities laws against
fraudulent and deceptive conduct, coupled with the common-law
notion that it is fraudulent for a fiduciary to have an informational
advantage over the beneficiary with whom the fiduciary trades.22 9
Second, if the issuer or insider undertakes to make statements, the
antifraud provisions generally provide-in various contexts-an ob-
ligation to speak truthfully and to make such additional statements
as are necessary to avoid rendering the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, misleading. 230 Fi-
nally, insiders will have to correct or amplify any statements that
they made in the past but that have become false or misleading due
to intervening events.231 This duty lasts as long as the statements
are "alive"; that is, as long as the statements are relevant, and under
228. See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-55; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228, 232; SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 376
(1969). This duty also applies to the outsider who has been "tipped" inside information
by an insider in breach of the insider's fiduciary duties. See infra note 244.
229. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-35 (duty to disclose under rule lOb-5 arises
from existence of fiduciary relationship; adopting the reasoning of Cady, Roberts, which
based duty on access to nonpublic corporate information and unfairness of allowing
person with access to take advantage of that information vis a vis uninformed stockhold-
ers). The Chiarella decision was based on subsections (a) and (c) of rule l0b-5, prohibit-
ing any "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or engaging in any practice "which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." 445 U.S. at 226-27 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a),
(c) (1986)).
230. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 862 (issuer's statements must be not "so in-
complete as to mislead"). An explanation of the scope of this duty is found in Block,
Barton, & Garfield, supra note 226, at 1250-51 (footnotes omitted):
[T]his rule has not been construed to create an affirmative duty to disclose all
material information every time an issuer makes any disclosure. As the Third
Circuit explained in Staffin v. Greenberg: "[W]e do not believe that the intent
of the [Texas Gulf Sulphur] court was to create a doctrine requiring a corporation
to reveal every material corporate fact known to it every time it makes a public
statement." Rather, an issuer must only ensure that when it does have a duty to
disclose specific information, the information it discloses is sufficiently com-
plete so as not to mislead.
This disclosure obligation will also arise under any of the other antifraud provisions
having similar language but applicable to other contexts. See, e.g., Flynn, 744 F.2d at 984
(duty to disclose under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, supra note 211, prohibiting mislead-
ing statements or "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer."). See supra note 33 (listing of various antifraud provisions).
231. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1215 (1985); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y.), revd on other grounds,
607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). See supra note 47.
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existing circumstances, it would be reasonable to rely on them. 232
Outsiders also generally have the latter two disclosure duties
described above.23 In situations in which outsiders are totally si-
lent, however, they usually will not have a duty to disclose material
facts because they do not have a fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship with the issuer's shareholders, which is necessary to render
such silence "fraudulent" or "deceptive," as the Supreme Court has
interpreted those terms under the antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties laws.234
There is another source of a duty to disclose that may apply to
both insiders and outsiders. Certain sections of the federal securi-
ties statutes and certain rules and regulations promulgated by the
SEC require specific disclosures in various situations. 235 These obli-
gations are generally imposed by way of line-item disclosures re-
quired to be made in various filings with the Commission. Thus, for
example, any person making a tender offer for registered equity se-
curities of certain issuers must make specified disclosures regardless
of the offeror's relationship to the issuer.236 Similarly, disclosure
requirements are imposed upon a person soliciting proxies for se-
232. See supra note 47.
233. First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[A] duty
to speak the full truth arises when a defendant undertakes to say anything."); Rowe v.
Maremont Corp., 650 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (interpreting rule lOb-5 as creating
obligation to speak truthfully even if party who undertakes to speak is not an insider or a
fiduciary); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. and Utility Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1206
n.38, 1206-08 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (duty to speak truthfully and so as to avoid being mis-
leading may be imposed on persons not issuers or insiders, under rule lOb-5, if they
undertake "the affirmative act of communicating or disseminating information," with
the intent or knowledge that it may be relied upon in purchasing or selling a security;
also includes duty to correct).
234. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. See also supra note 229. The court in Chiarella held
that, as to an outsider, mere possession of material information does not create a duty to
disclose. The court reasoned that a "duty to disclose arises when one party has informa-
tion 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them.' " Id. at 230 (brackets in original) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 551 (2)(a) (1976)) (additional citations omitted). In
addition, the court recognized that "[slilence in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities may operate as a fraud actionable under 10(b) . . . [b]ut such liability is pre-
mised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween parties to a transaction." Id. An outsider who receives nonpublic corporate
information from an insider in breach of the insider's fiduciary duty, however, will in-
herit the insider's duty to disclose, or abstain from trading with respect to that informa-
tion, even absent a separate confidential relationship between the outsider and the
issuer or its shareholders. See infra note 244.
235. See supra notes 2-3.
236. Exchange Act § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982); SEC regulation 14D, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14d-1 to .14d-9 (1986); SEC schedule 14D-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100.
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curities of certain issuers, regardless of the person's status.23 7 This
information must be disclosed regardless of whether it otherwise
would be deemed material. Moreover, certain of the SEC's sched-
ules and forms, or the rules specifically applicable to them, require
disclosure of all other material facts necessary to avoid rendering the
required statements misleading."' Finally, the prohibition in the
antifraud provisions against misleading statements applies to state-
ments or half-truths made in SEC schedules or forms, and also cre-
ates a duty to correct statements therein that become misleading.2" 9
Applying these rules to the usual types of cases in which soft
information disclosure is at issue, one can say generally that when
issuers or insiders are involved in a transaction with shareholders,
such as a leveraged buyout or a merger that they recommend to
stockholders, they will have a duty to disclose material facts to which
they have access, 240 even if they are otherwise silent. Of course, re-
gardless of their interest in the transaction, once they make any
statements, such statements must be truthful and complete, that is,
not misleading or half-truths.2 4'
237. Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982); SEC regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-13 (1986); SEC schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101.
238. See, e.g., SEC rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1986) (additional material
information as necessary to avoid rendering statements and reports filed under Ex-
change Act §§ 12(b), 12(g), 13, and 15(d) misleading); SEC schedule 14D-1, item 10(o,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100, item 10(d) (additional material information as necessary to
avoid rendering statements made in schedule 14D-1 misleading); SEC rule 14a-9, 17
C.F.R. § 24 0 .14a-9 (prohibiting false or misleading statements as to materials and com-
munications used to solicit proxies); SEC schedule 13E-3, item 16, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
100, item 16 (additional information necessary to avoid rendering statements made in
schedule 13E-3 misleading); SEC rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (additional material in-
formation as necessary to avoid rendering Securities Act registration statement
misleading).
239. See, e.g., SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1012 (1980) (liability under § 10(b) and rule 14a-9 for misleading disclosure in
various Exchange Act reports); SEC v. Youmans, 543 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Tenn. 1982)
(liability under § 10(b) for failure to disclose material facts in reports filed under Ex-
change Act), rev'don other grounds, 729 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Zimmerman, 407
F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C. 1976) (violation of § 10(b) for, among other things, misleading
disclosure in schedule 13D, and periodic reports filed under § 13(a) of the Exchange
Act) aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F. 2d 1149 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (court of appeals remanded for further findings as to the basis for the individual
defendant's liability for the misleading statements), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979).
240. There is authority for the proposition that an insider may not avoid liability for
nondisclosure of material facts to which he merely has access by consciously avoiding
acquiring actual knowledge of such facts. See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d
978, 984 n.5 (3d Cir. 1984) ("While not central to our discussion in the present case, we
note that a policy of conscious ignorance cannot eliminate the fiduciary duty a majority
shareholder owes to the minority shareholders.").
241. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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As to outsiders who, for example, make a tender offer for the
issuer's securities, they generally will acquire a duty to disclose all
material facts only if they become a controlling shareholder or
otherwise take on the status of an insider.242 In such situations, be-
cause they acquire an insider's fiduciary-type relationship to share-
holders, they will have to disclose material information that they
receive from the issuer or to which they have access, as well as, ar-
guably, any relevant information that they generate independently
of information gained from the issuer.243 Under certain circum-
stances, even if the outsider does not take on the status of an in-
sider, the outsider may still be required to disclose material
information acquired from the issuer.24 4 If, however, the outsider
receives no inside information and does not take on the status of an
insider, a duty to disclose will exist only by reference to any applica-
ble, specific SEC disclosure requirement and the antifraud proscrip-
tion against half-truths.
B. Materiality of Soft Information: TSC Industries, Recent Standards,
and a Proposal
Based on the notions of duty discussed above, the most signifi-
cant difference in the disclosure obligations of insiders and outsid-
ers occurs when dealing with an issuer's shareholders. When an
issuer or insider is involved in a transaction with shareholders, such
as in a leveraged buyout, an issuer tender offer, or simply a purchase
or sale of the issuer's securities, a duty to disclose material facts is
triggered even absent specific SEC disclosure rules and even if the
issuer or insider otherwise remains silent. An outsider trading in or
242. See supra notes 225, 234 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 227, 230.
244. An outsider who receives material, nonpublic information from an insider in
breach of the insider's fiduciary duties can be liable for failure to disclose such informa-
tion if the outsider trades in the issuer's securities. The outsider becomes a "tippee"
whose duty is derived from the tipping insider's duty. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
657-58 (1983). Of course, in a customary situation in which an outsider is bargaining
with the issuer as to a merger or other transaction, the issuer usually will authorize the
release of certain nonpublic information. Under such circumstances, the outsider may
not acquire the duties of an insider as to that information. See id. at 659-60 (requiring a
breach of insider's duty before outsider can inherit or assume the duty of an insider);
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing circumstances
under which an outsider may assume a confidential relationship to insider, and thereby
acquire duty of loyalty, i.e., not to misappropriate or use to his personal benefit nonpub-
lic information received from the insider); cf., Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d
796 (2d Cir. 1980) (investment banking firm did not acquire common-law fiduciary duty
of insider by receiving nonpublic information from issuer during arms-length negotia-
tions). Of course, issuers may require confidentiality agreements.
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proposing to purchase an issuer's shares, however, has no such gen-
eral duty. Thus, in transactions proposed by an issuer or insiders
asset valuations and earnings projections could be discloseable in all
situations in which they are material.
For example, earnings projections, it would seem, always would
be relevant to shareholders when they are asked to change funda-
mentally the nature of their investment in the issuer.24 5 Asset valua-
tions could be considered relevant in most situations, even when a
proposed transaction will leave the issuer operating as a going con-
cern. 2 4 6 Many issuers constantly generate internal forecasts and
budgets. Asset valuations may also be frequent, especially if a cor-
porate restructuring or merger is contemplated. The specter of
possibly creating a disclosure issue or a de facto line item require-
ment for existing earnings projections and asset valuations when-
ever the issuer or insiders propose or recommend a transaction to
shareholders may underlie the courts' reluctance to undertake con-
sideration of the materiality of such information.
Arguably, if the issuer or insiders have such information and it
is significant and relevant, then there is no valid reason to withhold
such information from the true owners of the corporation, the
shareholders. Yet the courts have advanced various reasons for not
requiring such disclosure, such as the unreliability of soft informa-
tion, the lack of specific SEC disclosure requirements, or the per-
ceived irrelevance of certain soft information. This section focuses
on whether these reasons and the standards for materiality of soft
information recently enunciated by several courts of appeals are
consistent with the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the
concept of materiality, and whether one standard can suffice for dis-
closure of both hard and soft information.
1. The Materiality Standard of TSC Industries.-The concept of
materiality is central to disclosure under the federal securities laws.
In addition to information expressly required to be disclosed in the
various forms and schedules filed with the SEC, the Commission's
rules require that in certain of those forms and schedules "there
shall be added such further material information, if any, as may be nec-
essary to make the required statements, in light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading. ' 247 Moreover, as dis-
cussed earlier, misstatements or omissions of material facts may vio-
245. See supra notes 12-13.
246. See supra notes 58-60, 67 and accompanying text.
247. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1986) (emphasis added). See also supra note 238.
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late the antifraud provisions, as can a failure to disclose material
facts when a person has a duty to speak.2 48
Before 1976 the SEC and the courts struggled with various ver-
bal formulations in an attempt to find a simple, "objective" standard
for materiality. The different articulations generally focused on the
potential effect that the fact as stated or omitted could have on a
reasonable shareholder or investor in making the relevant decision,
e.g., to buy, sell, or tender securities, or to exercise voting rights.24 9
This focus reflects general agreement that materiality should be
judged through the eyes of those whom the disclosure policy of the
federal securities laws was designed to protect.250 A dispute devel-
oped, though, concerning the degree of certainty that should be re-
quired about whether a fact would affect a shareholder's decision
before that fact would be considered legally material.
In 1976 the Supreme Court decided this issue in TSC Industries,
which involved facts omitted in a proxy statement, allegedly in viola-
tion of rule 14a-9 promulgated under the Exchange Act.25  The
Court held that in the proxy context materiality required that there
be "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would con-
sider [the fact] important in deciding how to vote."' 25 2 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had reversed the lower court's de-
nial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its rule 14a-9
claims, holding that the omitted facts were material as a matter of
law under a standard that covered "all facts which a reasonable
248. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Materiality, "of course, encompasses any fact '...
which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corpora-
tion's stock or securities.' ") (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)) (emphasis added); Fashion Park, 340 F.2d at 462
("The basic test of'materiality' . . . is whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance
. . . in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.' ") (emphasis
added); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 642 (1971) (a fact is material if it
is of "such importance that it could be expected to affect the judgment of investors")
(quoting In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968));
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (violation of rule 10b-5 for trading
while in possession of information "which, if known, would affect [a shareholder's] in-
vestment judgment.").
250. See, e.g., TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976). ("The question
of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, involving the significance of an
omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation
of a general test of materiality occur in the articulation ofjust how significant a fact must
be or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact would affect a reasonable
investor's judgment.").
251. See supra note 186.
252. 426 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
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shareholder might consider important. '"25'
Although the Supreme Court in TSC Industries chose a standard
that it believed "best comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 ...
,,254 the language of that rule is fairly common among the antifraud
provisions, and the policy of the proxy rules-as with the securities
laws in general-is disclosure-oriented.25 5 In fact, the lower courts
have applied the standard of TSC Industries in determining material-
ity under various other antifraud provisions, 25 6 and have even stated
that this standard is applicable to all provisions of the securities
laws.257 Moreover, the SEC has amended the definition of "mate-
rial" in the rules that it has promulgated under certain of the stat-
utes it administers to conform to the language of TSC Industries.258
In TSC Industries the Supreme Court did not question the prem-
ise that the test for materiality should be based on the significance of
a fact to a reasonable investor.259 It has been suggested, however,
that any verbal formulation based on a determination of the poten-
tial effect of a fact on a hypothetical reasonable investor is too un-
certain and subjective, and that some mathematical percentage of a
relevant base amount, such as earnings or assets, or a specified dol-
lar amount should be used to define materiality.2 60 But attempts to
253. 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added), rev'd, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
254. 426 U.S. at 449.
255. Id. at 448 (explaining that purpose of rule 14a-9 is "to ensure disclosures by
corporate management in order to enable the shareholders to make an informed
choice."). See supra notes 26, 33, 80, 99, 211 (language of other antifraud provisions).
256. E.g., SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1323 (11 th Cir. 1982); SEC v.
Washington Utility Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1982); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d
1196 (3d Cir. 1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980);
Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 1980); Steadman v.
SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1130 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 91, reh 'g denied,
451 U.S. 933 (1981); Seaboard World Airlines v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 360 (2d
Cir. 1979); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979) (rule 10b-5).
257. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 176 & n.17 (8th Cir. 1982); see also SEC v.
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978).
258. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383,
Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, [Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328 (Mar. 16, 1982) (amending rule 12b-2 under the Exchange
Act and rule 405 under the Securities Act, both of which define materiality for the pur-
pose of certain reporting or filing requirements).
259. 426 U.S. at 438 ("The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an ob-
jective one, involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reason-
able investor.").
260. See, e.g., Jennings, Reckers & Kneer, Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure-Can the
Disciplined Practitioners Agree?, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 337 (discussed infra note 261). Cf. Kripke,
Facts, supra note 55, at 1075 (suggesting that if certain facts "cannot be ascertained with
any degree of certainty" the notion of materiality is "comparatively unimportant," and
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substitute an across-the-board judgment of an authoritative body
for what is material under a wide range of possible circumstances
would prove unworkable and artificial.26'
the standard should be "whether, after reasonable investigation under the circumstances, the
persons accused of misrepresentation reasonably believed that the presentation which they made was a
fair one") (emphasis in original). An as yet unresolved dispute has raged for some time
over whether the concept of materiality is a purely quantitative one, or whether some
qualitative analysis is also appropriate. See generally Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure
of Information Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 555 (198 1).
The areas in which proponents of qualitative materiality recently have lost the most
ground involve management integrity or unadjudicated illegal or questionable conduct.
See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (no criminal prosecu-
tion for failure to disclose uncharged criminal conduct in proxy materials). Regardless
of the outcome of the dispute as to certain specified situations, there is a need for con-
sideration of the quality of disclosure in any determination of materiality. E.g., AICPA,
Professional Standards No. AU 150.03 (in determining materiality "[o]ne factor to be
considered is the dollar magnitude of the effects. However, materiality does not depend
entirely on relative size; the concept involves qualitative judgments."); AICPA, Profes-
sional Standard No. AU § 312.06-.07 (noting that SFAC 2, supra, "recognizes that mate-
riality judgments are made in light of surrounding circumstances and necessarily involve
both quantitative and qualitative considerations," and stating in § 312.07, "[a]s a result
of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations in materiality judgments,
errors of relatively small amounts detected by the auditor could have a material effect on
the financial statements"). Thus, the concept of materiality contains some consideration
of how a particular false or omitted fact fits into the overall context and circumstances of
disclosure, or alters the "total mix" of information available. A strict percentage
method or non-user oriented standard would not easily accommodate this concern.
261. But see Jennings, Reckers & Kneer, supra note 260. The authors examined the
views of various groups, such as judges, auditors, lawyers and bankers, concerning stan-
dards for materiality of various facts and events, based on percentages or dollar amounts
and merely concluded that there may be mutual ground for agreement on some more
objective, unspecified standard. Id. at 363-65. The authors specifically discussed the
FASB's attempt in 1975 to investigate and to establish a more objective, universal stan-
dard for materiality, and its acknowledgement, in QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF Ac-
COUNTING INFORMATION, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, 131 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1986) [hereinafter SFAC 2] that it was unable to devise an
acceptable standard which could take into consideration all potential factors which could
affect a decision-maker. Jennings, Reckers & Kneer, supra note 260, at 340. See also
Discussion Memorandum, Criteria for Determining Materiality 8 (1975). The FASB was thus
left with a general user-oriented statement:
The essence of the materiality concept is clear. The omission or misstatement
of an item in a financial report is material if, in the light of surrounding circum-
stances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the judgment
of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have been changed or
influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.
SFAC 2, at 132. See also the 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, in which the Committee
concluded:
Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be desirable to have
absolute certainty in the application of the materiality concept, it is its view that
such a goal is illusory and unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmental in
nature and it is not possible to translate this into a numerical formula. The
Committee's advice to the Commission is to avoid this quest for certainty and
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An investor-oriented standard is more consonant with the in-
vestor-protection and full-disclosure policies of the federal securi-
ties laws than a "legislated" percentage or dollar amount test. The
Supreme Court implicitly accepted this notion by its unhesitating
endorsement of a user-oriented basis for its materiality standard in
TSC Industries.
26 2
Indeed, the Court refused to decide the ultimate issue of
whether the omissions were in fact material and reversed the court
of appeals for so deciding, concluding that the determination of ma-
teriality "requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reason-
able shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of these inferences to him, and these assessments are
peculiarly ones for the trier of fact." 263
It was the attempt to substitute a broad policy-based rule
against soft information disclosure for a case-by-case determination
of materiality that led to much of the confusion in dealing with dis-
closure of soft information. This contributed to the bias against soft
information disclosure that continues to pervade the case law in this
area.
2. Materiality of Soft Information Under TSC Industries.-a. Should
Soft Information Ever Be Considered Material?-Under a user-oriented
standard of materiality, the answer to the question of whether soft
information is in fact material is obvious.26" The SEC recognized
the significance to investors of soft information such as earnings
projections and asset appraisals even while it refused to encourage,
and initially prohibited, disclosure of such information.265 The rule
against disclosure of soft information was not a result of judging it
"immaterial" to investors. It was premised, rather, on a policy con-
cern for the potential of such information to mislead investors.
That policy has rightly been repudiated. In effect, the approach in
Flynn of balancing the potential value against the potential harm of
disclosing possibly unreliable soft information has been done on a
to continue consideration of materiality on a case-by-case basis as disclosure
problems are identified.
Id. at 32.
262. See supra note 259.
263. 426 U.S. at 450 (footnote omitted).
264. See, e.g., Fiflis, supra note 5, at 103 ("Given the fact that traditional investment
analysis has been fundamental analysis [i.e., analysis of risk and potential return], the
materiality of soft as well as hard information to investment decisionmaking is evident.")
(footnote omitted).
265. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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policy level. The result has been that the courts and the SEC have
recognized that the significance of such information may indeed
outweigh the potential for shareholder misunderstanding, and that
the information therefore should be judged under some concept of
materiality rather than be subject to a per se exclusionary rule.
A total exclusion of soft information from the boundaries of any
materiality standard because of a policy grounded in fear of investor
misunderstanding is unwarranted in light of the recognition of the
importance of this information.266 Such a policy would also ignore
the realities of the present-day marketplace and the role of analysts
and sophisticated investors in pricing securities in the major mar-
kets. Indeed, although the Court in TSC Industries recognized that
"[s]ome information is of such dubious significance that insistence
on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good, ' 2 6 7 nothing
in the opinion intimates that entire categories of information should
be excluded from consideration. The risk of shareholder misunder-
standing is far outweighed by the need for and the relevance of vari-
ous types of soft information.
b. Recent Standards in the Courts of Appeals.-As discussed previ-
ously, several federal courts of appeals recently have enunciated
standards for determining the materiality of soft information.
These standards are inconsistent with TSC Industries and place un-
due emphasis on the reliability issue, creating a built-in bias against
disclosure of soft information, with too little regard for investor
need for and the potential value of such information.
The Third Circuit-In Flynn the Third Circuit began its analysis of
materiality by stating that in dealing with materiality in the context
of a tender offer and alleged violations of section 14(e) of the Ex-
change Act, it would follow the standard set forth in TSC Indus-
tries.26 8 The court discussed the SEC's early prohibition of soft
information disclosure and the federal courts' reliance on that pol-
icy in creating a rule that did not require disclosure, even when a
duty to speak existed. 26 9 The Flynn court concluded that in light of
the SEC's recent policy change and the evolution of the law in the
266. See, e.g., 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, at 347-50. See also Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814
F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987) (although holding that preliminary merger discussions are not
material based on policy reasons, court rejected the argument that disclosure of soft
information should not be required because of the tendency to confuse investors); infra
note 318.
267. 426 U.S. at 448.
268. 744 F.2d. at 985.
269. Id. at 985-86.
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area of soft information, the Third Circuit would no longer consider
asset appraisals immaterial as a matter of law. 270 The Third Circuit
then announced a standard that requires a court to balance "the po-
tential aid such information will give a shareholder against the po-
tential harm, such as undue reliance, if the information is released
with a proper cautionary note. "271
On close analysis, this standard does little to change the ex-
isting bias against soft information. The courts in early decisions
could not avoid an implicit consideration of shareholder need, yet
they consistently ruled against disclosure, based on the concern for
unreliability. The Flynn standard still allows a court to place undue
emphasis on the potential unreliability of soft information and,
therefore, allows this to become a predominate concern, as it was
under previous court decisions.2 72
But the difficulty with the standard runs deeper. The Flynn
court, although stating that it would follow TSC Industries, in fact did
not expressly reconcile its test with the Supreme Court's standard.
The Flynn test is inconsistent with the user-oriented approach of
TSC Industries. The test substitutes a court's judgment about
whether the information will aid or harm a shareholder for the anal-
ysis, required by TSC Industries, of what a reasonable investor's judg-
ment would be concerning the significance of the information in
such an investor's decisionmaking process. Certainly, under TSC In-
dustries a court is called upon ultimately to use its own judgment in
making this latter determination. Yet, a determination of whether
the potential aid of information outweighs its potential harm or un-
certainty, as suggested in Flynn, too easily allows the result to be
dictated by the particular court's view of the reliability issue in
general.
In order for the Flynn test to be consistent with TSC Industries, it
must be true that before there is a substantial likelihood that a rea-
sonable investor would consider information important, the inves-
tor would determine that the "aid" of the information outweighs its
potential to mislead or to harm. But an investor will attempt to un-
270. Id. at 988.
271. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 190-99.
272. If, however, the court emphasizes the clause in the Flynn test that requires con-
sideration of the effects of disclosure "with a proper cautionary note," id., disclosure
could be favored, depending on the court's view of shareholder sophistication. See, e.g.,
Schneider & Shargel, Soft Information and Appraisal Disclosure, 18 REV. SEC. REG. 215, 219




derstand the uncertainties of information and factor any risk associ-
ated with those uncertainties into a determination about the value of
the information. 73 The Flynn test, thus, does not accurately reflect
the core philosophy of TSC Industries, which looks to the effect of the
information on the investor decisionmaking process. Flynn focuses
not on the potential risk of return represented by the information,
but on the potential for an investor to misunderstand or to be mis-
led by the information. In reality, an investor may well determine to
accept a great risk of misunderstanding the information because of
the potential for a large return if that information is interpreted ac-
curately. 74 Attempts to determine, through Flynn, the point at
which the potential size of the return outweighs the risk of misun-
derstanding would prove difficult.
The Sixth Circuit-The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
also recently confronted the issue of materiality of soft information.
In Starkman the Sixth Circuit considered the materiality of valuations
of oil and gas properties.275 The specific valuations at issue were
based, in part, on "possible" or "probable" reserves.2 7 6 The court
found that cases in the Sixth Circuit "firmly establish the rule that
soft information such as asset appraisals and projections must be
disclosed only if the reported values are virtually as certain as hard
facts." ' 2 7 7 It further stated: "Our cases fully support a rule under
which a tender offer target must disclose projections and asset ap-
praisals based upon predictions regarding future economic and cor-
porate events only if the predictions underlying the appraisal or
projection are substantially certain to hold. '2 78 The court held that
the issuer was not required to disclose the valuations at issue in its
public statements made in opposition to a hostile tender offer. 2 7 9
The Starkman rule was followed in the companion case of Radol, in
which the court held that the same valuations were not required to
be disclosed in tender offer materials used by a subsequent friendly
suitor or in the issuer's filing in support of that offer.2 80
273. See infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
274. Indeed, since hard facts are readily available, it has been noted, for example as to
projections, that "[tihe value to the investor--.e., the materiality-of management's
projections is roughly inversely proportionate to the certitude with which projections
can be prepared." Libby & Rollinson, supra note 12, at 703.
275. 772 F.2d at 234. See supra text accompanying notes 200-09.
276. 772 F.2d at 240-41.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 242.
280. Radol, 772 F.2d at 252-53. See supra text accompanying notes 210-14.
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The Starkman/Radol standard is clearly inconsistent with TSC In-
dustries. The "substantial likelihood" test of TSC Industries focuses
on the likelihood that the information will affect a shareholder's de-
cision." 8' The "substantial certainty" test of Starkman and Radol fo-
cuses on the likelihood that the information will prove to be
accurate. It reflects the court's judgment that in all cases soft infor-
mation will be substantially likely to affect a shareholder decision
only if the information is substantially certain to prove true. This
unsupported assumption is at odds with the observations in TSC In-
dustries that the determination of materiality is best left to a jury and
requires a "delicate assessment" of the potential inferences an in-
vestor might draw from a particular set of facts.282 The rule of
Starkman does not allow for an analysis of the information's effect on
a reasonable shareholder or on the "total mix" of information
under the specific circumstances at hand until the information is
"virtually as certain as hard facts."283
It seems clear that an important concern of the Sixth Circuit is
to give comfort to management in its disclosure decisions. In Radol
the court described the purpose of the "substantial likelihood" test
of TSC Industries as "to lessen the uncertainty facing corporate offi-
cials in determining what must be disclosed while preserving share-
holders' access to all truly factual information. ' 284 But the court's
rule does not present a test for assessing a reasonable shareholder's
view of soft information that is consistent with TSC Industries, and
the desire to comfort management in disclosure decisions cannot
justify this deviation. The Starkman/Radol standard subjugates
shareholder need for soft information to a concern for certainty.
Moreover, although it provides more certainty for management, the
standard still allows for substantial litigation over materiality issues.
The added degree of protection at the expense of disclosure is not
justifiable, even absent the mandate of TSC Industries.2 85 Manage-
281. See supra notes 186, 250, 259.
282. See 426 U.S. at 450.
283. 772 F.2d at 241.
284. Id. at 253. Although the TSC Industries Court was concerned with subjecting
management to liability for "insignificant omissions or misstatements," 426 U.S. at 448,
this was not the core concern of the Court in enunciating its standard, and nothing in
the opinion intimates that only "truly factual information" need be disclosed. See infra
note 285. The Court's main concern was to ensure disclosure of information "to enable
shareholders to make an informed choice." Id. at 448.
285. See 426 U.S. at 448 ("And particularly in view of the prophylactic purpose [of
rule 14a-9] and the fact that the content of the proxy statements is within management's
control, it is appropriate that . . . doubts [as to the need for omitted information] be
resolved in favor of those the statute is designed to protect.").
1987] 1181
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ment is in a unique position to judge the value of soft information,
and thus the need for disclosure. Management also controls the
context of disclosure and can provide appropriate qualifying lan-
guage to avoid liability for uncertain information. And, if manage-
ment discloses soft information that fails to hold, it need only have
acted in good faith and have had a reasonable basis for the informa-
tion-not a substantially certain one-in order to avoid liability.2 s6
3. A Materiality Standard for Soft Information.-These criticisms
of the Flynn and Starkman/Radol standards are not simply based on
rhetorical differences between the language of these opinions and
TSC Industries. There are obvious difficulties in attempting to find a
verbal formulation that provides an objective standard suitable for
the myriad of situations in which the materiality issue arises. The
search for an appropriate standard, however, is not a mere exercise
in semantics. Rather, the standard, for all its ineluctable inadequa-
cies, should seek to advance the disclosure philosophy of the federal
securities laws.
In TSC Industries the Court finally settled on a user-oriented
standard because it believed that such a standard was most consis-
tent with the policies to be served under the proxy rules.28 7 In light
of the full-disclosure policy of the federal securities laws, the SEC's
current policy encouraging disclosure of soft information, 218 and
the obvious relevance to investors of forward-looking and valuative
information, the standard for judging the materiality of such infor-
mation should also encourage its disclosure, or at least should not
discourage it.
The standard for soft information, as with hard facts, should be
user-oriented, consistent with TSC Industries. It should also allow for
consideration of the reliability issue, which is somewhat unique to
soft information. Yet to advance the policy of full disclosure, the
standard should provide a formula that directs the courts and man-
agement to give adequate consideration to the relevance of such in-
formation, while it protects against providing an avenue for the
reliability issue to become the dominant concern.
Since the initial concern in developing a standard is that it be
user-oriented, the search should begin with an analysis of the inves-
tor decisionmaking process that the disclosure scheme of the federal
286. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
287. See supra text accompanying note 254.
288. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (1986) discussed at supra note 32.
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securities laws seek to enhance. The general theory of investment
analysis upon which the SEC's mandated disclosure system is based,
and which provides a logical, objective framework for investor deci-
sions, is "fundamental analysis." '289 This method of investment
decisionmaking involves analysis of available data to determine the
potential return on specific investments and the concomitant risk
that the expected return will vary.29 Evaluation of risk versus re-
turn is necessarily a future-oriented inquiry.
The standard of TSC Industries provides an appropriate basic
structure for inquiring into the specific risk/return analysis that an
investor will make in a given situation. Determining whether a spe-
cific piece of information has a significant propensity to affect a
shareholder's decision or, in the words of TSC Industries, presents a
"substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider it
important," necessarily involves an inquiry into the possible effect
that the addition of that information to the "total mix" available will
have on an investor's analysis of potential risk and return. Thus, the
289. See, e.g., Fiflis, supra note 5, at 102-04 (discussing the importance to investors of
analysis of risk versus return; noting SEC's acceptance of fundamental analysis in ad-
ministering the disclosure system of the federal securities laws). See also supra note 264,
infra note 290.
290. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTE, SECURITY ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1962); 1977
REPORT, supra note 1, Introduction, at pp. IX-XX (discussing the work of Graham and
Dodd):
When [an] allocation decision relates to investment the benefit [sought to be
maximized] is usually defined in terms of "return," that is, either income or
increase in value of the amount allocated to the investment. Essential to invest-
ment decisions are perceptions with respect not only to return but to risk as
well; investment portfolio theory has made significant contributions to the de-
velopment of these concepts and the nature of their relationship.
Id. at pp. XIV-XV.
"Investment portfolio theory" involves the attempt to minimize risk through portfolio
diversification. Seegenerally J. LORIE& M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET, THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE (1973) (cited and discussed in the 1977 REPORT, supra note 1, Introduction).
Finally, in discussing whether theories of investment analysis support the need for a
mandatory system of corporate disclosure, the Committee on Corporate Disclosure
stated:
[I]ncreasingly portfolio managers were attentive to the so-called "beta coef-
fient" which was a measure of risk. Emerging portfolio theory suggested that
sensible investment policy entailed a judgment with respect to the degree of
risk desired in the portfolio and the investment of the portfolio resources in
securities having beta coefficients which would average out to the desired de-
gree of risk. These theories do not militate against a mandatory disclosure sys-
tem. If anything they suggest a maximization of the quantity and quality of
disclosure through a mandatory component in order that the beta of securities
may more accurately reflect the degree of risk.
Id. at pp. XL-XLI.
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TSC Industries standard is properly based in the theory of fundamen-
tal analysis.
When "hard" information is at issue, the standard provides a
general framework for a more specific factual analysis that focuses
on what the information means in the totality of the issuer's opera-
tions, i.e., what return on investment is indicated. But when the
"fact" at issue is forward-looking or soft information, an investor's
specific evaluation of potential risk will include an initial analysis of
whether the "fact" will or will not occur or hold. In making this
analysis, it is reasonable to assume that the greater the potential re-
turn in the event the information proves accurate, the greater the
risk of nonoccurrence a reasonable investor may be willing to bear.
The smaller the potential return, the smaller the acceptable risk. A
verbal formulation that expresses this relationship already exists
and has been applied by the courts in insider trading cases involving
soft information.
In the seminal case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 291 a central
issue was whether the test results of an exploratory drill hole were
material for purposes of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.2 92 The re-
sults indicated "the possibility ...of the existence of a [copper]
mine of vast magnitude .... In determining whether a reason-
able investor would attach importance to this "possibility," the
court stated that materiality "will depend at any given time upon a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of
company activity."' 294 Applying this test the Second Circuit found
that the information was material despite expert testimony at trial
that "one drill core does not establish an ore body much less a mine
.... "295 Thus, in an early case involving soft information-the eval-
uation of a drilling test that indicated the possibility of a valuable
ore mine-the Second Circuit had little difficulty in finding material-
ity, at a time when the courts and the SEC declined to impose an
291. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 976 (1969).
292. Id. at 848-52. The court was discussing materiality to determine whether insid-
ers who possessed the information were prohibited by rule lob-5 from trading in the
issuer's securities. The appellate court also considered whether a press release issued
by the company was materially false and misleading, but did not discuss the materiality
of the release as such. Id. at 862-64. The Second Circuit remanded this issue for a
determination of "whether the release was misleading to the reasonable investor .
Id. at 864.
293. Id. at 849.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 851.
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obligation to disclose soft information in other contexts, based on
policy concerns.
In a subsequent decision the Second Circuit applied the
probability/magnitude test to another type of future-oriented infor-
mation in an insider trading case. In SEC v. Shapiro29 6 the Second
Circuit affirmed the lower court's determination that preliminary
merger discussions were material and that trading in the target's se-
curities by certain persons privy to those discussions violated rule
1b5 29 7lOb-5.29
Discussing materiality, the court stated: "Facts are material for
purposes of rule lOb-5 if a 'reasonable investor might have consid-
ered them important in the making of [an investment] deci-
sion.' "298 "Whether facts relating to a future event are material
depends 'upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light
of the totality of the company activity.' "299
Even though the target had formally rejected the initial over-
ture by the potential merger partner, the court found that the
merger discussions were material because of two significant
"events" that occurred shortly prior to the purchases. First, pro
forma financial statements were compiled that projected a signifi-
cant earnings increase if the merger were consummated; and sec-
ond, one director agreed to raise again the issue of a merger with
members of the target's board of directors. In applying the balanc-
ing test to these events the court stated: "Although the negotiations
had not jelled to the point where a merger was probable, the possi-
bility was not so remote that, when considered in the light of a pro-
jected increase of at least 600% in [the issuer's] earnings per share,
it might not have influenced a reasonable investor."300
296. 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
297. Id. at 1307.
298. Id. at 1305 (citations omitted). The court used a "might have" standard, quoting
and citing several Supreme Court decisions which had used that language. In TSC Indus-
tries, however, the Supreme Court refused to rely on the language of those cases, and
adopted a "would have" standard. See supra text accompanying notes 249-53. The
Court distinguished the language of the cases cited in Shapiro, noting that it had specifi-
cally declined to consider the issue in one of the cases, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375 (1970), and that its reference to materiality in the other case, Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) was merely "to give a 'sense' of the no-
tion," in order to reach the primary issue in that case. TSC Industries, 462 U.S. at 446-47
& n.9.
299. 494 F.2d at 1305-06 (citing Texas Gulf Sulphur).
300. Id. at 1306-07. Although the degree of certainty that these events would influ-
ence an investor must be greater after TSC Industries, see supra note 298, the basic ele-
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The probability/magnitude test clearly is grounded in the pro-
cess of fundamental analysis upon which reasonable investment de-
cisions are based. It balances the potential return (the magnitude of
the event) with the potential risk that the return will vary or will not
materialize (the probability of occurrence). The reliability issue is
encompassed within the risk side of the test. Yet the test safeguards
against making the reliability issue dominant, because the test rec-
ognizes the reality of investor decisionmaking: that the greater the
potential return, the less probability or certainty is required before
an investor's decision is likely to be affected. The test considers
whether one of the two elements is great enough to overcome the
weakness of the other in its potential impact on an investor.
The probability/magnitude test is not a substitute for the gen-
eral standard of TSC Industries, but rather it is a more specific appli-
cation of that standard to situations involving future events and soft
information. That is, it is a method of determining whether for-
ward-looking information in a specific case presents, as required by
TSC Industries, a reasonable likelihood that it would affect a share-
holder's decision.
Because most of the decisions in which courts have applied the
probability/magnitude test are insider trading cases, the question
arises whether the test is appropriate in other contexts. Several
courts have expressed the view that information becomes material at
an earlier stage in an insider trading context. For example, in SEC
v. Geon Industries, "' in finding even "embryonic" merger discussions
material,3" 2 the Second Circuit stated:
In cases of the disclosure of inside information to a favored
few, determination of materiality has a different aspect than
when the issue is, for example, an inaccuracy in a publicly
disseminated press release... ; the information takes on an
added charge just because it is inside information."0 '
ments of the test in Shapiro nevertheless are valid under, and consistent with, TSC
Industries. See also SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); Harkavy v.
Apparel Indus., 571 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1978) (applying the probability/magnitude
test in an insider trading case subsequent to TSC Industries). See also Radiation Dynamics,
Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972) (reviewing jury instructions in insider
trading case in light of probability/magnitude test). At least one court has applied the
probability/magnitude test in a non-insider trading, corporate disclosure context. SEC
v. Mize, 615 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980) (failure to disclose in
registration statement discussions concerning proposal to acquire control of subsidiary
being spun-off judged by probability/magnitude test).
301. 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
302. Id. at 47.
303. Id. at 48 (citations omitted).
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The district court in Levinson v. Basic Inc. ," in holding that the
merger discussions at issue in that case were not material for pur-
poses of a target's public disclosure, in fact distinguished the finding
of materiality in Geon because it was an insider trading case. 30 5
Information may indeed be more significant in a case of selec-
tive disclosure, but the probability/magnitude test is uniquely able
to take into consideration any "added charge" that an insider trad-
ing context might give to soft information while remaining suitable
for other contexts.
For example, in the insider trading context, when a security is
trading at $40 per share and nonpublic preliminary merger negotia-
tions are occurring, an insider who has this information could buy
the security at $40 and await the announcement of a merger-or
even simply the fact of negotiations-to cause the market price to
rise. The only "risk" involved is that if such an announcement is not
made, the insider will have to resell at $40, bearing only the normal
market risk in the interim that the price will fall due to other factors.
Under such circumstances, the insider may be willing to buy the se-
curity even if the information is extremely tentative and would not
otherwise be considered important enough to disclose. Thus, the
information, simply because it is able to be used before being made
public, has an "added charge."
The somewhat "riskless" nature of the insider's transaction can
be factored into the probability/magnitude test. The Geon court's
view that information "takes on an added charge just because it is
inside information, ' 306 is another way of saying that an insider is
willing to trade based on the information because the financial risk
of losing money is minimal, or at least is not tied to the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of the possible event of which the insider has knowl-
edge. The Geon view is open to criticism because, it can be argued,
the materiality of information to all investors generally should not
be judged by a different standard simply because an insider pos-
sesses that information and plans to take a long-shot by trading.30 7
304. [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,801 (N.D. Ohio 1984), af'd
in part, rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987); see
infra text accompanying notes 316-18.
305. Id. at 90,015 n. 11.
306. 531 F.2d at 48.
307. See, e.g., Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227 (1st
Cir. 1984). In refusing to apply a lower standard for materiality to proxy disclosure
drafted by insiders interested in the subject transaction, the First Circuit stated: "A fact
does not become more material to the shareholder's decision because it is withheld by
an insider, or because the insider might profit by withholding it." Id. at 1231. Neverthe-
1987] 1187
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Regardless of the merits of the issue, however, a court following
Geon can simply factor the risklessness of the insider's transaction
into the probability/magnitude analysis.
The probability/magnitude balancing test is also well suited for
general corporate disclosure situations.3 0 8 In fact, the SEC has ad-
vanced the test in dealing with forward-looking information in the
corporate disclosure context. In a recent amicus brief in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson3"9 the SEC urged the Supreme Court to reject the material-
ity standard followed by the Sixth Circuit in Levinson" ° as well as the
conflicting standard adopted by the Third Circuit in Staffin v. Green-
less, the context of disclosure may affect the point at which a particular fact becomes
material. Consider the solution reached in Pavlidis:
This is not to say, however, that court [sic] must ignore the interests of the
parties who drafted the proxy statement in deciding whether they have met
their obligation to disclose material facts. Certain facts might be material in the
context of a one-sided transaction that would not be material in the context of
an adversarial transaction. Therefore, although the same standard of materiality
would apply to both kinds of transactions, the standard might identify different
facts as material in each transaction.
Id. (emphasis in original).
308. See, e.g., SEC v. Mize, 615 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980)
(applying test to failure to disclose in registration statement discussions concerning pro-
posal to require control of subsidiary). In contrast, the federal district court for the
Southern District of New York refused to apply the balancing test of Texas Gulf Sulphur
where it was charged that the issuer violated § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, by failing to
disclose earnings projections in its self-tender offer materials. The court distinguished
Texas Gulf Sulphur as involving the disclosure of "events that were likely to occur in the
future," whereas, in the court's view, earnings projections involve personal "interpreta-
tion" of facts and "analysis of the possible effects on the company's future operations."
Fisher v. Plessey Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,129, at
95,466 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 1983) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the court stated
that in the context of a claim of inadequate corporate disclosure, to the extent that a
claim by the defendants concerning the issuer's failure to disclose new contracts and
new telephone equipment under development involved "future events," the
probability/magnitude test should be applied. Id. at n. 14. The court accordingly de-
clined to decide the materiality of such information on the motion for summary judg-
ment that was before it.
The Fisher court's distinction does not appear to be unwarranted. At issue in Texas
Gulf Sulphur was the meaning of test results. In one sense such results were "events" or
"facts", but in another, the insiders' knowledge of and the issuer's announcement con-
cerning the results involved analysis and interpretation of technical readings concerning
ore content and grade. Analysis and interpretation were required by those with the test
results in order to render the results meaningful. Moreover, although an insider does
not have to disclose the fruits of his own personal analysis, projections prepared for
corporate use or based upon nonpublic information are on different footing, rightfully
belonging to the issuer and its stockholders.
309. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, No. 85-279 (U.S. filed Apr. 1987), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987) [her-
ineafter Amicus Brief]..
310. 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
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berg " and Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc." 2 and by the Seventh Circuit in
Flamm v. Eberstadt.'3" Those cases involved the issue of at what
point preliminary merger discussions become material under rule
lOb-5 for purposes of corporate disclosure.
In Staffin the Third Circuit held that merger negotiations are
"immaterial as a matter of law" until an agreement in principle is
reached.3" 4 In Heublein the court reaffirmed its holding in Staffin and
noted that agreement on price and structure are "typically critical
aspects of any merger.-3 15 It indicated that these elements are nec-
essary if merger negotiations are to be considered material.3 1 6
Based on this standard, the Heublein court found that a public state-
ment that the company was "aware of no reason" that would explain
increased market activity in its stock was not materially misleading
in failing to include disclosure of ongoing preliminary merger
311discussions.
In Flamm the Seventh Circuit accepted the price/structure stan-
dard to affirm a jury verdict in favor of defendants in a case involv-
ing failure to disclose the corporation's efforts to attract a merger
partner in the face of a hostile tender offer.31 8 The court did not
rest its decision on any perceived insignificance of preliminary
merger discussions.3 1 1 Rather, it adopted the strict rule of Staffin,
based on dual policy concerns for management's need of a bright-
line materiality test when involved in preliminary merger negotia-
tions and the tendency of "premature disclosure," in the court's
311. 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
312. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
313. 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987).
314. 672 F.2d at 1205-07.
315. 742 F.2d at 756-57.
316. Id. at 757.
317. Id. at 757, 759.
318. At issue were the jury instructions. The court of appeals, although questioning
the propriety of the instructions, id. at 1173-74, looked beyond that issue and affirmed
on the "alternative ground" that the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
issue of materiality should have been granted. Id. at 1174. No niew briefs were re-
quested. Id. See also id. at 1181-82 (Cudahy, J., concurring in judgment and concurring
in part) (noting lack of argument on the issue decided and lack of opportunity for SEC
amicus position).
319. Indeed, the court stated: "From one perspective this conclusion [that a search
for a merger partner is immaterial] is simply another cause for wonderment at the legal
mind." Id. at 1174. The court later remarked: "[S]ome information is almost always
preferable to none. Investors, who appreciate the necessary omissions, can deal with
risk." See also Rowe v. Maremount Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,239, at 96,158 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1986) (stating that the Seventh Circuit noted in a
case prior to Flamm that the policy underlying the price/structure rule "is not that
merger discussions are unimportant to investors").
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view, to inhibit or frustrate such discussions.3 20
In Levinson the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment on the rule 1Ob-5 claim and found that an
issuer's specific public denial of merger negotiations and its two de-
nials of any corporate developments that would explain increased
market activity in its stock were materially false or misleading.32'
The court held that "information concerning ongoing acquisitions
discussions becomes material by virtue of [a] statement denying their
existence. "322
In its amicus brief in Levinson, the SEC disagreed with both the
Levinson and the Staffin/Heublein/Flamm standards. Relying on the
general standard set forth in TSC Industries, the SEC advanced the
probability/magnitude test enunciated in Texas Gulf Sulphur for de-
termining the materiality of a "future, uncertain event," such as a
merger.3
23
320. Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1178. The court treated the case before it as one involving an
omission in various statements made by the target management in opposition to the
unsolicited tender offers. Id. at 1179. The case thus differs from Levinson and Heublein in
which the issuers made public statements denying the existence of merger discussions or
of any material corporate developments. The Flamm court, therefore, did not choose
between the Levinson view-that otherwise immaterial discussions become discloseable
by virtue of a statement denying their existence, see supra text accompanying note 322-
and the Heublein view that a denial of such discussions is acceptable. Flamm, 814 F.2d at
1179. However, the Flamm court suggested: "If by hypothesis silence is the best course
for investors, then it may be necessary to condone evasive answers, as the Third Circuit
did in Greenfield, to put pursuers off the scent for a time." Id. at 1178 (citations omitted).
But cf. Rowe v. Maremount Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,239, at
96,158 (N.D. Ill.June 3, 1986) (in a case prior to Flamm, noting Seventh Circuit's discus-
sion of the policy underlying the price/structure rule in a previous case and refusing to
apply the rule in a case involving affirmative misstatements.).
321. 786 F.2d at 747-48, 751. The lower court had held that although two of the
statements were false and misleading, they were not material. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 304-05. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's class certification and
remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 751.
322. Id. at 748 (emphasis in original).
323. Amicus Brief, supra note 309, at 5, 8-15.
In general, the SEC viewed the policy considerations advanced for the
price/structure rule-(i) potential for investor misunderstanding, (ii) inhibition of
merger discussions, and (iii) need for a bright-line test-as overstated, not justifying
misleading statements, and unrelated to the standard of TSC Industries. The SEC consid-
ered the bright-line test to be inconsistent with the "discerning inquiry" required by
TSC Industries. Id. at 14-18.
The SEC found the Levinson court's test faulty in its "apparent equating of falsehood
with materiality," which "has no basis under [TSC Industries]." Id. at 18-19.
See also Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Cu-
riae, Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) (attaching the amicus
brief of the United States on petition for writ of certiorari in Levinson and stating that the
Commission "strongly disagrees with the Third Circuit test of materiality," [at p. 3]
which was applied by the lower court in Jordan); Brief for the United States as Amicus
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The approach of the Third and Seventh Circuits in the area of
preliminary merger negotiations, favoring a per se or strictly de-
fined rule based on the degree of certainty or the "hardness" of the
negotiations, is similar to the early approach to earnings projections
in the concerns for reliability and the potential to mislead share-
holders. To support the price/structure rule the Third Circuit pos-
ited that disclosure of tentative merger discussions could do more
harm than good if such disclosure causes increased investor specula-
tion and, thereafter, an agreement fails to materialize. 24 This argu-
ment, however, fails, as it did in the case of earnings projections, in
light of the importance of the information to investors. The user-
oriented standard of TSC Industries requires, ultimately, that the in-
formation be judged by its importance to investors. The
probability/magnitude test allows for proper consideration under
such a standard of whether a reasonable shareholder would view the
information as so speculative or as evidencing such uncertainty that
it would not likely affect the decisionmaking process.
It has been correctly observed that "[t]he general premise of
Curiae at 16 n.17, Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985) (petition for writ of
certiorari) (noting that several circuit courts applied the probability/magnitude test in
assessing "the materiality of predictive information") cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986);
In the Matter of Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,596 n.7 (July 8, 1985) (noting use of
probability/magnitude test in Second Circuit). In Carnation the SEC, in concluding that
a corporate statement denying takeover discussions was materially false and misleading,
stated its belief that "Heublein was wrongly decided." Id. at 87,596 n.8. Cf. In the Mat-
ter of Allied Stores Corp. and George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 24,648,
[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (June 29, 1987) (administrative pro-
ceeding instituted against issuers and counsel for alleged failure to make timely disclo-
sure in schedule 14d-9 of negotiations for sale of assets and for merger before
agreement in principle was reached as to the latter).
324. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982) ("The reason that
preliminary merger discussions are immaterial as a matter of law is that disclosure of
them may itself be misleading."). See also Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1195-96
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711
F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Disclosure may in fact be more misleading than secrecy so
far as investment decisions are concerned."); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur
Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1970) (failure to disclose consideration of plan to
merge in schedule 13D).
The Seventh Circuit specifically rejected this argument as a basis for the rule:
It assumes that investors are ... unable to appreciate-even when told-that
mergers are risky propositions up until the closing. To attribute to investors a
child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the probabilistic significance of nego-
tiations, implies that they should not be told about new plants, new products,
new managers, or any of the other changes in the life of the corporation. These
new events-things with the potential for boom or bust-are exactly the news
on which sophisticated investors make most decisions ....
Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987).
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the securities laws is to give investors all relevant information, and
rely on them to make their own evaluations. '3 25 Thus, management
should not be allowed to withhold important relevant information
based on fear of investor misunderstanding. Management controls
the content and, to a great extent, the timing of disclosure, and can
provide appropriate cautionary language or disclose the uncertainty
of outcome.3 26 Experience must be gained in providing proper cau-
tionary legends. As the Commission has recognized in the financial
statement context, "[i]n a business world characterized by uncer-
tainty, it is necessary to recognize that [information] based on sub-
jective judgments must be included [in corporate disclosure] and
that appropriate means of describing the uncertainties and the lack
of precision in the data must be found. 3 2 7
A more compelling argument advanced to justify a strict stan-
dard for merger negotiations, and for materiality of future-oriented
information in general, is that there should be more certainty for
management, especially in light of the potential for substantial lia-
bility for misleading corporate statements.328 Yet in their quest to
325. Kripke, Nits, supra note 4, at 268 (also noting: "In effect, the traditional view on
soft information is based on the paternalistic view that certain investors may misuse such
information.").
326. For example, in rejecting the argument that the potential to mislead investors
can justify a bright-line or per se immateriality standard for preliminary merger discus-
sions in an amicus position in Michaels, the SEC argued:
The Commission does not agree with this reasoning. As noted, the obligation
to disclose even material merger negotiations only arises in certain situations
that are largely in the corporation's control, such as where it is trading in its
stock or has made a public statement. Disclosure is necessary in most cases to
correct a potentially misleading situation already created by the corporation.
In such situations, it should be a relatively simple matter for a corporation to
disclose that it is engaged in preliminary talks toward a possible merger, that
there is no agreement to merge, and that the results of the talks cannot be
predicted.
Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 7,
Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985) (in connection with pending peti-
tion and suggestion of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986) [hereinafter
Michaels Memorandum]. See also Amicus Brief, supra note 309, at 15-16.
327. Accounting Series Release No. 190, 41 Fed. Reg. 13596 (1976) (adopting
amendments to regulation S-X requiring disclosure of certain replacement cost data;
deleting Accounting Series Release 271, 44 Fed. Reg. 62888 (Nov. 1, 1979)). See supra
notes 166-67. See also supra note 6.
328. An additional argument advanced in Flamm that is specifically applicable to dis-
closure of preliminary merger discussions is that disclosure prior to an agreement in
principle will frustrate or inhibit the discussions since potential acquirors do not wish to
negotiate "in the glare of publicity." 814 F.2d at 1176. The Flamm court ultimately
justifies keeping admittedly significant information about a potential merger from share-
holders because those shareholders who are not "hair-trigger sellers" will reap benefits
from the eventual merger price-if a merger materializes. Id. If not allowed to negoti-
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provide certainty and to resolve the reliability issue objectively, the
ate in secrecy, the argument goes, potential acquirors will not bid for fear of being
forced into a bidding war in which they will pay too much or lose the opportunities that
they discovered. Id. at 1177.
The fear that potential "white knights" or other bidders-sophisticated and power-
ful market players-will pay too much and therefore will learn their lesson and stay out
of the market seems an overstatement of the trepidation of this usually sturdy lot. In-
deed, this should not be a cause for alarm in an efficient market. The bidder who repeat-
edly would overpay should be weeded out. If, however, the target is worth that much,
then let the bidder pay. In between these extremes is the fear that our craven bidder will
not bid if not guaranteed a deal negotiated comfortably and privately with management.
In such situations, management's interests conflict with those of shareholders. See, e.g.,
Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L. REV. 240, 243-47 (1984).
At this point, we do well to remember Brandeis' oft quoted maxim, "Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." L. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1981). We should be careful not to douse or weaken those
lights, glaring though they may be, until we are certain that the streets are fairly safe for
all.
In fact, these arguments on the whole seem to advance a policy of preserving the
market for only the "big players," rather than to provide a means of ensuring that (all?)
mergers succeed for the benefit of "most" shareholders. The major premise of this
policy-that mergers are to be encouraged-is and should remain open to discussion
rather than being substituted for full disclosure as the major goal of the securities laws.
Short-term returns to "most" shareholders may not be the best or even the largest re-
turns for individual shareholders-or for society as a whole. See, e.g., Why is No One Safe?,
FORBES, Mar. 11, 1985, at 134. The article explains:
Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, a target's shareholders are often better
off if a tender offer fails. We studied 39 cases in which companies successfully
resisted hostile tenders. In 17 cases, the value of the target's stock at year-end
1984 exceeded what a shareholder would have if the offer had succeeded and
the proceeds had been reinvested in the S&P's 500 Index.
Id. at 319.
The SEC also has rejected the argument that disclosure may inhibit discussions:
In our view, this concern is overstated, and does not justify deeming such talks
not material. In the first place, in many cases even material negotiations need
not be disclosed, and many of the situations where disclosure is required-such
as where the company is engaged in trading or has already made a corporate
statement-are in the control of the corporation. If a company refrains from
trading in its stock, and does not otherwise make statements regarding corpo-
rate developments, it should usually be able to negotiate in secrecy. Second,
even if some facts regarding negotiations have to be disclosed, many details,
including the identity of the other party to the talks and the precise terms dis-
cussed, may often remain secret.
Michael's Memorandum supra note 326, at 8 (footnote omitted). See also Amicus Brief, supra
note 309, at 16-18 (same effect).
Likewise, in In the Matter of Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801 (July 8, 1985) the SEC
stated its belief that "Heublein was wrongly decided," id. at 87,596 n.8, and noted that
issuers confronted with requests for explanations from the press in the face of unusual
market activity in its stock or takeover rumors may respond with "no comment" in ap-
propriate circumstances, id. at 87,595 n.6. Although a "no comment" may be viewed as
an affirmance of suspicions that there is in fact an event pending, the alternative is to
allow a denial which could be clearly false or misleading. This result cannot be tolerated
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courts not only have developed varying standards between different
circuits, but they have employed different standards for different
types of soft information within the same circuit. For example, in
the Third Circuit, under Staffin and Heublein, preliminary merger dis-
cussions are not material until an "agreement in principle" has been
reached, 2 whereas, under Flynn, the materiality of asset appraisals
is determined by balancing the potential harm against the need for
disclosure."3 Moreover, these attempts. at certainty still allow much
under the securities laws. Moreover, if explanations for price movement are being re-
quested, the need for disclosure is probably acute, whereas the 'information' given by a
"no comment" response should cause minimal concern to those who view the advance-
ment of merger negotiations as paramount.
329. 672 F.2d at 1205-07; 742 F.2d at 756.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 268-71. The Seventh Circuit also applies
varying standards. Under Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981), earnings projections are either per se nondisclosable or are
judged by a reasonable certainty test. Compare supra note 185 and text accompanying
notes 183-85 with supra note 217 and accompanying text. However, the Seventh Circuit
has adopted the price/structure rule for merger negotiations. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814
F.2d 1169, 1175-77 (7th Cir. 1987).
Indeed, the Flamm standard does not apply even in all cases in the Seventh Circuit
involving merger negotiations. Prior to Flamm, in Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185,
1194-97 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986), the Seventh Circuit held that
the policy considerations which had been articulated by other courts to support a
price/structure rule do not apply to disclosure of merger negotiations to the other party
to a privately negotiated transaction where the issuer's securities are not publicly traded.
After Flamm the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the Michaels holding in Jordan v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1987), because "[a] closed corporation may
disclose to an investor without alerting the public at large, so that disclosure does not
injure investors as a whole," i.e., potentially frustrate merger negotiations. This ration-
ale would apply in any face-to-face transaction, regardless of whether the issuer's securi-
ties are publicly traded. Id. at 431 ("the face-to-face negotiations allow the investor to
elicit the information he requires . . . while permitting the firm to extract promises of
confidentiality that safeguard the negotiations."). Thus, the Flamm rationale, based on
policies that the Seventh Circuit sees as significant-rather than the user-oriented dis-
closure standard of TSC Industries-creates potential exceptions and confusion. See Jor-
dan, 815 F.2d at 444-52 (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that no duty to disclose
anything existed because the plaintiff was under a contractual obligation as an employee
of the company to resell his stock at book value when he left the company's employ and
he could be fired at will).
Moreover, the policy considerations that form the basis for Flamm arguably do not
apply to any insider trading situation, since an insider is forbidden to trade and to dis-
close the information. Thus, the issuer is not in need of the price/structure rule in order
to keep negotiations secret in the case of insider trading. See Amicus Brief, supra note
309, at 15 n.15:
The policy considerations articulated by the Third and Seventh Circuits do not
apply in all fraud cases. In particular, they do not apply in an insider trading
case, since a corporate insider need not make disclosure at all (indeed, it proba-
bly would be a breach of duty to do so), but can simply refrain from trading.
See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 227. Thus, a separate objection
•.. to skewing the definition of materiality on account of these policy consider-
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room for disagreement and litigation, especially since they en-
courage not disclosure, but testing the waters by venturing close to
the line before making disclosure. Finally, at some point, a concern
for certainty for management becomes inconsistent with a user-ori-
ented standard and the full-disclosure philosophy of the federal se-
curities laws. 33'
The probability/magnitude test recognizes the realities of in-
vestor decisionmaking and provides a user-oriented standard for de-
termining the materiality of all types of soft information. It is
flexible and may be applied in any context and to all types of future-
oriented information. The test allows consideration of the reliabil-
ity issue, yet provides a structure that should safeguard against this
issue's dominating the primary inquiry. That inquiry, consistent
with TSC Industries, should be into the likelihood that the informa-
tion would be considered significant by a reasonable shareholder.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite a wealth of relevant SEC policy statements and federal
court decisions, soft information disclosure remains a controversial
topic. The early prohibition on the use of soft information in SEC
disclosure documents focused on concern over the reliability of in-
formation based on subjective judgments. The SEC was also con-
cerned that soft information, even if reasonably reliable, would
cause investor misunderstanding and, because of its subjectivity,
would prove difficult to review. The Commission's policy was rou-
tinely cited by the courts as the basis for rejecting claims for disclo-
sure. The judiciary thus gained little experience in exploring the
materiality of soft information in early decisions.
ations is that doing so would make the same facts material in some legal con-
texts but not others, a result for which there is no warrant. The alternative,
applying the agreement in principle test in all cases, would allow insider trading
on highly significant information about pending acquisitions.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 284-86. The SEC echoed these concerns in its
amicus brief in Levinson:
Some measure of uncertainty is inherent in the Northway [TSC Industries] test of
materiality because decisions about whether corporate information is material
depend on all the circumstances. Any rule that makes a single event (such as
the reaching of an agreement in principle) the conclusive determinant of mate-
riality in all cases will either excuse some falsehoods about significant matters
or impose liability on account of misstatements of trivial information, a result
against which Northway cautioned.
Amicus Brief, supra note 309, at 16 (footnote omitted). See also 1977 REPORT, supra note
1, at 327 (advising the SEC "to avoid the quest for certainty and to continue considera-
tion of materiality on a case-by-case basis").
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Unable to deny the significance of forward-looking information,
the SEC reevaluated and reversed its policy, thus undermining the
basis for prior judicial decisions. In light of this development, grow-
ing investor sophistication, the efficiency of present-day markets in
pricing securities and evaluating soft information, and the increas-
ing number of corporate takeovers and other unique and complex
corporate transactions, the courts should now strive to develop a
materiality standard for future-oriented information that is consis-
tent with the full and fair disclosure goals of the federal securities
laws.
The probability/magnitude materiality test, already accepted in
various judicial decisions and by the SEC, is consistent with the dis-
closure goals of the securities laws and provides an investor-ori-
ented analysis of the potential risk and return that a particular item
of future-oriented information may indicate under different circum-
stances. Since this test provides a realistic appraisal of the investor
decisionmaking process, it should not be difficult for corporate
management to apply in making disclosure decisions. Management
itself no doubt makes such an analysis in considering whether to
pursue a particular business opportunity. Moreover, so long as
management's disclosure is in good faith and has a reasonable basis,
liability will not attach to predictive statements that do not
eventuate.
Future-oriented and soft information can be extremely relevant
to investors. Neither the outdated policy concerns once advanced
to prohibit disclosure of such information nor the more realistic
concern for management liability can justify incomplete or mislead-
ing disclosure. The judiciary must now move beyond the SEC's
prior policy concerns and develop a user-oriented standard of mate-
riality that assures investors that they will receive the full disclosure
they need to judge the future potential-and thus the present
worth-of their investment.
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